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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the psychological processes involved in 
responding to survey questions. Minor variations in questions 
have been shown to lead to variation in responses. These 
findings are inconsistent with the assumption that survey 
questions are tapping stable responses. Recently,
psychological theories have been used to provide an 
explanation for these response effects.
Research applying psychological theory to survey response is 
reviewed, covering research on both behavioural and 
attitudinal questions. These reviews illustrate a
reconceptualisation of the basis of the survey response. The 
need for more detailed data on the response process is 
identified. Verbal reports are identified as a potential 
method for producing process data, yet, uncertainty over their 
validity is noted. The use of verbal reports as data is then 
reviewed, covering both their historical and more recent use.
In the present research verbal report techniques are first 
experimentally examined to find an appropriate technique for 
obtaining process data in surveys. Think-aloud techniques are 
then used to examine the processes involved in responding to 
questions. A split-ballot questionnaire was administered, 
varying a number of questionnaire features where response 
effects have been hypothesised or shown to occur. Generally, 
the verbal protocols showed processing differences between the
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different question forms, and provided information about 
general types of cognitive processing during response.
The next study moved on to look at context effects for 
attitudinal questions. An experiment was carried out in which 
a number of factors hypothesised to be influential in 
producing context effects were examined. A questionnaire was 
administered via computer and response latencies were 
measured. The results provide further information about the 
nature of context effects at attitude questions.
The findings from this study are then discussed in terms of 
the methodologies used, the specific response effects 
addressed, and the survey response process generally.
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INTRODUCTION
This investigation concerns the application of psychological 
theory and methods to the understanding of survey methodology. 
Survey methods have a long history of use both as a research 
tool within the social sciences as well as for data collection 
in other areas. Research examining the reliablity of this 
method has shown that small variations to survey questions can 
lead to differences in response (Schuman & Presser, 1981). 
For example, small changes in question wording, in the type of 
response options provided or in the context in which the 
question is asked can produce differences in response. These 
findings are described in Chapter one.
Attempts to explain these findings have led to the application 
of psychological theory to survey methods, which has the 
broader aim of understanding of the processes which produce 
response to questions. Chapter one discusses assumptions and 
theories about the processes which produce responses to survey 
questions. Research within the CASM (Cognitive Aspects of 
Survey Methodology) framework is then reviewed. Survey 
questions include questions about behaviour and attitudes. 
Chapter one reviews work within the CASM framework which looks 
at the processes involved in response to behavioural 
questions. Conceptions of attitudes are then discussed and 
research focusing on context effects for attitude questions is 
reviewed.
Attempts to explain the cognitive processes which occur during 
response to survey questions leads to the need to provide data
14
on these processes. To date most research has relied on 
indirect, response data on processing. In part this thesis 
aims to explore methods for providing information on response 
processes. Verbal protocols are identified as a potential 
method. Yet this method has been surrounded by controversy 
throughout its history of use in psychology. Chapter 2 
explores the controversies surrounding the use of verbal 
protocols and indicates how the use of verbal reports applies 
to survey methods.
Chapter 3 reports on an experimental investigation of the use 
of different verbal report techniques in the survey. It aims 
to provide the basis for choosing a suitable method for use in 
surveys. Qualitative assessments are made of the techniques 
in terms of their validity as reports of ongoing processing. 
Assessments of the completeness of the verbal reports are also 
made. A methodology for think aloud protocols is developed 
from this experiment and is used in subsequent studies.
Chapters 4 and 5 report a study which uses think aloud reports 
with split ballot questionnaires. A number of response issues 
concerning both behavioural and attitudinal questions are 
addressed. In some cases hypotheses concerning particular 
questions were drawn from split-ballot surveys, in other cases 
untested questions which addressed particular issues were 
used. These included issues of the influence of response 
scales on response, assimilation and contrast effects, and the 
order in which questions are asked. The aim is not to explore 
one response effect in detail but to address a range of
issues.
Chapters 6 and 7 move Qn_£rom verbal^xepor t s to a different 
method. Perhaps the major issue in response effects for 
attitudinal questions is context effects. Context effects can 
arise when previous questions influence the response to later 
questions. A response effect can be shown when different 
previous questions, or contexts, produce different responses 
to a particular question. Context effects may be in the 
direction of assimilation, producing responses consistent with 
the previous context, or they may be in the direction of 
contrast, producing responses contrary to the previous 
context. In part, these effects, and the direction of the 
effect, may depend on the amount of time and cognitive effort 
a respondent brings to the answering task. Think-aloud 
protocols were deemed inappropriate for exploring such a
factor. Thus, a split ballot questionnaire was used with 
manipulations, and measurement, of response time. A number of 
factors which have been suggested to be influential in 
producing context effects were addressed.
Finally chapter 8 reviews the findings of the studies. The
methods used in this study are reviewed as to their 
appropriateness for exploring response processes in the 
survey. The findings are discussed in terms of the specific 
types of response effects addressed and in terms of the
response process in general. Suggestions are made as to what 
factors are likely to be important considerations in response 
effects, as well as a discussion of the survey more generally.
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CHAPTER 1: THE SURVEY METHOD
SUMMARY
The assumptions traditionally seen as underlying the 
survey method are discussed. Contradictory findings 
which undermine these assumptions are reviewed, 
illustrating a need to reconsider the basis of survey 
response. Explanations of the survey response in 
terms of psychological theory are discussed and 
research using psychological theory to explain survey 
response is reviewed. The need for a
reconceptualisation of survey measurement is discussed 
in light of this review.
1.1 WHAT KIND OF METHOD IS THE SURVEY METHOD?
Asking questions and giving answers to questions is a fairly 
mundane activity; people do it all the time. Survey research 
has taken this basic activity and developed it into a research 
method. Essentially the survey elicits information from 
people by asking them questions, and this simple technique is 
one of the most widely used research tools. Surveys provide 
information about people's behaviours, attitudes, beliefs, 
states of mind etc. They provide information that is often 
used as the basis for policy, marketing, and other decisions, 
as well as providing an important research tool in the social 
sciences.
Central to the use of survey questioning is the belief that 
people can answer questions reliably and validly. That is,
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the responses offered to the questions posed are meaningful. 
This belief essentially rests on two assumptions. The first 
assumption is quite aptly put by Fischhoff (1991) when, in 
discussing the measurement of values, he asks the question "is 
there anything in there?". He describes a continuum of 
philosophies on the expression of values from the philosophy 
of articulated values to that of basic values. The former 
assumes that people have answers to the questions they are 
asked whilst the latter assumes that usually they do not, but 
must rather derive responses from more basic values. 
Different positions along this continuum have led to different 
research paradigms. Fischhoff places survey researchers at 
the articulated values end of the continuum. That is survey 
researchers have faith that there is something "in there". A 
second, related assumption is that what is in there can, in 
principle, be "got out'.
This belief by survey researchers that respondents can give 
meaningful answers concerns not only answers to value 
questions, but extends to other types of questions asked on 
surveys, including those addressing behaviours and attitudes. 
Given the assumption that there is something 'in there' to be 
"got out" the focus in survey research has been how to "get 
out" what is already "in there".
Brenner (1982) applies the stimulus - response analogy to 
survey response, whilst noting that survey response is more 
complex. In these terms the problem is to find the right 
stimulus to elicit the desired response. One central tenet is
that a questionnaire must be standardised; each respondent 
must receive exactly the same question, or stimulus. Even 
minor differences might mean that a different stimulus has 
been administered and thus, as Fischhof puts it, "Any slip 
could evoke a precise, thoughtful answer to the wrong 
question" (1991, p839).
Essentially, problems encountered with survey results, for 
example slightly different wordings leading to different 
responses, were not treated as problems with respondents' 
inability to produce a response, but as technical problems 
with the questionnaire itself. Hyman for instance says: "when 
the original conception is good, technical errors in 
interviewing or in the construction of questionnaires can 
damage the results, but these are technical problems only" 
(1954, p666). Similarly, Lazarsfeld (1944), in defending the 
merits of both depth interviewing and closed survey 
questioning, was concerned with getting a picture of the 
respondent's 'real' attitude.
Producing a good questionnaire was not assumed to be an easy 
task. Many textbooks describing the techniques of survey 
design were produced (eg Hyman, 1955; Payne, 1951). The focus 
was on how to get questions, and interviews, right. For 
example, methods for producing unbiased questions were 
developed (Suchman & Guttman, 1947). These considerations 
aimed to produce the best method of getting at what is there 
without leading the respondent away from his or her true 
response.
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Not only questions but also interviewers, could bias results 
by, for example, suggesting answers to respondents. Work on 
interviewer effects is analogous to concerns in experimental 
psychology with the effects of experimenter bias (Rosenberg, 
1969; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1969). Interviewers are thus 
trained to read the questions exactly as presented and to 
exert no directive influence on the respondent.
However, there were concerns other than simply the correctness 
of the instrument and its administration. Whether the 
respondent was telling the truth was another concern (Hyman, 
1944). Again this reflects the general idea that a response 
is there, but the concern is whether the respondent is willing 
to report it accurately. This underlying assumption of the 
ability of the respondent to answer, if they want to, is shown 
in a study of voting behaviour (Miller, 1952). Comparing 
reported behaviour to actual behaviour it was found that 22 
people had 'lied'. That is they reported that they had voted 
when in fact they had not. There is no other explanation 
offered for this discrepancy (eg the respondent could not 
remember and so misreported) . The assumption is that they 
could have reported accurately if they had wanted to, but for 
some reason they did not want to. Guarding against lying, and 
associated motivational biases, also became important to 
survey researchers. Much work examined the various kinds of 
response sets that affected people's responses to questions. 
Greenberg & Folger (1988) compare this work on response sets 
to that on subject roles in the experimental situation (Orne, 
1962; Weber & Cook, 1972). Thus, as in experiments, one had
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to protect respondents from undue pressures to respond in a 
particular way. Given the right question in a situation free 
from biasing factors, respondents could report what they 
thought or did relatively unproblematically.
In part this characterisation of survey research is 
simplified. Early researchers raised as a possibility the 
question of whether there was really anything there to be 
measured; if only in passing they suggested that people might 
answer attitude questions off the top of their head (eg 
Sanford, 1951). Later research on non-attitudes (Converse, 
1974) made this question a more salient and central issue. 
Memory problems associated with asking retrospective questions 
were also recognised (eg Kendall & Lazarsfeld, 1954). 
However, although these issues were considered, they did not 
provoke a reconceptualisation of what was being measured. The 
implications of these issues were not fully pursued. The 
crucial issue of what if anything was "in there' was largely 
side-lined.
However, research findings showing response effects were still 
found, even with good questions developed and administered by 
experienced survey practitioners. Much of the instigation for 
a rethink of survey methodological assumptions has come from 
the accumulated evidence of such response effects. Survey 
researchers found anomalous results and had no coherent 
explanation for them. I now want to look briefly at the 
types of response effects that have led to such a rethink,
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before moving on to look at the more recent attempts to 
understand the survey response process.
1.1.2 Anomalies -- 'errors' in measurement
Bradburn (1985) distinguishes two major sources of errors in 
surveys: sampling and non-sampling errors. The latter he
further divides into errors due to failures in executing the 
sample and errors due to other factors, which are better 
termed response effects. There is a good deal of knowledge 
about sampling error and errors associated with the sample, 
but much less is known about the possible biasing effects 
involved in responding.
Response effects have generally been conceived of as occurring 
during the interview and have been ascribed to three sources: 
the interviewer, the respondent and the task (Bradburn and 
Sudman, 1979). Interactions between these elements can also 
be a source of error. Research on effects due to the 
interviewer has included both extra-role characteristics, such 
as race (eg. Hagenaars and Heinen, 1982) and role-restricted 
characteristics such as misreading the question (eg. Brenner, 
1982) , or style of interviewing (Dijkstra, Van der Veen, & Van 
der Zouwen, 1985) . Research on effects due to the respondent 
has also included demographic characteristics (eg. Gove, 1982) 
and other, more psychological, factors such as motivation and 
self-serving biases (eg. Phillips and Clancy, 1972).
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Although there has been much research on these factors, with 
equivocal results, the task itself seems to be the most 
important source of response effects (Bradburn, 1985) .
The task can include mode of administration, where, typically, 
research has been equivocal about the difference in response 
effects for different modes (Cannell, 1985a). One can also 
focus on the questionnaire as the task, and, indeed, much of 
the research on response effects due to the task concentrates 
on this area.
In general, the questionnaire involves three areas where 
response effects may occur. These are the question wording, 
the response alternatives, and the context of the question. 
Several comprehensive reviews of research on these areas 
exist (eg Turner and Martin, 1984; Schuman and Presser, 1981). 
Generally, changes, often minor changes, to any of these 
questionnaire features can sometimes have substantial effects 
on the distribution of responses.
Differences to the wording of a question can, for example, 
result in the questions tapping different aspects of a 
multifaceted issue (Turner and Martin, 1984). Very minor 
wording differences may also produce different results, for 
example, using either the word 'welfare' or the word 'poor' 
(Smith, 1987). A classic example of wording effects is a 
question asking either whether the US should forbid public 
speeches against democracy, or asking whether they should not
- 23
allow them. Different results were obtained with the 
different wordings (Rugg, 1941; Schuman and Presser, 19 81) .
Differences in results have also been obtained by changing the 
response categories offered. A number of changes in response 
categories have been shown to affect responses. For example, 
offering a middle category, and its position in the list of 
options (Bishop, 1987), and explicitly including or excluding 
a 'don't know' category (Schuman and Scott, 1989).
More subtle, yet equally substantial, effects have been 
obtained by altering the context in which a question is asked. 
A classic example of this is the 'communist reporter' question 
(Schuman and Presser, 1981; Schuman, Kalton, & Ludwig, 1983) . 
If people are asked first whether a communist country should 
allow American reporters to send news to America, they are 
then more likely to approve of allowing communist reporters to 
send news from America than if the order of questions is 
reversed.
The kinds of effects described above have led survey 
researchers to reconsider the assumptions on which survey 
methods are based. As Schuman et al (1983) say they have been 
"forced to regard the problem of context as a matter of real 
substantive importance rather than a technical issue". The 
faith in technical solutions had been shaken; the search for 
alternate, coherent explanations was instigated.
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Although there were always attempts to explain the various 
response effects that occur (for example, Schuman and Presser 
(1981) explain the context effects produced by the communist 
reporter questions by suggesting that it evokes a norm of 
reciprocity) these explanations have tended to be fragmentary 
and lacking a coherent theoretical basis. One of the many 
recommendations made by Turner and Martin (1984) for improving 
our understanding of the survey is the need for theoretically 
based research. This research is needed in order to 
understand why effects that have been demonstrated occur, but 
also to guide the selection of factors that may be related to 
response effects. Given that the assumptions underlying 
surveys have been shown to be questionable, what should we 
assume underlies survey response?
1.2 COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF SURVEY METHODOLOGY -  
A NEW THEORY OF SURVEY RESPONSE?
Two conceptualisations of the survey have emerged, which 
approach the problem from different perspectives, and, 
perhaps, at different levels. On the one hand, coming from 
more sociological perspectives are conceptualisations
regarding the interview as a communicative event (Briggs, 
1986; Mishler, 1986; Suchman & Jordan, 1992). These 
approaches concentrate on the interview, rather than for 
example self-completion questionnaires. Briggs presents a 
model of the interview that locates it within a social 
context, involving types of communicative events and social 
situations, as well as the goals of participants and their
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roles. He argues that interviews largely involve indexical 
meaning, that is, meaning tied to a context (for the research 
interview the context is previous questions as well as the 
surrounding situation) . However, the standard survey approach 
is to treat interviews as though they involve referential 
meaning (ie. meaning not tied to a particular context) . 
Neglecting the contextual nature of interaction distorts the 
interpretation placed on responses. Mishler (1986) , similarly, 
suggests that a survey interview involves the joint 
construction of meaning by participants. He argues that the 
practices of survey interviewing (standardisation, limited 
interviewer involvement, etc.) deny this construction of 
meaning and undermine the validity of responses.
In this view there is not necessarily a conceptualisation of 
what respondents intrinsically can and cannot report, but 
rather the focus is upon the problems of the interview as a 
form through which views are expressed. The survey interview, 
as currently conducted, constitutes a barrier to valid 
reporting. The suggestion is that survey interview practices 
must be changed away from standardised practices to practices 
that allow exchanges between respondent and interviewer to 
determine joint understanding. The focus is on social 
interaction, with an emphasis on language. Whilst I think 
this conceptualisation has something to offer in explaining 
the problems inherent in this interaction, it is also limited 
in scope and thus limited in the problems it can address. It 
tends to reach neither beyond itself to explore the social 
structures that may shape response to various issues nor
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within itself to explore the variety of individual factors 
that shape response.
On the other hand, drawing on cognitive and social psychology, 
is a conceptualisation of the survey largely in terms of the 
cognitive processes underlying responses. This approach has 
received far more research attention than the approach
described above, and it is this approach that will be 
discussed further. The application of psychology to survey 
practice was in part a direct effort by survey researchers to 
deal with the problems of response effects, but also it was 
seen by psychologists as a way of exploiting surveys for 
cognitive psychological research (Loftus, Fienberg and Tanur,
1985) . It was thus through the joint efforts of survey 
researchers and psychologists that this research programme 
developed (Jabine, Straf, Tanur, & Tourangeau, 1984; Jobe & 
Mingay, 1991) . The outcome of this effort has been the
development of research that attempts to provide a general 
theoretical framework for the explanation of response 
behaviour in the survey in terms of psychological processes.
It might be suggested that early survey researchers' 
conceptualisation of response processes lacked sophistication. 
However, it might also be claimed that the psychological
theories extant at the time may not have been up to the task 
of offering a much more sophisticated conceptualisation. The 
present approach draws heavily on recent work in cognition and 
especially social cognition. This area adopts, at least by 
analogy, an information processing approach to cognition
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(Hamilton, Devine & Ostrom, 1994). Generally, the conception 
of the cognitive system is a dynamic one, where various 
aspects of the cognitive system interact (Wyer & Srull, 1986) . 
The information drawn on can be abstract or particular, (eg 
schemas, or MOPS, Schank, 1987; exemplars Kahneman & Miller,
1986). The way information is structured is also considered. 
Distinctions have been made between different types of 
processing, for example controlled or automatic (Schneider & 
Shiffrin, 1977) , deliberate or spontaneous (Dovidio & Fazio, 
1992), where some types of thinking are more thoughtful and 
others more unconscious. But also, the way information is 
processed can vary for example between being memory-based or 
on-line (Hastie & Park, 19 86). Judgements can draw on stored 
information or be constructed on-line. Increasing emphasis is 
placed on the context in which processing occurs (Branscombe, 
1988; Linville & Carlston, 1994; Kolers & Roediger, 1984) . 
Context can influence what information is processed, and also 
how it is processed. A further development is the increasing 
focus on more naturalistic memory with the development of 
research into autobiographical and everyday memory (Cohen, 
1989; Rubin, 1986). Thus, in this view the focus is on 
explaining phenomena by reference to the mental processes and 
structures by which they operate (Hamilton, Devine & Ostrom, 
1994) . The type of information processed, how it is 
structured, and the type of processing engaged in is 
important, and all are seen as being interrelated. 
Increasingly attention is given to the context of processing, 
and to the processing of more everyday experience.
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In this view what is 'in there' can take various forms, from 
relatively discrete instances to more generic structures that 
can be retrieved for judgement. But also, it is not
necessarily assumed that there is anything in there; 
judgements may be ad hoc constructions. Getting information 
out, similarly, can involve a variety of types of processes, 
and these may interact with the current context. The question 
of what is 'in there' and if and how whatever is in there can 
be 'got out' is largely an empirical question.
Attempts to understand response effects within this 
theoretical framework are related more generally to the way 
people respond to (survey) questions, ie the psychological 
processes of responding. Response effects become not just 
problems in a survey, but psychological phenomena in their own 
right. The goal is to understand the response process. A 
first step in this direction was taken by speculating about 
the general processes required in the production of a response 
to a question. The process of responding to survey questions 
has been broken down into several subtasks (Tourangeau 1984, 
1987; Cannell 1985b) . Four general processes have been
proposed: comprehension, retrieval, judgement and response.
First, Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) suggest, respondents 
need to understand what the question refers to; what it means. 
Thus the meaning of a question is not a given but is rather a 
process engaged in by the respondent. Secondly, respondents 
must recall or reconstruct relevant information from memory. 
The information accessed to answer a question may rely upon a
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variety of memory processes. Thirdly, the question may call 
for a judgement requiring a manipulation or combination of 
retrieved information. Judgemental processes such as 
information integration or a variety of heuristics may be 
used. Finally, the respondent must select a response. In 
part, this may involve mapping an answer onto a response 
scale. A second aspect of this fourth stage is editing the 
response, for example, in terms of self-serving biases and 
consistency with previous responses. While these stages in 
the response proces are described sequentially, it is assumed 
that there may be feedback loops from later to earlier stages.
I now want to look in detail at research aimed at 
understanding survey response from the psychological 
perspective. To do this I divide the area by the type of 
question being investigated, namely questions that ask for 
reports of behaviour and those that ask for reports of 
attitudes, opinions, or other subjective states. I will start 
with a review of work on behavioral questions. This review is 
meant to give a general flavour for the lines of research 
herein. I will then review work on attitudes, opinions, and 
other subjective states. This starts with a review of the 
nature of attitudes and continues to look at work in CASM 
(Cognitive Aspects of Survey Methodology) exploring the 
reporting of attitudes. I then want to draw out some general 
points about the research in the CASM programme, both with 
respect to behavioral and attitudinal questions and responses.
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1.3 BEHAVIORAL QUESTIONS
Surveys often include questions that ask respondents to 
provide estimates of some aspect of their behaviour. 
Variously termed behavioral frequency questions or 
quantitative autobiographical questions, these type of 
questions are aimed at measuring how often respondents engage 
in a behaviour. They range from reports of infrequent 
behaviours (eg. number of dental visits, or number of crime 
victimisations) to relatively mundane behaviours (eg. amount 
of alcohol consumed or hours of television viewed), and, from 
more objective to subjective behaviours (eg number of 
household appliances purchased or number of times pain is 
experienced).
There are also differences in the kind of report requested. 
Some questions call for very accurate estimates of the 
frequency of a behaviour in a given period; others may ask for 
the rate of occurrence (eg once a month) rather than absolute 
frequency. Others might ask for more general estimates of the 
rate of occurrence using vague quantifiers (eg sometimes, 
rarely). Some questions ask about the respondent's usual 
behaviour, and some questions ask for comparative estimates of 
behaviour, for example, behaviour now versus in the past, or 
compared to other people.
It is assumed that, at least in principle, there can be a 
correct answer to these questions; people have actually 
engaged in a certain amount of behaviour, which could,
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theoretically, be accurately counted. However, usually there 
are no other corroborating sources of information; the 
person's report is the only source of information. Thus the 
accuracy of the report is more central for these types of 
questions.
1.3.1 Strategies for producing behavioral frequency estimates
The application of cognitive theory to measuring behaviour in 
the survey begins by looking at memory. Theories of memory 
play an important role in examining behavioral questions. 
Expectations about the types of strategies used to respond, 
how accurate the answer is, and where sources of inaccuracy 
are likely to come from, depend a great deal on the model of 
memory used. Ideally if a respondent is asked to provide a 
response to a question about how often a behaviour occurs the 
respondent should recall and count each incidence of the 
behaviour over the relevant time span. This is known as
episode enumeration;) This implies a search and retrieve model 
of memory. Memories must be assumed to record an event and 
store it as it happened. Retrieval involves having the
appropriate cues to access the record, and often these cues 
are not available, hence people can fail to retrieve
potentially available material, so called errors of ommission.
This model of memory does not however, appear to be an 
entirely appropriate one. Tulving (19 83) distinguished
between episodic and semantic memory. The latter involves 
general knowledge. The former is the type of memory assumed 
to store events or episodes in detail. Thus, it would be this
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type of memory that would be associated with recall of 
behavioural episodes. However, episodes tend not to remain at 
the level of discrete events. Neisser (1986) describes how 
event memories are nested within molar memories. Invariant 
properties of episodes are abstracted across repeated events 
and these abstractions become more accessible than the 
individual events from which they were derived. Others see 
this shift from instance to generality as a transition from 
episodic to semantic memory (Linton, 1986). Both, however, 
agree that with repetition discrete instances become difficult 
to recall.
However, it is not simply the lack of retrieval cues and the 
indistinguishability of different episodes which can cause 
problems. Memory involves not only retrieval but
reconstruction (Bartlett, 1932; Mead, 1934) . Memories are not 
simply stored but can be constructed from schemas and from the 
contexts in which one encodes and retrieves the event. In 
this model memories can change in both content and form; it 
is possible to 'recall' events which never happened. The task 
for those investigating survey response is to examine how such 
constructive or schematic memory mechanisms influence reports 
of behaviours. And, furthermore, it leads one to look at 
other types of processes which may be occurring. If 
respondents are not simply retrieving episodes, they may be 
using other types of strategies to infer the amount of a 
behaviour. These strategies need to be identified and 
evaluations of the accuracy of these strategies determined.
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Much of the work done on behavioural questions has examined 
estimates of the absolute frequency of a behaviour within a 
particular time span. These types of questions are often of 
particular concern to survey researchers. The main types of 
errors which occur with these questions are omissions of 
relevant behaviours, underreporting, and the incorrect 
inclusion of irrelevant behaviours, overreporting, or errors 
of commission. Omissions are most commonly seen as due to 
retrieval failure whereas incorrect inclusions are often due 
to the misdating of an event that occurred outside of the 
given reference period. This is usually due to forward 
telescoping where events appear to have happened more recently 
than they actually did.
For episode enumeration the respondent needs the time to 
recall and appropriate cues for recall. Given time and 
repeated attempts respondents can retrieve more instances of 
the desired behaviour from memory (Means, Mingay, Nigam, & 
Zarrow, 19 88) . This poses a problem for survey research where 
there is often little time to contemplate an answer. It is 
also likely that providing appropriate recall cues can 
increase the number of events recalled (Strube, 1987). The 
problem here is finding appropriate recall cues. The best 
cues are those which match encoding circumstances, yet little 
is known about how everyday events are encoded. Social and 
personal factors may be important in determining appropriate 
recall cues. Particular strategies used for searching memory 
have also been found to affect the quality of recall. 
Searching from most to least recent event was found to be
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better than the reverse (Loftus & Fathi, 1985). Presumably 
this is because more recent events provide cues for the recall 
of more distant events. However it was found that the latter, 
sub-optimal strategy was more commonly used.
Dating events is also problematic. Survey researchers often 
bound the recall period with calendar type dates. Yet often 
this type of information is not linked with the memory for an 
event (Strube, 1987). Bounding the period with public or 
personal landmark events has been shown to improve recall 
(Loftus & Marburger, 1983).
However, it is not simply the case that some episodes will be 
left out, but that other strategies will be used to estimate 
the amount of behaviour. For example, Smith, Jobe and Mingay 
(1991) reporting research on dietary memory, suggest that 
respondents often report on the basis of generic knowledge, 
what they typically eat, rather than on the basis of specific 
memories of what was actually eaten. This type of reporting 
seemed to increase for longer retention intervals. Means and 
Loftus (1991) looked at the recall strategies used to answer 
questions about medical and dental visits which varied in 
their likely frequency. They found that recall of individual 
events decreased with the number of events reported whilst 
rule based estimation strategies were more likely to be used 
for more frequent events and, to some extent, for dental 
visits which may be a more regularly occurring event.
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Thus estimations of the amount of a behaviour rely not only on 
the recall of episodes of that behaviour but also rely on
knowledge, for example, relies on inferences from normal 
behaviour. Thus as well as looking at memory and how the 
structure of memory may lead to errors in reports of 
behaviour, one also needs to look at the types of inference 
strategies people use and how these may lead to bias.
Based on theories and research in other areas of cognitive 
psychology, a number of possible strategies have been 
identified. These include strategies based on a number of 
judgemental heuristics as well as more theory based 
strategies.
There are a variety of types of judgmental heuristics which
decomposition strategy breaks the problem down into different 
elements. For example, if asked to report the number of 
shopping trips made, respondents might break it down into type 
of shopping trip, food shopping, clothes shopping etc. This 
type of strategy is likely to lead to inaccuracies when the 
categories used for decomposition are not exhaustive. 
However, it might provide a method for improving behavioural 
reports. Means and Loftus (1991) found estimates of health 
visits improved when respondents were encouraged to use time­
line and decomposition techniques.
reference strategieiP*to generate estimates. Use of generic
may be used for answering behavioural questions. A
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With the ^ HXfaiJLabi 1 it~S) heuristic the ease with which an 
instance comes to mind is taken as indicative of its frequency 
of occurrence (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) . Problems
associated with availability stem from the overrespresentation 
of salient instances.
WithQanchoring and adjustments the respondent picks a number
(perhaps based on the response alternatives or on some other 
judgemental strategy) and 'adjusts' due to recognised
deviations. The problem here is that adjustments are usually
not enough; the anchor tends to over-influence the estimate 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 19 74).
Bradburn, Rips and Shevell (1987) report that decomposition 
strategies have been observed in responses to survey
questions, as well as anchoring and adjustment. However, they 
do not report conditions or question types which influence the 
use of these strategies, nor how prevalent these strategies 
are. Burton and Blair (1991) compare the use of episode 
enumeration and other strategies. They found that those
reporting fewer target behaviours used more episode 
enumeration; a longer reference period produced less 
enumeration, and giving more time to respond produced somewhat 
more enumeration. They report the use of strategies which 
involve a combination of episode enumeration and adding an 
amount to that recalled on the basis of the availability 
heuristic. Strategies based on rates of occurrence and direct 
estimation were also observed. Their results are also 
suggestive of a differential use of episode enumeration
depending on the type of behaviour being measured, eg 
characteristics such as distinctiveness and regularity.
These results echo those of Smith et al (1991) and Means and 
Loftus (1991). The more behaviours there are to count the 
less likely they will be enumerated and the more likely some 
other judgemental strategy will be used. This may reflect 
both a lack of cognitive effort by respondents, and the 
schematic nature of memory organisation.
Other types of inference processes rely more on people's
behaviour (and attitudes) people may rely on their present 
position and the use of subjective theories of stability and 
change (Conway & Ross, 19 84). Their estimates will be based 
on whether they believe the behaviour, or the self in regard 
to the behaviour, is likely to be stable or to have changed.
General world theories or normative expectations may also 
affect reports. Pearson, Ross and Dawes (1992) discuss 
research on stressful events. They suggest that most past 
research which has relied on retrospective reports of stress 
over long time periods found differences between men and women 
because people's reports were influenced by their theories of 
how men and women deal with stress and what they find 
stressful. A study by Hamilton and Faggot (1988) which asked 
about stresses the previous day found no such sex related 
differences, providing some support for Pearson et al's
theories of the world. In estimating past and present
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proposition. That is recall of recent stressful events, a 
simpler memory task, showed less use of schematic models than 
recall of more distant stressful events.
Lay theories of memory may also play a part in estimates of 
behaviour. If an instance is not recalled a respondent may 
decide that the failure to recall is simply due to the 
difficulty of recalling a particular instance rather than 
being due to the instance not having occured.
There is a body of research dealing with the strategies people 
use to report behavioural frequencies and under what 
circumstances they use them. In order to investigate which 
strategies are actually used it is necessary to use some kind 
of process tracing technique (such as think-aloud) and there 
are few studies which apply these techniques to survey 
responses, in part because of uncertainty about verbal 
protocols (Burton and Blair, 1991). The studies reported 
above are unusual in this regard.
So far then we have seen that the time allowed for response 
and the type of behaviour questioned can influence the type of 
strategy adopted. Another aspect of the response situation 
which can influence behavioural reports is the questionnaire 
itself. Aspects of the question which can influence responses 
are its wording and the response scale or categories used.
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1.3.2 Response scales
Schwarz and colleagues have concentrated on the informational 
value of response scales in responding to behavioral frequency 
questions. Through a number of studies they have demonstrated 
two effects of response scales (eg Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz and 
Bienias, 1990).
Firstly, response scales may help respondents interpret the 
meaning of a question^ This is most likely to be the case
— .....  irri-iim it
when questions address a vague, or subjective, behaviour. For 
example, respondents were presented with the question 'how 
often are you annoyed' with either a high or a low frequency 
scale (Schwarz, Stack, Muller, & Chassein, 1988). Respondents 
who received the high frequency scale reported more incidence 
of annoyance than those respondents who received the low 
frequency scale. A 'meaning shift' is hypothesised to occur 
because respondents given the high frequency scale use the 
scale to infer that the behaviour in question is trivial, and 
therefore common, whereas those given the low frequency scale 
interpret the behaviour as being more severe and, therefore, 
less common. In line with this, when asked to provide 
examples of a typical example of an annoying experience, those 
given the low frequency scale reported more severe annoying 
experiences than those given the high frequency scale.
O'Muircheartaigh, Gaskell, and Wright (1992) have extended 
this work to include more substantive topic areas, and less 
extreme scales, using large scale surveys. Initially using 
high and medium frequency scales, with questions on annoyance
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with television adverts, feeling unsafe where they lived, and 
experiencing physical pain, they failed to produce the large 
effects which Schwarz et al (1988) had produced. A further 
experiment varied priming of the topic area (primed or not 
primed), as well as frequency range. Priming questions 
increased the effect of scale frequency. Thus it appears 
that, although differences in frequency scale affect response, 
the effect is magnified by priming the area.
A second way in which response scales may have an impact on 
responses, is by informing respondents about the range of^^ 
behaviour in the population (Schwarz, Hippier, Deutsch & 
Strack, 1985; Schwarz & Bienias, 1990). With unambiguous 
questions, respondents may infer that the response scale 
represents the range of a behaviour in the population. This 
may, or may not affect their response to that particular 
question, but it may also effect responses to later questions. 
For example, Schwarz et al (1985) have shown that giving 
either a high or a low frequency scale for "amount of 
television viewed' affected respondents' subsequent reports on 
questions pertaining to satisfaction with leisure time, and 
how important television was to them. In particular, those 
who reported on a low frequency scale, thus making them seem 
to view more television than average, reported television as 
being more important and reported less satisfaction with their 
leisure time. This 'comparison shift' appears to result from 
respondents taking the scale to represent a sort of usual 
distribution. Upon responding they place themselves within
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that distribution and inferences about other behaviours follow 
from their position in that distribution.
Thus, response scales may both inform the respondent as to the 
meaning of the question and provide information about how the 
respondent compares to others. Response scales should be 
viewed as part of the question, effecting in some cases the 
interpretation of the question to which they are attached, and 
in some cases, affecting responses to subsequent questions, in 
some cases both effects may occur.
This research illustrates how respondents construct responses 
on the basis of the information provided in the situation. 
People are not simply retrieving episodes but are rather 
constructing an estimate.
1.3.3 Summary of behavioural research.
Research on behavioural questions has shown that retrieval of 
behavioural episodes is often a difficult task for 
respondents. In many cases they do not retrieve either 
episodes or estimates of behaviour, but rather construct 
estimates on the basis of a variety of inference strategies. 
Features of the questionnaire, such as the response scales, 
may provide information to respondents that influences their 
judgements. In this way aspects of the questionnaire 
influence reports of behaviour.
The type of behaviour in focus is also important in 
determining the strategy used. Behaviours can be frequent or
infrequent, regular or irregular (other dimensions may also be 
relevant). Different processes may be used to elicit 
estimates of different types of behaviour. What 'type' a 
behaviour is, is likely to depend upon social and personal 
habits. That a behaviour is mundane or unusual is in part a 
social fact. Because our culture has, in general, ready 
access to televisions, television viewing becomes a mundane 
activity. If we lacked such access this behaviour would be an 
infrequent, more memorable occurrence. At this level then the 
characteristics of behaviour are socially defined. But within 
this, there will be individual variations in what type a 
behaviour is. For people in our culture who lack access to a 
television, television viewing may still be an infrequent and 
more memorable occurrence. The importance of this for survey 
measurement is that the type of behaviour we are interested in 
is not manipulable, but rather we need to be sensitive to the 
social characteristics of the behaviour, and possible group 
and individual variations in the behaviour.
1.4 ATTITUDE QUESTIONS
Attitude questions are also very important to surveys. These 
types of questions differ from behavioural questions in that 
they are more subjective, and it is uncertain whether there is 
any accurate answer to these questions. In this section I 
will briefly review theories of attitudes before going on to 
review research within the CASM framework which focuses on 
context effects on attitude questions.
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1.4.1 The nature of attitudes.
The conception of what an attitude is will affect how it is 
measured, and the interpretation of that measurement. In this 
section I want to look at conceptions of attitude in terms of 
their implications for measurement. In particular I want to 
look at what, according to the different conceptions, produces 
the response to an attitude question.
Early attitude theorists saw the attitude as a kind of general 
guiding framework, or mind set, that might underlie many 
activities such as learning, perception and judgement. 
Allport (1935) traces this usage back, in part, to the notion 
of einstellung, or set. This and related concepts (eg 
aufgabe) represent an overall mental preparedness or 
positioning in a task. More specifically, in social 
psychology, especially through the work of Thomas and Zaniecki 
(1918) , the attitude was conceived of as a state of mind of 
the individual towards some stimuli or social object. The 
attitude predisposed a person to evaluate objects in a 
particular way.
To measure an attitude social psychologists needed to get at 
this general state of mind. To do this they would sample from 
the "attitude universe' and select items tapping various 
aspects of the attitude. The attitude was inferred from the 
covariation amongst responses to these items (the more 
behaviouristic theorists regarded the attitude simply as the 
consistency among responses). The point was to sample enough 
of the relevant attitude universe to be able to say something
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about the underlying attitude, rather than merely saying 
something about the responses to particular items. Responses 
to attitude items were assumed to be produced by the attitude. 
Whilst this model did not necessarily rule out the possibility 
of temporary or dynamic attitudes, in practice attitudes 
tended to be regarded as relatively enduring and stable --as 
dispositions.
There were attempts to define more clearly the structure of 
attitudes. Rosenberg and Hovland (1960) proposed that
attitudes were composed of affective, cognitive and behavioral 
components. Thus in measuring an attitude researchers needed 
to sample items from the different components. They also 
suggested that the structure of an attitude may affect its 
stability. In particular Rosenberg (1960) found that low 
affective-cognitive consistency was a feature of attitude 
instability.
One problem of the tripartite structure model is that it 
assumes a relationship between the three components. A one- 
component view of the attitude was proposed by Fishbein & 
Ajzen (1975). In this view attitudes are seen as the 
evaluative component involved in behaviour. Cognitive and 
behavioral components are taken out of the attitude concept; 
beliefs are seen as influencing attitudes which in turn 
influence behavioral intention (along with other factors). 
But this model also has been questioned as presupposing a 
relation between attitude and cognition and behaviour.
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Behaviour for example has been seen as an antecedent of 
attitudes (Bern, 1967; Kelman, 1979).
More recently, the focus has been on attitudes as 
representations in memory involving associative networks. In 
this later view there is often less emphasis on the structure 
of attitudes per se, and more emphasis on general cognitive 
structure. Whilst the attitude still retains its essential 
nature as an evaluation, it is sometimes treated simply as an 
evaluation based on various elements in the cognitive system, 
and sometimes these elements are seen as part of the attitude.
Zanna and Rempel (1988) treat attitudes as evaluations. 
Attitudes involve "the categorisation of a stimulus object 
along an evaluative dimension'. This categorisation is based 
on cognitive and affective information as well as information 
about past behaviour and behavioral intentions.
Pratkanis and Greenwald (1989), regard attitudes as being 
represented in memory by an object label, an evaluative 
summary, and a knowledge structure supporting the evaluation.
Tourangeau and Rasinski (19 88) also regard attitudes as 
structures residing in long term memory, however there may be 
no pre-existing evaluation to draw on but rather the attitude 
/ evaluation may be constructed from elements retrieved at a 
given time. They are not specific as to whether these 
elements are an essential part of the attitude or whether the
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attitude is to be regarded as the evaluation based on these 
elements.
Whatever the disagreement about the exact structure of 
attitudes in memory, however, these various conceptions 
generally agree that the stability of attitudes is in 
question. They regard attitude stability as an empirical 
question. The conception of the cognitive system is a dynamic 
one. Expression of an attitude involves associations amongst 
a variety of cognitive elements. What attitude is expressed 
at any given time depends on the particular associations made. 
Attitudes are often temporary constructions (Wilson & Hodges, 
1992) . Even when an evaluation can be retrieved, exactly what 
is retrieved and how it is expressed is likely to be 
influenced by the measurement context (Feldman & Lynch, 19 88). 
Thus, attitude measurement is no longer seen as simply tapping 
what is already there, but as a process of interaction between 
cognition and the measurement situation; a process that may 
involve constructing an attitude "on-line7.
All these recent attempts to redefine attitudes recognise the 
importance of context in looking at attitudes. Most however 
conceptualise the relationship between attitude and context by 
treating the two as separable entities - - there is an attitude 
and there is the context in which it is reported, or 
constructed. Palmerino, Langer and McGillis (1984) take the 
relation between context and attitudes further. Drawing on 
Lewin7s field theory (1939), they regard attitudes as a 
relationship between the person and an object. Thus the
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attitude is not seen as residing in the person or being held 
by the person, but rather is defined in terms of the 
relationship. They define an attitude as 'a relation between 
two entities [person and object]. Furthermore, these two 
entities not only are attached to one another but the person 
and the object become part of an extended structure that is 
the context.'
The conception of context as outside the individual reflects 
the largely individualistic conception of attitudes. In 
earlier conceptions the attitude simply lies in the individual 
to be retrieved when required. Later conceptions view the 
individual as in a more dynamic relationship with his or her 
environment, and yet the social nature of that environment is 
largely neglected. Often social aspects of attitudes are 
acknowledged and are often implicitly used. Many researchers 
draw on issues that have a particular social structure or base 
their research on content drawn from media sources. Hovland, 
Harvey and Sherif (1957) for example in a study on 
communications and attitude change specifically use an issue 
which is controversial in a given area, use social groups 
which have a particular stand on the issue and draw different 
sides of the communication, in part, from media sources. All 
these factors draw upon the social structure and content of 
the attitudinal issue --an issue can only be controversial at 
a social level. Yet rarely is the social structure of 
attitudes and its relation to individual attitudes explicitly 
and systematically explored.
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Thus whilst recent conceptions may neglect some aspects of 
attitudes, the view of attitudes proposed is different from 
earlier conceptions. The idea that there are "real' 
attitudes, or that attitudes are stable dispositions is 
undermined. Attitudes may or may not be drawing on a prior 
evaluation. Measuring attitudes involves the interplay of 
cognitive contents, structures, and processes, within a 
measurement context. Attitudes may be constructed within this 
context based on whatever considerations are, temporarily, 
accessible (Feldman & Lynch, 1988; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 
1988; Wilson & Hodges, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992) . In this 
view then, the measurement context is important for 
understanding attitudes.
1.4.2 Context effects and attitude surveys.
Whilst some research on attitude questions in the CASM 
framework has examined wording effects (Hippier & Schwarz, 
19 86; Rasinski, 19 89) and effects of response scales (Schwarz, 
Knauper, Hippier, Noelle-Neumann, & Clark, 1991; Schwarz & 
Wyer, 1985; Krosnick & Alwin, 1987), most research concerning 
attitude questions has focused on the context in which the 
questions are asked. My focus will be on context effects.
Assimilation and Contrast effects
In terms of the direction of the context effect there is a 
distinction between assimilation and contrast effects. That is 
effects in which the target is answered in line with the 
context and effects in which the response to the target goes 
against the context. This is merely an observation of the way
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in which context effects are manifest. If the context has
positive implications for the target then we would expect the
target to be more positively evaluated; if the context has
negative implications for the target then we would expect the
target to be more negatively evaluated. Both of these are 
assimilation effects. If the opposite occurs we have a 
contrast effect. Whether an effect is assimilation or 
contrast depends on the a priori implications of the context 
for the target.
It is unclear why context sometimes produces assimilation and 
sometimes produces contrast. Attempts to explain assimilation 
and contrast effects in surveys draw on theories from other 
areas of social cognition. Research in these areas sometimes 
has a slightly different focus.
Sheri f and Hovland (1961) for example, used the terms 
assimilation and contrast effects to refer to two processes. 
On the one hand these effects were defined in terms of whether 
a statement was assimilated towards the person's own stance on 
an issue or whether it was contrasted to it. The person's 
initial position was used as an anchor in judging attitude 
relevant material. On the other hand they also used the terms 
to refer to positive and negative attitude change. 
Assimilation, or positive attitude change, was change in the 
direction proposed by the communicator. Contrast, or negative 
attitude change, was change in the direction opposite to that 
proposed by the communicator. The terms as used in CASM are 
closer to this latter definition.
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Essentially, there are two ways in which assimilation and 
contrast effects are investigated. On the one hand, stemming 
from psychophysics, the research model used is to have 
subjects rate different stimuli along the same dimension. For 
example, when judging the weight of objects, it is found that 
when an extreme anchor is used judgments of later weights are 
contrasted towards this anchor. If a heavy weight is given 
first a medium weight will be judged as lighter than if a 
light weight had been presented first (Brown, 1953) . Similar 
results are found with less psychophysical stimuli, for 
example with judgements of the typicality of beer as German 
drink (Schwarz, Munkel, & Hippier, 1990) and with the 
importance of issues (Sherman, Ahlm, Berman, & Lynn, 1978).
On the other hand, there are studies that tend not to look at 
ratings on the same dimension but to prime different 
dimensions, or categories, and look at the ratings of targets 
when different dimensions, or categories, are primed. For 
example, Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) primed positive or 
negative trait items (eg. adventurous vs reckless) as part of 
an 'unrelated7 task. They then had subjects rate how 
favourable they were to a target person described ambiguously 
with regard to the primed dimensions. People primed with 
positive trait items rated the person more favourably than 
those primed with negative trait dimensions. That is, they 
assimilated to the context.
Whether these different research approaches are dealing with 
distinct phenomena, involving different processes is unclear.
They tend to be dealt with together at a theoretical level. 
Herr, Sherman, and Fazio (1983) note that usually assimilation 
effects due to priming are found (as in the impression 
formation work), whereas, in much of the social judgement work 
contrast effects are found.
Martin (1986; Martin & Achee, 1992), looking at assimilation 
and contrast effects found in impression formation studies, 
proposes a set/reset model to explain these effects. Use of 
accessible information is likely to result in assimilation. 
However, processing objectives determine whether accessible 
information is used. Information is not used if it is seen as 
inapplicable to the judgement. In terms of previous context, 
if subjects are aware of a previous, irrelevant, priming 
episode they are likely not to use this information in forming 
a judgement. When information is suppressed because it is not 
relevant to the current processing objectives, the subject 
'resets', partialling out the primed information and searching 
for other information on which to base a judgement, often 
resulting in contrast. In priming studies, contrast has been 
shown when subjects are aware of the priming episode, whereas 
assimilation is shown when they are not aware of the priming 
episode. However, contrast occurs when the prime is not 
relevant for the judgement (eg simply stereotypical traits, as 
opposed to individuating information) . When the prime is 
relevant for the judgement it may lead to assimilation, even 
though people are aware of it.
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Lombardi, Higgins, and Bargh (1987) propose a similar model of 
assimilation and contrast effects. In their view though, 
awareness has the effect of making the primed concepts seem 
more extreme. Thus contrast results not from a partialing out 
of information, but from comparison with an extreme standard.
Schwarz and Bless (1992) theorise that assimilation and 
contrast effects occur as a result of categorisation 
processes. Simply put, for assimilation effects to occur a 
later item must be included in the same category as the 
context items. For contrast effects to occur the context must 
be excluded from the representation of the later item. When 
contrast effects are found one of two types of processes may 
have occurred. First, the context may simply have been 
excluded or 'subtracted7 from the target item. Second, it may 
have been excluded but then used as a standard of comparison 
against which to judge the target item. Thus inclusion is 
necessary for assimilation; exclusion is necessary for 
contrast.
Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) relate assimilation and 
contrast effects to the various stages in the response 
process. Effects at the comprehension stage essentially 
involve the resolution of ambiguity. Assimilation may occur 
when the respondent infers that an ambiguous question relates 
to the previous context and uses this context to interpret the 
meaning of the later question. They see contrast effects at 
this stage as being of the specific - general type. 
Respondents interpret a general question on an issue asked
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after a specific question on the same issue to mean 'excluding 
the specific area just mentioned' . They use the context to 
infer the range of what is meant to be included. The target 
issue itself is not ambiguous, indeed Tourangeau and Rasinski 
suggest that the effect is most common for familiar issues. 
Rather, in this case it seems the context itself causes 
ambiguity about what should and should not be included.
The key to response effects at the retrieval stage is 
accessibility. Material retrieved for answering a previous 
question is accessible, and is therefore, due to cognitive 
economy, likely to be used in answering a later question. 
This results in assimilation when prior context makes 
considerations favouring one side of a related issue 
accessible. Contrast effects are more problematic.
Accessible material may not be used, but if it is not used it 
may simply not lead to an effect. When the exclusion of 
accessible material pushes the respondent in the opposite 
direction contrast occurs. Why this leads to contrast is not 
explained cogently. The assumption is that respondents reject 
or discount the accessible material because they have become 
conscious that it is invalid or irrelevant to the target 
question. This is assumed to be a more controlled process 
than the processes producing assimilation.
In terms of judgement, prior context can serve as a standard 
of comparison. Assimilation can occur when the previous 
context suggests the dimension on which to make the 
evaluation. Contrast effects can occur when the context is
extreme. Self- presentational factors are seen as being most 
important to effects at the response stage. A desire for 
consistency can lead to assimilation effects. A desire to 
appear moderate, not to seem extreme or unreasonable, may lead 
to contrast effects.
Some problems with the models. While these models go some way 
towards explaining assimilation and contrast effects, there 
are still some aspects which remain unclear.
First, there are problems with a simple inclusion/exclusion 
view of assimilation /contrast. One experiment by Schwarz and 
Bless, which purports to show how exclusion leads to contrast 
actually shows an assimilation effect, possibly involving 
exclusion. Specifically, an experiment was conducted 
concerning ratings of the German Christian Democratic Party. 
The figure of Richard von Weizacker was used as context. 
Richard von Weizacker is, apparently, a well respected 
politician and is both a member of the Christian Democrat 
party and president, an apolitical position something like the 
Queen. Prior to rating the Christian Democrats, respondents 
in one condition were asked to say which party von Weizacker 
was a member of; in another condition subjects were asked to 
recall his apolitical position first, and in another condition 
there was no contextual information about von Weizacker. 
Ratings of the Christian democrats went up relative to the no 
context condition when von Weizacker"s party identification 
was previously made salient, and went down in relation to no 
context when his apolitical position was made salient. The
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first condition is identified as an assimilation effect due to 
inclusion of a positive context example in the overall 
category and the second as a contrast effect due to exclusion 
of a positive example. However, both effects are in the 
direction expected by the researchers. That is, both effects 
are in line with the implications of the context and, by this 
definition, are assimilation effects. A contrast effect would 
have occurred if the reverse results would have been found -- 
that is if highlighting party membership decreased ratings of 
the Christian Democrats and highlighting apoliticalness 
increased them.
If this is not a contrast effect, but rather an assimilation 
effect, then we might assume that the exclusion of context 
information from a category can result in assimilation. Thus 
a simple separation of assimilation and contrast into 
inclusion / exclusion based on categorisation is not possible.
I believe the confusion of interpretation in the above 
experiment is due to a confusion of the two strands of 
research on assimilation and contrast mentioned above -- 
social judgement and priming. That is rating items along a 
single dimension versus priming related areas. In fact it may 
be better to see these instances as dealing with different 
types of effects, perhaps involving different processes.
Secondly the idea that simple discounting or partialing out of 
context is necessary for contrast is problematic. Whilst it 
may be necessary, it does not seem to be sufficient.
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Partialling out of contextual information could simply lead to 
no effect at all. There must be some way in which the 
partialled out information leads to the opposite implications. 
Schwarz and Bless attempt to deal with this by suggesting that 
the subtracted information must be more extremely valanced 
than the information left. This may be part of the answer, 
but perhaps not a complete answer. For example, if people are 
aware of a positive prime why not simply discard this and use 
a different positive piece of information? Why opt for, 
opposite, negative information? Perhaps there is a sense in 
which the discarded information implies or evokes its 
opposite. Perhaps contrast effects are more likely where 
opposite information is more readily evoked. This would seem 
to be most likely when associations between negative and 
positive information are strong.
Factors influencing context effects
As well as explaining the direction of the effect which 
context can produce, there is also a need to understand why 
the effects occur at all. The focus of research on context 
effects for attitude surveys has been the search for factors 
which make these effects more or less likely. A number of 
factors have been found, or are hypothesised to produce 
context effects, either assimilation or contrast effects. 
Most have focused on priming related areas. For the purposes 
of discussion, these can loosely be classified as question 
factors, situation factors, and person factors.
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Question factors)
Factors within the questionnaire which have been shown or 
which research suggest may produce context effects include: 
positional factors, relatedness of context and target, and 
type of question in terms of issue familiarity.
Positional effects. The position of the context in relation 
to the target may influence context effects. This is assumed 
to work through accessibility. Prior context is more 
accessible if it has been primed more recently. The further 
away the priming episode, the less impact it will have on the 
target.
Some studies have shown reduction in context effects due to 
buffering -- placing non-related items between the context and 
the target. Other studies, however, have not shown such 
effects (Bishop, 1987).
Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn and D'Andrade (1989a, 1989b)
looking at the effect of related contexts on a variety of 
opinion questions, found that placing context questions in a 
block immediately preceding the target produced larger context 
effects than when the context is scattered amongst unrelated 
questions prior to the target. However, context effects were 
still present when the context was scattered. The context 
effects Tourangeau et al found were in the direction of 
assimilation. However, one question produced assimilation 
effects when blocked and contrast effects when scattered.
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However, it may also be the case that placing the context 
immediately prior to the target is more likely to lead to 
contrast effects because the context is more blatantly related 
to the target and hence respondents are more likely to become 
aware of this relationship. Evidence for this type of blatant 
priming effect comes from other areas such as impression 
formation. Lombardi, Higgins, and Bargh (1987) for example 
found that when subjects were made aware of a priming task 
they showed contrast in their judgements, but assimilation 
when they were not made aware.
Ottati, Riggle, Wyer, Schwarz, and Kuklinski (1989) looked at 
placement of specific items in relation to general items. 
They found that when the specific item was separated from the 
general item by a number of questions the general item was 
assimilated to the specific item whereas when it was 
immediately preceding the general item a contrast effect was 
f ound.
Relatedness. For context to effect the target, it must not 
only be accessible but must also be perceived to be related to 
the target. Context can be both conceptually and episodically 
related to the target. Here I am concerned with conceptual 
relatedness. Feldman and Lynch (1988) discuss the
'diagnosticity' of previous questions for the present 
question. This is the extent to which the respondent 
perceives some implication of previous questions for the 
present question. The more diagnostic previous items are,
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they suggest, the more likely this context will produce an 
effect.
There is certainly evidence from priming studies to show that 
context must be conceptually related to the target for context 
effects to occur. For example Higgins Rholes and Jones (1977) 
primed positive, negative or unrelated traits in a previous, 
unrelated task. Later, when forming an impression, those 
given related traits assimilated the target to the traits, 
those given unrelated traits showed no effect. Thus 
accessible information was used, but only when applicable.
Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, and D'Andrade (1989b) use the 
correlation between context and target as a measure of 
relatedness, presuming that items which are highly correlated 
are closely connected in memory. They found greater context 
effects when context and target items were highly correlated.
These studies then suggest that assimilation is likely when 
context and target are more closely related. Is the 
conceptual relatedness of issues likely to produce contrast? 
There does not appear to be any studies directly addressing 
this question, however, there may be a link. Recall that 
contrast is said to be likely when people become aware of a 
priming episode (Martin, 19 86; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, 
& Wanke, 1993) . People are most likely to become aware of the 
priming episode when it is blatant. But what makes priming 
blatant? In most studies it is, seemingly, the episodic 
relation between prime and target, but perhaps conceptual
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relatedness may also play a part in making people aware of the 
priming context. That is a prime which is conceptually 
related in a very direct, or blatant, way to the target may be 
more likely than a more subtle conceptual relationship to 
induce an awareness of the priming episode, and thus may be 
more likely to lead to contrast.
Issue familiarity. Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) suggest that 
unfamiliar issues may be interpreted in terms of the previous 
context, thus leading to assimilation effects. There is some 
evidence of assimilation effects when people are presented 
with unfamiliar or fictitious issues (Bishop, Tuchfarber, & 
Oldendick, 1986; Schuman & Presser, 1981; Strack, 1992).
Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, and D'Andrade (1989) report 
that the context effects they found did not depend on issue 
familiarity. However, they present no measure of issue 
familiarity, using policy issues likely to be present in the 
media, which, while some may be more familiar than others, may 
not vary substantially in their familiarity.
I am grouping under this heading some rather different types 
of factors. Factors within the situation that have been 
shown, or suggested to produce context effects include the 
time given to think and the motivation to think -- the effort 
people put into thinking, and the conversational context of 
the questionnaire.
ituation factors.
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Thinking effort. At a general level many theories in 
cognitive and social psychology consider people to be 
'cognitive misers' (Taylor, 1981), or that much social 
behaviour is mindless (Langer, 1978). Krosnick (1991) has 
described how people may satisfice in answering attitude 
questions. Rather than engaging in optimal strategies for 
answering questions, people will satisfice and produce an 
acceptable answer by the simplest means rather than an optimal 
answer which may involve more complex processing.
However, the amount of cognitive effort devoted to responding 
is influenced by a number of factors. In general these may be 
considered to include the actual time available for thinking 
and the motivation to think.
The first factor here is straightforward. Where there is 
little time to think, less thinking and less complex 
strategies are likely to be used. Where there is more time, 
there is more likelihood of more thinking and the use of more 
complex strategies. Surveys are generally characterised by 
time pressure and are therefore more likely to result in low 
cognitive effort.
Motivation to think may involve a number of factors, generally 
including the importance of thinking and interest in the 
topic. Factors such as the perceived consequences of 'getting 
it wrong', the goals of the person, and affective investment 
may all play a role in the perceived importance of engaging in 
thinking, but so too will interest in the area.
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Cognitive effort is often assumed to be related to 
assimilation and contrast effects. Little effort is assumed 
to be more likely to produce assimilation effects whilst more 
effort is assumed to be required for contrast effects (Martin 
& Harlow, 1992). In many circumstances less thinking seems to 
promote a greater effect of context. This is because prior 
items, being salient, offer a simple, and therefore quicker 
answer to the question. This would lead to assimilation; the 
respondent selects the first thing in mind.
It has been suggested that a contrast effect can be produced 
when people become aware of, and explicitly reject the 
previous context, this is thought to require a greater degree 
of thinking (Martin, 1986) . Some evidence for this is 
provided by Martin, Seta, & Crelia (1990). In an experiment 
on impression formation they blatantly primed certain concepts 
and then asked people to form an impression of the person 
described ambiguously with regard to these concepts. Some 
subjects, however, were played a distracting tape while 
forming their impressions, which should reduce the amount of 
cognitive capacity they have for forming impressions. 
Subjects who were not played the distracting tape showed 
contrast, whilst those who were played the tape showed 
assimilation.
Martin and Harlow (1992) discuss a number of factors which may 
influence the amount of cognitive effort exerted in response 
to survey questions. In looking at the effect of difficult or 
easy filter)questions on reports of political interest, they
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show that failure to answer questions leads to brooding and an 
attempt to distract oneself from the topic of failure. These 
subjects seemed to expent less effort on political questions 
and more on unrelated questions than did subjects who were 
successful and therefore basked in their success by thinking 
about the topic of success.
They also suggest that because informed respondents may find 
it more enjoyable to answer questions on which they are 
informed they may exert more cognitive effort than uninformed 
respondents. Furthermore, any differences in response may be 
due to differences in effort rather than differences in 
attitudes. They also suggest that respondents may exert more 
cognitive effort in face-to-face interviews than in telephone 
interviews, at the beginning rather than at the end of long 
interviews, and when they see their individual responses as 
important rather than simply being one of thousands.
Conversational norms. In many ways conversational norms are 
extra-situational. They are not specific to the questionnaire 
situation but are general conversational rules. By comparing 
the questioning situation to a conversation, research has 
shown that norms guiding conversational interaction may help 
explain context effects (Strack, Martin & Schwarz, 19 88). 
Other areas of psychology have also made use of conversational 
rules in explaining behaviour; for example, research in 
attribution theory has shown that psychological processes, in 
this case explanations or attributions, may be influenced by
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conversational norms (Hilton, 1990; Slugoski, Lalljee, Lamb & 
Ginsburg, 1993) .
One particular conversational maxim that has been studied is 
the idea that people should make their contributions 
informative, avoiding redundancy (Grice,1975). Research has 
shown that if asked a specific question about marital 
happiness before a general question about overall happiness 
people report being less generally happy. However this seems 
to occur only when the two questions are seen as being part of 
the same conversation; the question about general happiness is 
taken to mean 7 apart from marital happiness7 (Strack, Martin, 
& Schwarz, 1988; Schwarz, Strack & Mai, 1991).
Martin and Achee (1992) describe this as another way in which 
people partial out irrelevant information in forming 
judgements. That is, use of the information is seen as 
inappropriate to current processing objectives.
Norms of cooperation in conversation may also influence 
response where a question is ambiguous. Here, as in ordinary 
conversation, people use the context of the conversation to 
interpret ambiguous information (Strack & Martin, 1987; 
Schwarz & Strack, 1988).
Many individual difference factors might be associated with 
context effects (eg sex, educational level, age etc) . However, 
I will not be discussing demographic distinctions. Here, I
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want to discuss individual differences on attitude dimensions. 
Among the person factors examined as relevant to context 
effects are: attitude 'strength7 or structure, and prior
knowledge.
Attitude strength/strueture. Whilst the structure of
attitudes is uncertain, a number of dimensions, included in 
the concept of attitude strength, may be relevant to their 
measurement, and may also interact with context. Scott (1968) 
identified a number of attitude properties which could be 
regarded as dimensions of attitude strength: magnitude,
intensity, ambivalence, salience, affective salience, 
cognitive complexity, overtness, embeddedness and flexibility.
In a paper arguing for the routine measurement of strength 
dimensions in surveys Krosnick and Abelson (1992) discuss five 
measures of strength which are easy to measure and extensively 
validated: extremity, intensity, certainty, importance and
knowledge. Extremity refers to the degree of favourableness 
or unfavourableness of the evaluation of the attitude object. 
It is generally conceived of as a departure from the neutral 
point of the measurement scale, and is thus perhaps the most 
common dimension on which attitudes are measured. Intensity 
is the strength of the affective response to an attitude 
object. Certainty is the extent to which a person is 
confident that their attitude is correct. Krosnick and 
Abelson see ambivalence as related to this dimension, however, 
Olson and Zanna (1993) treat this separately from attitude
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strength. Importance is the degree of personal importance the 
person attaches to an attitude or attitude object. Knowledge 
is the amount of information and beliefs linked to the 
attitude. Generally, these dimensions are only weakly 
correlated with one another (Raden, 1985). Krosnick, 
Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot (1993) found a number of 
dimensions of attitude strength were only weakly correlated. 
In fact, their research suggests that while the term 'attitude 
strength' may be a useful shorthand for referring to the 
various dimensions of attitudes, it does not appear that these 
dimensions form one underlying dimension of attitudes.
I will deal with dimensions of knowledge and direct experience 
in a separate section below, as these are often dealt with 
separately from other dimensions of attitude strength. Now I 
will look at other dimensions of attitude strength and how 
they may be related to response effects.
Krosnick and Abelson discuss a number of ways in which 
'strong' attitudes may differ from weak ones. For example, 
attitudes which are more extreme or more important have been 
shown to be more resistant to change (Osgood & Tannenbaum, 
1955; Rhine & Severance, 1970). There is evidence that more 
extreme attitudes, important attitudes and attitudes about 
which people are more certain are more consistent with 
behaviour (Fazio & Zanna, 1978; Krosnick, 1988; Sample & 
Warland, 1973) . Thus dimensions of attitude strength seem to 
be an important aspect of attitudes.
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Dimensions of attitude strength have also been implicated in 
retrieval processes. Krosnick (1989) measured latencies along 
with importance and concluded that important attitudes have 
faster response latencies. His reasoning was that important 
attitudes are more accessible and hence answered more quickly. 
Roese and Olson (1994) however, show that accessibility may be 
used by respondents to infer how important an attitude is in 
line with self-perception theory (Bern, 1967). Whichever way 
the causality goes, and it may be different in different 
cases, it is clear that accessibility and importance are 
positively related.
Precisely how attitude strength might influence response 
effects is, as yet, unclear. It was assumed that people with 
strong, or crystallized attitudes would be less susceptible to 
response effects than those with weak attitudes, sometimes 
seen as non-attitudes (Payne, 1951; Converse, 1974) . 
However, evidence for this has been equivocal.
Krosnick and Schuman (1988) report on a series of studies 
which show context effects for a variety of question factors 
including question order, wording changes, and response order. 
Measures of attitude 'strength' were either of attitude 
intensity, certainty or importance. They found as many 
results supporting the idea that 'strong' attitudes are less 
susceptible to response effects as results disconfirming this 
idea. The only reliable effects were found for comparisons 
between questions which offered a middle response alternative 
and those that did not. People with less intense attitudes or
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unimportant attitudes are more likely to opt for a middle 
alternative if it is offered. Similar results were found by 
Bishop (1990).
Krosnick and Schuman suggest that the mechanisms underlying 
response effects which they tested -- that response effects 
result from changes in perceived extremity of response 
options, changes in self perception, or changes in attitude -- 
may not be the mechanisms underlying response effects. Thus 
measures of attitude strength may still be important, but may 
interact with different underlying processes not tapped by the 
types of questions they addressed. Another possibility is 
that the measures of strength they used -- intensity, 
certainty and importance - - are less clearly related to 
response effects than other measures. It is possible then 
that different dimensions of strength may be related to 
different processes producing response effects.
Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn and D'Andrade (1989a, 1989b) 
investigate the possibility that context serves to prime 
beliefs which then influence responses to subsequent 
questions. They found the largest context effects for those 
respondents whose attitudes are both important and conflicted 
(i.e. ambivalent). Importance alone had little effect while 
ambivalence alone produced slightly more effect. They argue 
that this is due to the person having both the necessary links 
between target issues and context items and having both sides 
of the argument available. If they are not conflicted, but 
their attitudes are important then they will accept only one
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side of the argument and thus context becomes less 
influential.
Prior knowledge. Prior knowledge, experience or involvement 
with an issue can influence context effects. Feldman (1992) 
notes that one important factor which influences whether prior 
items will be used to form a response to a question is the 
extent to which alternative inputs are available. The 
availability of alternative inputs depends, in part, upon the 
person's prior knowledge of an issue. This would, by itself, 
suggest that more knowledge of an issue would make people less 
susceptible to context effects, however, the relationship is 
not that straightforward.
Attitudes which are automatically activated upon an encounter 
with an attitude object are likely to be those formed through 
direct experience and are more likely to be linked to 
behaviour (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986) . In 
this case there is a stored evaluation strongly linked to the 
attitude which is spontaneously, and effortlessly, recalled 
upon encounter with the object. Such automatically activated 
attitudes guide the interaction with the attitude object. If 
we regard the survey question as representing the attitude 
object, then one would expect these attitudes also to be less 
susceptible to context effects, because it is the evaluation 
which serves to respond. One can view this as a continuum 
between spontaneous attitudes and non-attitudes. Some 
attitudes have linked evaluations, but the associations are 
not strong enough to be automatically accessed. Other
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attitudes are not formed at all. In this case the person may 
deliberatively process information to arrive at an attitude. 
In these cases the context is likely to have more impact on 
the production of an attitude.
More knowledge of an issue, however, could work to make people 
more susceptible to response effects. Recall that for context 
effects to occur it is thought that the context must be seen 
as related to the target issue. If people with more
knowledge of the issue link that issue with more related 
issues, then it is likely that more contexts will be seen as 
related to the target issue, and thus are more likely to have 
an influence. Questions which are less generally familiar or 
questions preceded by a somewhat subtle context may be more 
open to this kind of effect.
summary of factors
A variety of factors have thus been examined and shown to be 
related to context effects. The relative recency of research 
effort in this area means that there are still many questions
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left unanswered. How the various factors might interact and 
how much they generalise across different questions, for 
example, are two issues which have received relatively little 
attention. There is still much work to do to understand the 
intricacies of how these factors operate, and how 
generalisable they are.
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1.4.3 Summary of attitudes
The more recent conceptions of attitudes which are drawn on by 
researchers in the CASM framework, regard attitudes as 
knowledge structures. For some attitudes there may be stored 
evaluations, others may involve the on-line construction of an 
attitude. Thus attitudes are sometimes temporary
constructions.
Much of the research in CASM has focused on understanding 
context effects. Context effects differ by the direction of 
the effect -- assimilation or contrast. Efforts to explain 
why effects go in different directions have drawn on more 
general work in social cognition, and a number of different 
explanations have been offered. In general the explanations 
see accessibility and applicability, along with processing 
objectives, as the important factors in these effects. 
Awareness of the priming nature of context and perhaps the 
amount of cognitive effort is also seen as important in 
producing contrast effects. It was argued that there is 
sometimes confusion over the direction of the effect stemming 
from different research paradigms and that to date most of the 
explanations offered seem to provide only partial 
explanations.
Identifying the factors which contribute to context effects 
has been the main focus of research in CASM. A number of 
different types of factors have been reviewed. Here, again 
there is much work needed to understand more clearly how the 
various factors operate.
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1.5 CONCLUSIONS
The assumptions on which survey measurement is based, that 
people can give meaningful answers to questions, is questioned 
by findings that responses are affected by a number of 
seemingly trivial alterations in questions. The result of 
these troubles has been an effort to apply psychological 
theory to survey response and a considerable amount of 
research has been conducted in this framework.
Psychological theory does not assume that people can give 
reliable answers to questions. The situation is rather more 
complex. Sometimes people can retrieve answers; sometimes 
they must construct responses. What people have 'stored7 in 
memory and how what is stored is accessed varies due to a 
number of factors. In part, there is the cognitive system 
itself. Information is often simply not stored in a way which 
allows direct retrieval of the desired information. In 
addition a variety of factors impact on this system and on 
responding. Situational factors such as the specific 
construction of the questionnaire, and the time allowed for 
response influence responding. So too does the conversational 
context of a survey interview, which can be guided by a number 
of conversational rules. This latter 'situational factor' 
draws on social conventions in interaction.
Other social factors tend to receive less focus in the CASM 
model, and perhaps should be given more attention. The type 
of behaviour or attitude one is dealing with, as noted
73
earlier, is in part a function of its social structuring. 
Whether a behaviour is frequent or infrequent, whether an 
attitude issue is highly structured or has never been 
previously encountered, depends, in part, on the individuals 
location in a social structure. Mapping this social structure 
of the issues one is dealing with may prove to be an important 
element in understanding response. A few studies suggest this 
is the case. Tourangeau, Rasinski, and D 'Andrade (1991) for 
example, map the clusteral structure of attitudes and show 
that whether a context item is drawn from the same or from a 
different cluster affects response time to the target. This 
is not one individual's structure, but an aggregate level 
structure. Wright, Gaskell and O'Muircheartaigh (1994) point 
to the importance of the level of the group when they show 
that the meaning of vague quantifiers varies as a function of 
one's group membership. These studies point to a social level 
of structuring impacting on individual cognition.
However, one must be careful not to lose sight of individual 
differences. Individual differences have been shown to be 
influential in the effects of context on attitude reports. 
That is, as well as the social structure of an issue, the 
individual's particular structuring of the issue is also 
important. Less research on behavioural questions has 
addressed issues of individual differences. Schwarz and 
Beinas' (1990) relating self-awareness (Fenigstein, Sheier, & 
Buss, 1975) to behavioural reports is an exception here.
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All these factors combine to suggest an explanation of survey 
response as a highly complex process. This process involves 
an individual, with a particular kind of cognitive system, 
placed in a time constrained situation governed by 
interactional rules, an individual who uses cues within that 
situation, as well as his or her own individual and social 
backgrounds and current processing goals, to dynamically 
retrieve and construct responses. No more 'ask a simple 
question, get a simple answer'. Once we start examining the 
survey response process we discover a micro-social system with 
all the complexities that entails.
The CASM research has certainly illustrated the complexity of 
the response process. It has also begun to identify factors 
relevant to the explanation of response, but there is still a 
lot to be done. In part, some under researched factors need 
more emphasis, but also, even those factors which have 
received much attention still require further elaboration. 
One of the challenges to this research is the development of 
methods which allow the in depth exploration of response 
processes. In part, some of the limits of explanation stem 
from a lack of direct data on processing. Much research 
relies on split-ballot experiment. However, along with taking 
on the theories of cognitive psychology survey researchers are 
also exploring its methods. One of these methods, verbal 
reports of cognitive processes, looks promising but is 
controversial, even within psychology. The next chapter takes 
up this issue.
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CHAPTER 2
VERBAL REPORTS
SUMMARY
This chapter reviews the status of verbal reports as 
data on cognitive processes. Research using verbal 
reports as data on the processes of answering survey 
questions is considered first. The discussion 
continues by examining verbal reports as data in 
psychology more generally. The historical debates 
over introspection are reviewed as well as recent 
criticisms and defences of verbal reports.
"verbal reports, elicited with care and interpreted 
with full understanding of the circumstances under 
which they were obtained, are a valuable and 
thoroughly reliable source of information about 
cognitive processes." (Ericsson and Simon, 1980, p 
247) .
"it would appear that people may have little ability 
to report accurately on their cognitive processes" 
(Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, pp246)
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The status of verbal reports as data in psychology has 
fluctuated from one of acceptance to rejection and most stages 
in between. Currently, there is much debate about the role of 
verbal data in psychology, as the quotes above illustrate. 
Attempts to use verbal reports as data about cognitive 
processes are often challenged about the validity of different
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types of verbal reports. This is especially true when 
collecting verbal reports in areas where they have not been 
previously applied. The survey questionnaire is one such 
area.
Verbal reports may provide a potentially rich source of data 
for the understanding of survey response processes. To date, 
much of the research looking at cognitive processes underlying 
survey response has involved indirect measures of processing, 
normally split-balJLot experiments designed to— produce 
differences in the pattern of responses. However, there is 
also a need to collect more detailed and direct information on 
cognitive processes. Verbal reports offer this type of 
information, but the controversy and confusion over their use 
suggests a need to carefully examine this method.
In this chapter I will examine the use of verbal reports as 
data on cognitive processes. I start with a review of their 
use in survey research; this illustrates both the potential of 
this method, but also the uncertainty surrounding its use. 
Because of this uncertainty, I then want to look in more 
detail at the use of verbal reports in psychology; first, 
placing the controversy surrounding them in an historical 
perspective and then moving on to more recent developments in 
the use of verbal reports.
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2.2 VERBAL REPORTS AND SURVEY RESPONSE
Attempts to gain insight into respondents' understanding of 
survey questions pre-dates the interest in linking cognitive 
psychology with survey methodology. A number of studies have 
collected verbal reports; often, however, many psychological 
assumptions underlying the collection of these reports are 
neglected or left unexamined.
Belson (1981), for example, developed a "re-interview" 
technique to investigate question understanding. The day 
after an initial interview, he re-interviewed respondents,
asking them to think back to the way that they had answered
the questions the previous day, and prompting them for their 
understanding of key words etc.. Clearly there are problems 
with regarding this data as a measure of what people were
thinking while they were responding. First, the time lag
between responding and reporting on responding means that 
there may be serious recall problems. Secondly, the fact that 
respondents have answered a number of questions before 
reporting on any specific question means that there may be 
interference between responses to different questions. 
Thirdly, the use of specific directive probes means that there 
are problems with the validity of the data.
Schuman (19 66) used a random probe technique to look at 
respondents' understanding of survey questions. The
interviewer probed for respondents' interpretation of a random 
selection of questions using non-directive probes. This
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technique does not have the recall and interference problems 
in Belson's technique in that the probe occurs directly after 
the respondent has answered. This is more likely to provide 
a measure of what respondents were considering while 
responding than Belson's method. The use of non-directive 
probes also offers advantages over directive probes, although 
some of the probes actually used might elicit explanations of 
'why' the respondent answered in the way s/he did.
The studies above use verbal reports to improve questionnaire 
design. They do not attempt, per se, to examine the cognitive 
processes behind responding, but rather they intend to provide 
information on problems with specific questions that will in 
turn lead to improvement in these questions. They do not 
attempt to answer the question "what are the cognitive 
processes underlying response to this question" but rather "is 
this a good question". Sykes & Morton-Williams (1987) suggest 
that two forms of verbal reports, interaction-analysis and 
Belson's re-interview, be routinely used for pre-testing 
questions. Evidence from these studies suggests that verbal 
reports would be very useful in this regard. However, their 
use in this way does not necessarily give a measure of 
cognitive processing during response.
With links between cognitive psychology and survey 
methodology, greater use has been made of verbal report 
techniques in survey design notably on several large US 
surveys (the Consumer Expenditure Survey, Lessler, 1989; the 
National Health Interview Survey, Means, 1989; and the Labour
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Force survey, Dippo, 1989;). Willis, Royston, and Bercini 
(1991) report on the use of verbal reports in the cognitive 
laboratory. Whilst they are interested in cognitive 
processes, and are certainly informed by cognitive theory, the 
main purpose underlying their use of verbal reports is in 
their practical use for survey design. This can be clearly 
seen in the way the methods are used and the criteria 
suggested for the assessment of their validity.
Willis et al concentrate on a technique which they call verbal 
probing. This technique involves the interviewer probing, 
either generally or specifically, immediately after the 
respondent has answered. An advantage of this technique, 
which they point out, is that it does not interfere with 
ongoing processes (as might thinking aloud during response); 
however, the drawback is that it relies on recall. Willis et 
al fail to point out a particularly difficult problem with 
probing, especially directive probing, namely that it may 
itself influence reports of processing, if indeed it gives 
information on processing during responding at all. An 
example of a probe which they give is "What does the term 
abdomen mean to you". It is unclear here whether this will 
generate what the respondent had in mind as they answered a 
question with the term 'abdomen' in it, or whether it will 
generate the respondent's general knowledge of the term. In 
the first case, the dynamics of knowledge use is being 
examined, in the latter, simply knowledge. An understanding 
of the latter can be informative for the questionnaire
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designer, but it is less useful when one is trying to 
understand how knowledge is actually used in responding.
The quality of the data produced is also problematic. For 
example, it may be important to find out how sure a respondent 
is of their answer, but a simple 'not very ' in response to 
the probe 'How sure are you of your answer' is weaker evidence 
than if the respondent had spontaneously said 'well I'm not 
really sure but..'.
Willis et al's interest in verbal reports, shared with 
predecessors not so informed by psychological theory, focuses 
on the practical implications for survey research. They 
suggest that the validity of verbal report methods will lie 
less in its theoretical merits than in whether or not it 
reduces survey error. I would suggest, however, that there 
are two problems with this position. First, valid as measures 
of what? As the example above shows, some reports may produce 
a valid measure of general knowledge, but poor measures of 
cognitive processing during response. Measures of general 
knowledge may reduce survey error (eg by eliminating poorly 
understood or ambiguous terms) but that does not make them 
valid measures of processing. Second, I would suggest that 
reduction of survey error is only part of the goal. In some 
cases, a good understanding of the cognitive processes 
involved may show that 'error' is endemic to some kinds of 
questioning; the focus of concern then becomes accurate 
interpretation of data.
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The techniques developed by survey researchers have 
practicality as their central concern; the objective is to 
produce 'better" questionnaires. While the techniques 
described above may be useful for these immediate goals, they 
may be problematic for testing and building general theory.
Some researchers have focused more on the cognitive processes 
underlying response as the main purpose of their use of verbal 
reports. In general these researchers have employed some form 
of protocol analysis, as described by Ericsson and Simon 
(1980,1984), to surveys. These techniques involve respondents 
either thinking aloud while responding -- that is saying what 
they are thinking-- or giving an account of what they thought 
immediately after they have responded to a question. 
Sometimes a combination of concurrent and retrospective 
reports is collected. In these techniques there is no probing 
from the interviewer, and reports are given as close to the 
time of response as possible. These techniques will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
Loftus (19 84) reports the use of think aloud to generate data 
on the cognitive processes underlying response to factual 
behavioural report questions concerning visits to the doctor. 
She suggests that the data are useful. However, she notes 
that the more relaxed reporting procedure of think aloud, as 
opposed to a formal checklist procedure, may have given 
respondents more time to think about their responses and, 
thus, to recall instances of the behaviour in question,
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suggesting a change in processing due to the think aloud 
procedure.
Bishop (1989) used think aloud followed by immediate 
retrospective reports to examine some well known wording and 
context effects in attitude surveys. He concluded that the 
think aloud technique can give useful information both for 
generating, and for testing, hypotheses about response 
effects. In the case of the latter especially, he notes that 
large samples may be necessary. This is because, for some 
respondents, processing may be so automatic as to leave no 
trace in the verbal protocol. However, the extent to which 
larger samples would alleviate this particular problem is 
questionable. Some processes may be so automated that they do 
not appear in protocols at all. Thus, the range of thinking 
that can be assessed with verbal protocols needs 
investigation. Bishop gives little indication of the validity 
of the information produced, but rather accepts that since it 
has been successfully used in some areas it can be applied to 
the survey. This may be a problematic assumption in regard to 
context effects, where if, as Loftus suggests, respondents 
have more time to think, they may also better remember 
previous questions and thus context effects may be increased.
Ursic and Helgeson (1989) used think-aloud to look at the 
decision making processes involved in questionnaire 
responding. They varied questionnaire length, scale anchors, 
and number of scale points in order to look at differences in 
processing among these questionnaire factors. Respondents had
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to think-aloud while rating fast food restaurants. The data 
resulting from these protocols appears interesting and suggest 
a number of hypotheses about questionnaire decision making. 
Unfortunately, details of the instructions used for think 
aloud are not given, nor do Ursic and Helgeson appear to have 
investigated whether think aloud itself has any effect on 
response. Whilst respondents were found to be accurately 
verbalising their thought processes, this information appears 
to be obtained through debriefings in pre-tests to develop a 
coding frame, and therefore may be a dubious measure of the 
validity of the verbal reports.
Burton and Blair (1991) used retrospective protocols to look 
at the processes that were used when respondents answered 
behavioural frequency questions. The retrospective report 
method was used because as Burton and Blair say it "allows the 
frequency question to be asked and answered in a manner 
natural to the survey; concurrent process measures would 
change the task and, possibly, the process used in response 
formulation." (Burton & Blair, 1991, p67). Thus, they have 
some doubts about the validity of think-aloud.
Burton and Blair reported two studies. The first, looking at 
estimates of number of B grades achieved and courses taken 
outside the university, used written retrospective protocols. 
The second, looking at the frequency of withdrawals from 
automatic teller machines, used telephone interviewing and 
asked subjects for retrospective reports with the prompt "How 
did you come up with that answer?"; probing by interviewers
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was used to clarify process descriptions. The written 
protocols obtained were sometimes ambiguous and not precise 
enough for hypothesis testing. This might be expected to be 
the case from previous research (eg. Byrne, 1983). The data 
from the verbal retrospective reports does, however, appear to 
be useful in testing hypotheses about the use of episode 
enumeration. Again, Burton and Blair gave no data concerning 
the extent to which these reports are valid.
An earlier study (Blair and Burton, 1987) did provide some 
reasons for believing that retrospective reports of processing 
during response may be valid. Retrospective reports of 
thinking were gathered for a question asking for frequency of 
eating at a restaurant. Different conditions were
hypothesised to effect the amount of episode retrieval, 
specifically a longer reference period was hypothesised to 
produce less reference to episode enumeration than would a 
shorter period. Indeed, evidence supporting this was obtained 
in the protocols. Blair and Burton regard this difference in 
the protocols as evidence that the protocols were valid. This 
seems to be the most convincing evidence so far in the survey 
literature that verbal protocols can provide valid information 
on processing during responding.
Thus, the use of verbal reports within survey research has 
different goals. Some see it as a means for dealing with 
problems in questionnaires; largely their aim is to improve 
specific questionnaires. Others see it as a way of collecting 
data on cognitive processes; largely their aim is to
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contribute to a theory of survey response. Most of these 
studies suggest that the data provided from verbal reports is 
useful, to both aims. Yet there is also a good deal of 
uncertainty about what kind of data the different methods 
provide, and about the validity of different methods. Given 
that this debate over the adequacy of verbal reports extends 
to psychology in general, it seems useful to examine, in some 
detail, the history and current controversies surrounding 
verbal reports. I start this review by looking at early uses 
of verbal reports in psychology, namely introspection.
2.3 INTROSPECTION AND ASSOCIATED VERBAL REPORTS
Introspection was a favoured method of early psychologists. 
It was seen as giving access to thought, to the mind. 
However, disagreements over its validity, and more importantly 
the move to a behaviouristic science, with its emphasis on 
observable behaviour and disregard for consciousness, led to 
a decline in the use of introspection.
Burt (1962) called for the reintroduction of introspection as 
a method in psychology. In criticising psychology for taking 
behaviour rather than consciousness as its defining 
characteristic he says of the then present day psychology 
"having first bargained away its soul and then gone out of its 
mind, seems now, as it faces an untimely end, to have lost all 
consciousness". It seems that, more recently, psychologists 
have regained consciousness and rediscovered mind. Since the 
1960's psychologists have shown increased interest in 
consciousness (Valentine 1992).
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Along with these theoretical concerns there have been a number 
of reassessments of the place of introspection as a method for 
psychology (e.g. Joynson, 1972; Radford, 1974; Lieberman, 
1979; Howe, 1991) . Increased interest in mental activity has 
led for a need to access, in some way, the stream of 
consciousness. Getting reports from people on their mental 
activity seems one way to do this. But, with introspection 
having ben discredited, how can this be done? First, I think 
it is necessary to look at the method of introspection, to 
understand what was wrong with it, before proceeding to look 
at more recent uses of reports of mental events which are more 
or less similar to introspection.
2.3.1 Early introspection
Wundt established his experimental psychology using
introspection as the method. Wundt was sophisticated in his
use of introspection. He, recognised the distorting nature of
introspection and, thus, attempted to control introspection by
rigorous experimental procedure. He states that:
"First ... mental processes may not be observed while 
they are taking place. We must limit ourselves to 
analysing them, so far as possible, from the effects 
which they leave behind in our memory. Secondly: 
wherever it is possible, we must endeavour so to 
control our mental processes by means of objective 
stimulation of the external organs . . . that the 
disturbing influence which the condition of 
observation tends to exercise upon them is 
counteracted. This control is given by experiment" 
(Wundt 1894/1977, pl2-13).
Recognising the distorting nature of introspection, ie. that
in observing a process the process, by this observation, is
altered, Wundt attempted to overcome this problem by rigorous
experimental procedure. Observation requires the focusing of
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attention. Yet, for introspection, because the observer and 
the observed are one and the same, this is an impossible task 
without changing that which is observed. For Wundt, the 
experiment provided this focus of attention. Very simple 
objects were presented (such as letters, or points of light), 
and often only for a short time, so that, essentially what was 
available to be 7 ideated7 was limited, and, therefore, 
focused. It was the careful and systematic control over the 
stimuli (the experimental method) which made scientific 
introspection possible (Wundt 1904). Allied to this tight 
control over the stimulus, observers were also trained in 
introspection. Partly, this approach was expected to produce 
such habitual observation so as to diminish self consciousness 
(Lyons, 1986) , but probably it was also necessary so that 
sensations could be correctly defined.
Even with this control over the conditions of introspection, 
Wundt believed that much of mental life could not be studied 
through introspection. Whilst Wundt believed that the 
contents of sensory perception could be examined through 
introspection, he placed the study of higher cognate 
phenomenon in social psychology. Blumenthal (1975) equates 
the former, attributes of experience, with what today would be 
termed 7 human information-processing capacities7. The 
7products of common mental life7 (Wundt, 1904) could not be 
examined through introspection, because the mind itself was a 
product of these forces and, therefore, the mind could not be 
conscious of them (Farr, 1983) . They became clear only at a 
collective level.
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Titchener followed Wundt in using introspection as the prime 
method of psychology. However, Titchener extended the range 
of phenomena to which introspection could be applied. And, 
whereas Wundt concentrated on laboratory conditions as the 
controls on introspection, Titchener laid more emphasis on the 
subject as the control (Lyons, 1986) . Hence, he created a 
number of rules about what could and could not be reported in 
order to guard against the 'stimulus error'. That is, in 
introspecting, one must make no reference to the external 
object, all reports must be of subjective sensations. Koffka 
(1924) gives an example of comparing weights where the subject 
cannot say ' This weight is heavier than that' but rather must 
say 'My sensation of tension is now heavier than before'. He 
further points out that this distinction makes it difficult to 
explain the objective nature of perception. It is curious, in 
some ways, that after taking so much trouble to isolate the 
objective conditions these are then expunged from the report 
of experience.
Boring (1953) labels the introspection of Wundt and Titchener 
as 'classical introspection', others have labelled them 
'structuralists' in line with their more general theoretical 
approach, (Valentine, 1978) and to differentiate them from the 
Wurtzburg school.
2.3.2 Introspection and the Wurtzburgers
The main difference between classical introspection and the 
Wurtzburg school seems to lie in to what introspection can be 
applied. The Wurtzburgers extended the use of introspection
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to thought in general. However, there were also differences 
in the methods of introspection. Kulpe describes the 
differences between classical introspection and that practised 
by the Wurtzburg school thus:
"Previously it was the rule not to obtain reports 
about all experiences that occurred during an 
experiment as soon as it was concluded, but only to 
obtain occasional reports from subjects about 
exceptional or abnormal occurrences. Only at the 
conclusion of a whole series was a general report 
requested about the main facts that were still
remembered....... However, as soon as persons trained
in self-observation were allowed to make complete and 
unprejudiced reports about their experiences of an 
experiment immediately after its completion, the 
necessity for an extension of the previous concepts 
and definitions became obvious. (1964/1922, p209-210) .
This passage implies a development in introspective
methodologies. The Wurtzburg school seems to have been less
restrictive in what could be reported during introspection.
In their studies the Wurtzburgers 'discovered' the imageless
thought. This was thought without imagery or feeling and
therefore contradicted the structuralist doctrine. The
ensuing debate over the existence of imageless thought is
often taken as one of the reasons for the demise of
introspection -- as introspection is one person's subjective
experience, there was no way in which to determine which is
the accurate interpretation when there are two conflicting
reports. Did thought have to have accompanying sensations, or
was thought possible without sensations?
Mandler and Mandler (1964) however, claim that the 
introspective protocols produced by the two groups were in 
fact very similar. It was the theoretical interpretation of
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essentially the same data that led to such heated conflict. 
Wundt (1894/1977) had also, in discussing the clarity of an 
idea, noted that, while introspecting, as well as those ideas 
that were clearly apprehended, there may be a number of others 
which are less distinct or entirely indistinct. This type of 
'half - formed' idea is very similar to the description, given 
by the Wurtzburgers, of imageless thought. Although 
certainly, at the time, the lack of agreement between 
different researchers contributed to the demise of 
introspection.
The Gestalt psychologists objected to the analytic 
introspection (which may be roughly equated with classical 
introspection, but provides a more descriptive term) not so 
much on the grounds that it could not provide valid data, but 
rather because of its relevance. Kohler (1930) objected to 
analytic introspection because the adoption of the 
psychological attitude which it entailed (as exemplified by 
the example given by Koffka above) changed ordinary experience 
into something quite different. He did not doubt that given 
the conditions of isolating the stimulus in such an extreme 
way one could decompose experience into the kinds of elements 
described by the analytic introspectionists. But rather, he 
thought that their results were so divorced from the way a 
person normally perceives that they were not generalisable 
beyond the psychological laboratory.
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2.3.3 The behaviourist challenge
Perhaps the main challenge to the use of introspection came 
from alternative frameworks for psychology. In America this 
took the form of behaviourism. The Behaviourists' 
dethronement of introspection came not because they 
demonstrated the invalidity of introspection, but because they 
ignored it and set up an alternative frame for psychology in 
which consciousness, and the mind, played little or no part 
and therefore introspection became irrelevant.
Whilst some behaviourists sometimes claimed that mind did not 
exist (eg Watson, 1930/1967) , the major objection to the use 
of introspection was that one can never really be sure about 
what goes on in another person's mind. Internal data is 
private and subjective, external data is public and objective. 
It was also thought that the experiment did not have the 
distorting influences that introspection did, however, more 
recently the reactivity of the experiment has been 
demonstrated (Orne, 1962). Questions have also been raised 
about the extent to which the external environment can be 
viewed 'objectively' rather than being socially constructed 
(eg. Gergen, 1982). Thus, more recently, the distinction 
between public and private data has become more problematic.
2.4 VERBAL REPORTS -- THE NEW INTROSPECTION ?
Behaviourists were not, however, able to banish introspection 
completely. Boring (1953) notes that introspection could be 
said to be dead, which he believed was true of classical
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introspection, or it could be said to be alive and flourishing 
under various aliases, one of which is verbal reports.
Whilst behaviorism pushed introspection from centre stage in 
regard to academic psychology, it maintained a role in many 
somewhat peripheral areas of psychology. So, the Gestalt 
psychologists collected phenomenal reports, similar to the 
Wurtzburg method of introspection but using naive, rather than 
trained, subjects who reported whatever they thought. A 
number of studies also used "think aloud" techniques, 
collecting the verbal reports simultaneously with a task 
rather than after completion. Psychophysics also found 
introspection a valuable, and indeed vital, method. Though, 
here, it is difficult to see in quite what way the use of 
introspection in psychophysics differs from much of the 
introspection practised by Wundt. Psychoanalysts used verbal 
reports (both in regard to retrospective accounts of dreams 
and in free association) to access the unconscious. Finally, 
with the gradual emergence of social psychology, the 
collection of post-experimental reports became common. 
Indeed, Orne (1962) suggested this method should be used as a 
means of assessing experimental artifacts.
Ericsson and Simon (1980) claim that dissatisfaction with 
classical introspection generalised to any use of verbal 
reports. So much so, they argue, that verbal reports have 
been used only as an heuristic rather than on a par with other 
types of hard data. One of the problems with this conception 
of verbal reports is that it discourages effort to distinguish
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between types of verbal report and when and how they can be 
used. De Groot (19 66) , who used verbal protocols in problem 
solving, summed up this position when he said "many 
psychologists have a bad conscience about using introspective 
data; as a result, they often use them poorly".
2.4.1 Verbal reports -- Nisbett and Wilson's challenge
Perhaps paradoxically, social psychologists have provided one 
of the strongest recent attacks on the use of verbal reports. 
Nisbett and Wilson (19 77) were concerned at the acceptance of 
verbal reports without any investigation of their validity. 
They attempted, in part, to evaluate more systematically the 
use of verbal reports; one aim was to look at why people are 
sometimes accurate in giving reports of higher cognitive 
processes and sometimes not.
Nisbett and Wilson review work in the area of attribution 
theory, subliminal perception, problem solving, and helping 
behaviour in the presence of others. It is perhaps surprising 
that the review of problem solving focuses on retrospective 
reports of 'insight7 and not the numerous studies using some 
form of process tracing technique such as "think aloud". In 
all the cases reviewed they conclude that subjects have been 
shown to be unaware of the processes producing their 
behaviour. In other words, the psychologists and the 
subjects7 explanations for the subjects7 behaviour are 
different. As the psychologists7 explanations derive from the 
experimental methodology, the subjects7 are assumed to be
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unable to accurately introspect the causes of their own 
behaviour.
Nisbett and Wilson then go on to conduct studies of their own, 
choosing situations where they felt that subjects would be 
unable to accurately identify the effects of a stimulus on 
their responses. Here again, they conclude that subjects were 
virtually never accurate in their reports. Their main 
conclusion is that, rather than drawing upon a record of the 
processes that have occurred, people are drawing upon lay 
theories of what would be plausible processes. People are 
accurate to the extent that their theories are accurate and 
not because they have introspective awareness of their 
cognitive processes.
This paper (and others produced in this series, eg. Nisbett 
and Bellows, 19 77) has been criticised on a number of grounds, 
both methodological and theoretical (eg. White, 1980, 1985; 
Smith and Miller, 1978) . It does not seem to be a fair test 
to claim that one is interested in when subjects are accurate 
and then conduct tests and review literature where one thinks 
they are likely to be inaccurate. Others have reviewed 
studies which they felt showed that subjects reports were 
accurate (eg. Lieberman, 1979; Ericsson and Simon, 1984). 
And, as Farr (1987) points out, Nisbett and Wilson's 
conclusion is not dissimilar from the position Wundt had taken 
in splitting his experimental, and introspectionist, 
psychology from his social psychology.
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However, there still was no detailed analysis of why these 
reports are unacceptable when others seem to find 
introspection a useful method. Ericsson and Simon (1980, 
1984), provided this much needed systemisation of the area of 
verbal reports. They present a theory, in information 
processing terms, which moves the debate from one of can we or 
can't we rely on verbal reports to one of under what 
conditions can or can't we rely on verbal reports. Because 
this is such an important theory it is worth describing in 
some detail.
2.4.2 Protocol Analysis - A brief outline of Ericsson and 
Simon's theory of verbal reports.
Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1984) present a theory of
verbalisation in regard to internal processes. This theory 
aims to tackle the misuse, and lack of use, of verbal reports 
as data by specifying when verbal reports are likely to 
reflect underlying processes and when they are not. Byrne 
(1983) points out that verbal reports are used in two ways: 1) 
the content of verbal reports is analysed in order to explain 
other behaviour, and 2) to examine patterns and sequences in 
behaviour. Similarly Bainbridge (1985) says that verbal 
reports collected during the performance of a task give 
information about how knowledge is used in a particular task, 
whilst an interview gives information on the content, 
interrelations and range of knowledge. Ericsson and Simon are 
mostly concerned with using verbal reports for process 
tracing, i.e. for investigating the type and sequence of 
mental operations carried out by a subject performing a set
- 96 -
task. Whilst their theory has implications for other types 
of verbal reports, such as responses in an interview (indeed 
they discuss how the theory applies to survey questions), the 
focus of the theory is on tracing ongoing cognitive processes.
Their theory is based on an information processing approach to 
cognition, with the basic assumption that verbal 
behaviour is just an example of behaviour in general and the 
cognitive processes that generate verbal reports are simply a 
set of the processes that produce any other behaviour. The 
main theoretical assumptions of this approach are that 
cognition is information processing, and that information is 
stored in several memories having different capacities and 
accessing characteristics. Essentially, they conclude that 
two types of information are accurately reportable. Firstly, 
information that is present in short term memory (STM). 
Secondly, information in long term memory (LTM) for which 
markers still exist in STM - these markers mediate the 
retrieval process.
Based on this theory, they predict that the following types of 
verbalization will be accurate reflections of cognitive 
processes:/ 1) concurrent verbalization - that is where the 
subject 'thinks aloud' during completion of a task, when 
information is still in STM. 2)1 retrospective verbalization - 
when it is conducted immediately after the completion of a 
task, when information or cues for retrieving that information 
from LTM are still likely to be in STM. In fact this leads to 
three possible ways to collect verbal protocols: 1) concurrent
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verbalisation 2) immediate retrospection and 3) concurrent 
verbalisation with immediate retrospection (ie. 1 and 2 
combined).
Importance of instructions to verbalise
As well as the timing of the verbalisation, other factors 
involved in eliciting the verbalisation also affect its 
accuracy. Primary among these is the instructions given to 
the subjects for verbalisation. Instructions are important 
because they can affect what type, or level, of information is 
reported. Ericsson and Simon describe three levels of 
verbalisation. Instructions to verbalise may be asking 
subjects to verbalise information at different levels.
Level 1 is simply the verbalisation of 'inner speech'. The 
information being verbalised is already in an oral code. 
Instructions such as: 'Try to think aloud. I guess you often 
do so when you are alone working on a problem' (Duncker, 1926, 
reported by Ericsson and Simon, 1984.) or 'Say out loud 
everything that you say to yourself silently' are presumed to 
ask subjects only to report their 'inner speech' . This kind of 
instruction will only be useful in tasks where one assumes 
that people naturally use oral codes. Where they do not, very 
little information is likely to be obtained from the verbal 
protocol.
For verbalisation at level two it is assumed that some 
translation into a verbal code is necessary. Verbalisation 
does not bring new information into awareness but involves
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labelling information that is held in some non-verbal internal 
format. Ericsson and Simon argue that this level does not 
involve any change in processing, but may require more time. 
Instructions such as: 'Tell me everything that passes through 
your head' require the subject to label and encode the 
contents of STM and, thus, requires the kind of recoding 
involved in level 2 verbalisation. Note that this type of 
instruction may also include the reporting of level 1 -inner 
speech- information.
Level three verbalizations require extra processing steps in 
order to comply with the verbalisation instructions. In these 
cases the verbal protocols will not be an accurate reflection 
of cognitive processes because some mediating process is 
involved between the original thought or process and its 
verbal production. The subject may have to explain his/her 
thoughts. For example the instruction: 'In order to follow
your thoughts we ask you to think aloud, explaining each step 
as thoroughly as you can' requires the subject not only to 
report but also to explain their thoughts and, thus, changes 
the course of ordinary processing. Subjects may also be 
required to report instances of particular types of contents 
or processes; this requires them to monitor their thought 
processes and thus may also change thought processes. Probes 
to report specific types of information would be examples of 
this type of instruction.
Criticisms and defence of verbal reports.
The main criticisms levelled at the use of concurrent
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verbalization are: 1) It affects, and in some way changes, the 
cognitive processes 2) Concurrent verbalizations are mere 
epiphenomena, unrelated to non-verbal behaviour and 3) The 
verbal reports are incomplete.
Ericsson and Simon review a large amount of empirical 
research, mostly in the area of problem solving, where they 
conclude that concurrent verbalisation, "think aloud", is not 
likely to change processing, but may slow it down, when the 
requested verbalisation is at level 1 or 2 described above. 
However, level 3 verbalisation, as noted above, is likely to 
alter processing requirements. Note that this criticism is 
very similar to that identified by early introspectionists - 
namely that introspection changes the process it attempts to 
observe. They attempted to deal with this problem by
experimental control and trained subjects. Ericsson and Simon 
are claiming, in fact, that there is no need for such 
controls. It is, rather, the type of information requested 
which can affect processing.
In answer to the second criticism, Ericsson and Simon argue 
that concurrent reports are likely to represent cognitive
processes when they are at level 1 or 2. At level 3,
different processes could be producing the verbal reports and 
thus they may be unrelated to the cognitive processes of 
interest. For example, if asked 'how' they answered a
question subjects may theorise how they think they must have 
answered it. Thus the subject's theorising, a separate 
process, produces the verbal report. In this case verbal
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reports are unrelated to the process which actually produced 
the original response. Where level 1 or level 2 information 
is provided, Ericsson and Simon give a number of ways to 
determine whether verbal data reflects processing.
For completeness of verbal reports Ericsson and Simon argue 
that 'the information that is heeded during performance of a 
task, is the information that is reportable; and the 
information that is reported is information that is heeded'. 
Information which is not stored in STM or not retrievable from 
LTM will not be reported. So such things as the process of 
recognition or processes which are automatic, will leave only 
their input and output in STM. These inputs and outputs may 
be reported, but not the processes that generated the output. 
In addition to these systematic omissions in reporting, Byrne 
(1983) notes that random omissions are likely, due to 
variations in effort and lapses in attention.
The instructions given to verbalise, may affect whether these 
criticisms are relevant, as they effect the level and type of 
information produced. So for example, to ensure that reports 
reflect the underlying process subjects should be asked to 
report only what they are thinking, perhaps as they are 
thinking it. They should be asked NOT to explain their
thoughts. And, they should not be asked to provide particular 
types of information. To make reports as complete as possible 
they should be asked to report all their thoughts.
101 -
The collection of retrospective reports presents some of the 
same problems as concurrent reports. For example, asking 
subjects to explain their thoughts will lead to reports which 
are not reports of their actual cognitive processing. There 
are also additional problems involved in the collection of 
retrospective reports. Some of the main worries include the 
fact that subjects, if asked to report after a series of 
trials, may not be reporting specific information from any one 
trial but may be reporting generalised information abstracted 
from performance across some or all of the trials. Also it 
should be made clear to subjects that only information which 
they can remember attending to on a particular trial (or when 
answering a particular question) should be reported, that is, 
not to report their current thinking about how they solve a 
problem (or would answer a question) , but what they can 
remember thinking when they actually solved a specific 
problem.
2.5 VERBAL REPORTS AND INTROSPECTION
Ericsson and Simon have detailed the conditions under which 
verbal reports can be said to be accurate, or inaccurate, 
descriptions of cognitive processes. They have provided a 
theory describing where these data come from, how they are 
produced. In so doing, they provide an explanation of what 
these data mean, how to interpret them. It is through this 
theory-based explanation that we can determine what these data 
are reports of and thus determine what they 'measure'.
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Comparing Ericsson and Simon's theory of the production of 
verbal reports to the early use of introspection, it can be 
seen that there are a number of differences between the two 
methods.
At a general level, both Ericsson and Simon's 'verbal reports' 
and 'classical introspection' seem to be very similar -- they 
are both meant to be reports of immediate experience. The 
differences lie not so much in what they studied as in how 
they studied it. I think Wundt and others were, in this 
endeavor, not so much wrong in principle as wrong in practice. 
A number of differences obtain between classical introspection 
and the verbal protocol technique, suggesting the presence of 
biases in the experimental arrangements of the classical 
introspectionists.
Ericsson and Crutcher (1991) define the introspective approach 
as one which relies on reports from skilled observers; these 
reports are given privileged status. Protocol analysis on the 
other hand uses naive respondents, and verbal reports are 
treated as just another form of data. Having skilled 
observers creates a number of problems. The subjects are not 
naive to the experimental hypotheses; they may be directed as 
to what elements to report; and there is some confusion 
between data production and data interpretation, that is, 
these subjects not only reported their thoughts, but also 
analysed them. These types of reports would constitute level 
3 verbalisations in Ericsson and Simon's terms, and thus pose 
problems for the validity of the data as reports of thoughts.
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Also, classical introspection often involved reports after the 
completion of perhaps a number of trials. This would also 
raise problems with the validity of reports.
Ericsson and Simon (1984) point out that the type of 
experience subjects in classical introspection were attempting 
to report was essentially that associated with sensory stores; 
information not normally attended to, or available in STM, and 
thus difficult to report on accurately. This is, perhaps, 
another reason why trained subjects were necessary. Verbal 
reports, on the other hand, as conceived by Ericsson and 
Simon, should only be reports of heeded information. But, 
what is heeded can vary with the subject, and the conditions 
of observation; hence Wundt's attempts to control the 
information available to be processed.
Thus the use of verbal reports as data on cognitive processes 
may be seen as in the same tradition as early experimental 
psychologists. The main difference is that the theory 
underlying the production of verbal reports specifies 
different conditions for their collection, differences which 
influence the validity of these reports.
Since introspection's falling from favour there have been 
numerous reassessments of its use, and many ideas of what it 
is. Some have held up Freudian introspection as the model to 
be followed (eg Bakan, 1954; Howe, 1991), others include 
reports on cognitive processes (eg Lieberman, 1979), and some 
do not define what they mean by introspection at all (eg Burt,
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1962) . Introspection is perhaps best seen as a family of 
methods (McKellerf 1962). Radford (1974) defines three groups 
of activities which have been referred to as introspection in 
terms of what the subject is asked to do. These are self- 
observation, self-reports and thinking aloud. In the first, 
a person observes his or her own mental events. In the 
second, a person reports his or her experience but without 
attempting to be objective. The third is self explanatory.
The classical introspectionists may come under the category of 
self-observation, Ericsson and Simon's reports would be 
included in think aloud. Nisbett and Ross, however, are more 
likely dealing with a type of self-report. Subjects in their 
experiments are not engaged in self-observation, because they 
generally did not know, whilst engaged in the activity, that 
they would be queried about their thinking on it, nor did they 
think aloud. Thus Nisbett and Wilson's are dealing with a 
different kind of verbal report than either Ericcson and Simon 
or the early introspectionists.
Nisbett and Wilson are asking subjects to provide reasons for 
their behaviour. In Ericcson and Simon's terms they are 
asking for level 3 information; they are not simply reporting 
their processing, but explaining it. The ability to provide 
reasons for one's actions rests on the ability to have insight 
into oneself, self knowledge. Nisbett & Wilson seem to be 
suggesting that subjects should have knowledge about why they 
do the things they do; in fact, to such an extent, that they 
should be able to explain their behaviour from the perspective
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of the experimental psychologists even though they do not have 
access to the same vital information as does the psychologist. 
If people did have the kind of self knowledge that Nisbett and 
Wilson regard as introspection, the psychologist would be 
redundant. It is more likely, as Nisbett and Wilson 
demonstrate, that people do not have this information. Rather 
they construct knowledge of themselves from theories and 
representations which they have derived through social 
interaction. When explaining themselves it is upon these 
theories that they draw.
In fact this view is very similar to a definition of 
introspection put forward by Lyons (1986, 1991). Reviewing 
early psychological and philosophical theories of 
introspection, he concludes that essentially these theories 
have given a two-level account of introspection. That is, 
they regard introspection as involving some second level 
process which monitors the first level process of thought. 
Thus, introspection becomes a distinct psychological process. 
One of the attendant ideas associated with this view is that 
it gives people some kind of privileged access to their
thoughts. They can, as it were, observe them from above.
This is the view of intropsection which Nisbett and Wilson 
discredit.
Lyons argues that this view of introspection is incorrect and 
suggests an alternative idea of what people are doing when 
they are said to be introspecting. In this view,
introspection is simply a first order process not unlike other
first order perceptual processes. It involves replaying, 
reseeing, refeeling etc.. There is no need for some kind of 
monitoring system in this approach. In these terms 
introspection is a kind of self-reflection, an ability to 
contemplate ourselves through recollection, and imagination, 
and is thus part of normal psychological processing, not some 
kind of special activity. He sees this as being linked to 
self-explanation, or self-knowledge, which ultimately derives 
from folk theories, much as Nisbett and Wilson regard 
explanations of behaviour as relying on personal theories.
There is certainly some reason to doubt these types of reports 
as accurate descriptions of cognitive processes. Yet there 
may be other uses for this type of data. For example, if one 
is interested in lay theories of thought this kind of data 
would be very useful. Whether they are accurate accounts is 
not the issue in this context, although it may also be 
interesting to determine when, and for what kinds of issues, 
will people's accounts and psychologist's accounts converge. 
Perhaps the dissemination of psychological theories may alter 
the explanations, as Moscovici (1976) has shown to be the case 
with psychoanalysis. Both Lyons, and Nisbett and Wilson, 
argue for a theory based production of this type of verbal 
report. In this way they attempt to define the processes 
involved in the production of this type of verbal report, a 
definition which describes the data in terms of normal 
psychological processing. Thus, this kind of report, or 
introspection, should not be rejected as data per se, but it
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needs to be treated as a different kind of data than verbal 
reports of immediate experience - process data.
These distinctions are important for survey methods because 
the survey method is also a form of verbal report, mostly 
involving self-reports, but sometimes respondents are asked 
for reasons - - Why do you do x? or Why do you think x?
Nisbett and Wilson's general arguments about people's ability 
to explain the reasons for their behaviour suggest caution in 
the interpretation of such data, indeed they suggest a
different interpretation of these data may be necessary.
The idea that people can give accurate self-reports is
questionned in recent approaches to the survey and the
processes involved in the production of these types of reports 
are now being investigated. In much the same way as Ericsson 
and Simon have described the production of verbal reports of 
cognitive processes, researchers in CASM are attempting to 
explain the production of another type of verbal report, the 
survey response. The need to explain the processing behind 
the production of this type of report makes the use of 
Ericsson and Simon's type of verbal report an attractive 
methodological option.
Looking back to the studies discussed earlier in this chapter 
which use verbal reports of cognitive processing during survey 
response, it seems that most have avoided blatantly asking for 
explanations of response, and thus exposing themselves to 
Nisbett and Wilson's criticisms of verbal reports. A question
- 108 -
such as 'why did you answer the question in that way' might be 
seen as asking for such self-explanations. Whilst most survey 
researchers want to obtain reports of the immediate 
experiences which occur while answering questions, some seem 
definitely to have used methods that, according to Ericcson 
and Simon's analysis, seriously undermine the validity of 
these reports as reports of heeded thoughts. Clearly, the re- 
interview technique poses far too great a demand on the recall 
abilities of respondents, and directive verbal probing is 
likely to involve level three processing, that is, it holds 
the risk of being produced by processes different from those 
used to respond to questions.
Some survey researchers, however, have complied with Ericcson 
and Simon's prescriptions for accurate verbal reporting, 
collecting reports during or immediately after response, 
without prompting from the interviewer. Having reviewed 
Ericcson and Simon's theory, there seems to be no definite 
theoretical reasons to doubt the validity of think-aloud 
techniques for survey response.
The empirical evidence for the usefulness and validity of 
verbal protocols is also generally positive. Verbal reports 
of cognitive processes, or verbal protocols, have been applied 
to many areas, aside from the area of problem solving, with 
apparent success. These include: decision making (Payne,
Braunstein, & Carroll, 1978; Svenson, 1989; Wofford & Goodwin, 
1990), applied areas such as processing engaged in by machine 
operators, and management appraisal (Bainbridge, 1985; Martin
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& Klimoski, 1990) , consumer research (Smead, Wilcox, & Wilkes, 
1981; Wright and Rip, 1980), and persuasion research (Wright, 
1980) .
However, whilst much of the research that has examined the 
validity of protocol analysis has failed to show differences 
between verbalising and non-verbalising groups in their 
choices, judgements, or problems solutions (eg. Ericsson & 
Simon, 1984; Smead et al, 1981), some studies have found
differences in processing between verbalising groups and non­
verbalising groups. That is, using designs which have some 
subjects verbalising on all trials and some subjects 
verbalising only on some trials, some differences in 
processing has been found, for example in studies of consumer 
choice decisions (Biehal & Chakravarti, 19 89), and impression
formation tasks (Mumma, Draguns, & Seibel, 1993). These tend
— —   —
to suggest that concurrent verbalisation may, for some types 
of information, or some types of processes, facilitate task 
processing. This facilitation may be due to stronger memory 
traces due to thinking aloud. It is unclear whether these 
results are important in the use of think aloud in the survey. 
The type of tasks used in the above studies are relatively 
complex, much more so than the task of answering a typical 
survey question. It is likely that if task facilitation 
effects do occur, they may be greater for more complex tasks, 
such as choosing between a variety of items based on a number 
of dimensions. Survey questions are, generally, not tasks 
which involve the same type of complexity, though they may 
involve different types of difficulties (eg recall of personal
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information). However, the suggestion that checks be carried 
out on the validity of concurrent verbalisation for different 
tasks (Mumma et al, 1993) seems a prudent one.
2.6 CONCLUSIONS
One of the arguments running through a number of papers 
calling for a reassessment of introspection is that no method 
is error free. This is certainly true, but it should not mean 
that no attempt is made to identify and deal with these 
errors, especially as the alternatives are either to accept 
error as a fact of life or to discard methods where errors are 
suspected. Neither of these options is conducive to the 
development of psychological methodology, nor by extension to 
the development of psychology as a whole.
In determining whether data are valid or not, it is clear that 
some theoretical explanation of how the data are produced is 
necessary. Different types of verbal reports may be produced 
by different processes. To determine what verbal reports are 
reports of one needs to distinguish what produced the report. 
Ericsson and Simon have provided this basic theoretical 
underpinning to the production of verbal reports of cognitive 
processes. Research within the CASM framework attempts a 
similar feat for verbal reports given as survey responses.
It seems that survey researchers could usefully draw on 
Ericcson and Simon's analysis in investigating the processes 
underlying survey response. Indeed, some have already done
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so. But, even here doubts are expressed about their validity 
and uncertainty remains over which method to use and what kind 
of information they provide. Thus, an investigation of verbal 
protocols in the survey seems warrented.
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CHAPTER 3. EXPERIMENT 1. 
AN EXAMINATION OF VERBAL REPORTS 
FOR SURVEY QUESTIONS
SUMMARY
This chapter reports on an experiment designed to test 
different verbal report methods for collecting data on 
cognitive processes associated with responses to 
survey questions. An experiment was conducted using 
four different techniques for collecting verbal 
reports which are in line with Ericcson and Simon's 
principles for verbal reporting. An effort is made to 
determine which method is most suitable for the 
survey. The completeness of the reports is considered 
and qualitative assessments of validity are made.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
It appears, from studies discussed in the previous chapter, 
that verbal reports can be expected to provide useful 
information about survey response processes. Yet, in the 
survey literature there is also a good deal of uncertainty 
about verbal reports: is the validity of some methods suspect? 
Is information on some issues likely to be inaccessible? Even 
conforming to the principles of valid reporting identified by 
Ericsson and Simon, some researchers use think aloud, others 
use retrospection only and some use a combination. Given this 
evident confusion a study designed to assess the use of verbal
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reports in surveys is warrented. This would allow a more 
informed choice on the most suitable method to use with
surveys.
The aims of the present study are to assess which type of
report -- think aloud, retrospection, or both -- is most
suitable for the study of survey response processes.
This raises the question of what criteria to use to assess 
what is the 'most suitable' method. Ideally the method should 
produce verbal reports which are both valid and complete: 
valid in the sense that the protocol is a report of heeded 
thoughts rather than the method itself influencing the
thoughts produced; complete in the sense that everything that 
is (at least consciously) thought is reported.
In terms of validity, the standard method for examining the 
effects of think aloud is to compare the output measures for 
a verbalising group and a non-verbalising group engaged in the 
same task. Such a comparison is not practical in the case of 
survey data. As there is no correct answer, large numbers 
would be required in order to conduct any reasonable test in 
this manner. The analysis of such a large number of protocols 
is impractical (Ericsson and Oliver, 1986, suggest that 20 is 
a large number of verbal protocols).
Hence, other ways of assessing the validity of the data are 
needed. Some suggestions of other, more qualitative, 
indicators of validity in verbal protocol data include: how
easy it is for respondents to verbalise (Byrne 1983), and the 
structure of the language used (Ericsson and Simon 1984). 
Comparing think aloud and retrospective reports may also 
provide useful information.
Given validity, the assessment of the comparable completeness 
of reports is fairly straightforward - - which method provides 
the most information. Of course this does not indicate how 
complete the reports are in any absolute sense, but only in 
comparison to other reports.
3.2 METHOD
This experiment was designed to investigate verbal report 
procedures for collecting information on cognitive processes 
underlying response to a structured questionnaire in an 
interview setting. To do this four groups were given
different instructions for verbal reports.
Group 1 received an instruction for think aloud only, using a 
modified wording of the instruction suggested by Ericsson and 
Simon (19 84) which was used by Bishop (1989) . This is 
referred to as instruction A. Group 2 also received an 
instruction for think-aloud only; this was a modified wording 
of the instruction used by Russo, Johnson,and Stephens and 
reported by Svenson (1989) - Instruction B. Group 3 received 
an instruction for think aloud with immediate retrospection. 
The think aloud part of the instruction was the same as for 
group one, but also included instructions for immediate
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retrospection. This instruction is also a modified version of 
that suggested by Ericsson and Simon and used by Bishop - 
Instruction C. Group 4 received an instruction for immediate
   ...._i win lirr-— “~ — •
retrospection only. This was the same (slightly modified) 
instruction as the immediate retrospection instruction 
received by group 3 - Instruction D. The full wording of
these instructions is given in appendix 1. Figure 3.1 below 
outlines the experimental conditions.
FIGURE 3.1 
Experimental Conditions
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4
Type of
verbal
report
TA TA TA + 
RETROSPECTION
RETROSPECTION
ONLY
Instruction A B C
(A+D)
D
(TA = think aloud)
This design allows comparisons to be made between the verbal 
resports produced by two different think aloud instructions, 
between think aloud on its own and think aloud with 
retrospection, and between think aloud accounts, and 
retrospective accounts.
3.2.1 The questionnaire.
Each of the four groups received the same questionnaire.
The main priorities in the design of the questionnaire were 
that it should be relevant to the sample, reflect the kind of 
questions used in surveys, and contain questions which, in 
theory, pose different response problems.
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The questionnaire comprised nine questions. The first four 
questions were factual questions dealing with library use: 
usual weekly hours spent in library (USUAL USE), actual hours 
spent in library last week (LAST WEEK USE), comparing this 
term's use to the previous term's use (COMPARE USE), items 
used in library over four weeks (WHAT USE) . The fifth 
question was a subjective behavioral question, also pertaining 
to the library: frequency of annoyance with library services 
(ANNOY LIB) . The final four questions were taken from the 
Eurobarometer survey and were attitudinal questions dealing 
with issues concerning Britain: satisfaction with democracy 
(DEMOSAT), whether Britain has benefited from membership of 
the EC (ECBENEFIT) , reaction to the possibility of the EC 
being scrapped (ECSCRAP) , and what should be the priority goal 
for Britain (GOALS). The complete questionnaire is given in 
appendix 2.
3.2.2 Respondents
Forty respondents were recruited from around the LSE. 
Respondents were mainly students at the LSE but a few were 
members of staff and a few were students from other colleges 
who also had classes at the LSE, or came to use the library. 
Male and Female respondents were used. Whilst most were 
British, a few were foreign students who spoke very good 
english. The age range was from about 19 to 50. There were 
10 respondents in each of the four conditions.
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3.2.3 Procedure
The respondent was seated across from the interviewer. They 
were asked to agree to being tape recorded. None refused, or 
expressed any anxiety about being recorded. The respondent 
was then given the appropriate instruction for his/her 
condition and asked to read it. When he/she had finished 
reading the instructions, he/she was asked whether he/she 
understood what he/she was to do. Most said they did. Any 
uncertainties raised by respondents were dealt with before 
continuing. This consisted of the Interviewer paraphrasing 
the particular instruction the respondent had received, and 
was required only in a small number of cases.
The respondent was then given two practice questions before 
going on to the main questionnaire. During the practice 
questions respondents engaged in the appropriate verbal report 
procedure for their condition. Minimal feedback was given 
about whether they were verbalising correctly (eg "yes, that's 
what I'd like you to do" or "try to tell me everything you 
think"). After the interviewer was assured that the 
respondent felt comfortable with the procedure, the main 
questionnaire was administered.
The interviewer then asked each question and recorded answers 
as in a normal interview. Think aloud respondents verbalised 
while answering each question. Respondents in the
retrospection conditions were prompted with "Now tell me all 
that you can remember about your thinking", at each question 
after respondents had answered, although occasionally 
respondents pre-empted this prompt by immediately reporting
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their thinking. The Interviewer gave the appropriate prompt 
(see instructions) when long silences occurred during think 
aloud.
After the questionnaire was completed, each respondent was 
asked to report all that he/she could remember about the 
instructions which they had received initially. They were 
then asked for their reactions to and comments on the 
procedure.
3.3 RESULTS
These results present the analyses of the verbal protocols 
produced by respondents. Responses to the questions are not 
analysed. The data are mostly categorical and because of the 
low subject numbers many cell frequencies are too small for 
analysis.
The protocols have been analysed in a number of ways. 
Comparisons between the different instruction groups are made 
in terms of the amount of verbalisation, the similarity of 
content in what is said, the structure of the language used, 
and the amount of time taken to respond as well as the rate of 
verbalisation.
To compare whether the content of the protocols differs across 
groups a content analysis of the protocols was done. Coding 
frames were developed for each question using classical 
content analysis methods. The coding frames were developed ad
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hoc from both the think-aloud and retrospective protocols. 
Protocols were exhastively broken down into independent 
statements. These statements were then given a descriptive 
label, for example, the statements 'I spent time on the 
computer [in the library]' and 'I got three books out' were 
identified as activities done in the library. These labels 
formed the basis of category development; subsequent 
statements given the same descriptive label were grouped 
together to form a category. When a sufficient number of 
protocols were coded to allow categories to be descriminated, 
further protocols were coded using these categories. Each 
statement was placed in only one category. Where, after 
coding was complete, a category had a very small number of 
statements, these were collapsed into more general categories 
or, if there was no logical relation to other categories were 
placed in an 'other' category. The codes produced from this 
analysis will also inform counts of the amount of 
verbalisation, and also the rate of verbalisation. (Examples 
of coding frames are given in figure 3.3).
3.3.1 Comparisons of amount of words and codes.
The number of words used in the protocols was compared across 
groups. This was expected to give some gross indication of 
the similarity of different instructions for verbal reports. 
In addition, the number of codes used (taken from the content 
analysis) was also compared.
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Comparisons between think aloud protocols.
The mean number of words used per question in think aloud 
protocols is given in table 3.1 below, along with a breakdown 
across question type. For the behavioral and attitude 
questions this represents the mean of four questions; for the 
subjective behavioral question, the mean is, in fact, the mean 
for only one question. The response to the question forms 
part of the number of words at a question.
TABLE 3.1
Average number of words per question in think aloud 
protocols, (standard deviations are given in parentheses).
Behaviour 
Q's 1-4
Subj ective
Behaviour
Q5
Attitude 
Q's 6-9
Overall 
Q's 1-9
Group 1 36 (23) 70 (45) 78 ( 59) 57 (33)
Group 2 23 (16) 77 (48) 63 (46) 46 (25)
Group 3 35 (20) 97 (80) 110 (93) 75 (48)
Group 4 15 (12) 59 (78) 2 8 ( 27) 24 (24)
In all the groups there was a large variance in the number of 
words produced. Some respondents talked a great deal, while 
some did little more than verbalise the answer to the 
question. Variability seems to be due both to some 
respondents being better verbalisers or more keen respondents 
than others, but also to variation in the response task. For 
example, some respondents give only a response when asked how 
many hours they spent in the library last week (Q2) because 
they knew they were away and immediately say 'none' ; other 
respondents, who did use the library, have more to think
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about. Thus, the response problem is not constant across 
respondents.
Although group 4 respondents do not receive a think aloud 
instruction, some subjects do produce some verbalisation 
during answering the question, thus they 'spontaneously' think 
aloud. The variation is very large in this group.-"
A one-way analysis of variance was carried out across the 
groups on the total number of words used for all questions 
across groups. This was significant (F=4.09, p=.013). A
priori contrasts were carried out between the three think 
aloud groups and group 4; it was expected that an instruction 
to think aloud would increase the amount of think aloud. 
These results are presented in table 3.2 below.
TABLE 3.2
Results of Contrasts between Think Aloud Groups 
and Group 4 (No Think Aloud)
GROUP T Value D.F. T Prob.
1 VS 4 -2.628 16.3 . 018
2 VS 4 -2.002 17.9 .061
3 VS 4 -3.057 13 .2 .009
Groups 1 and 3 differ significantly from group 4, group 2 
approaches significance. It seems that an instruction to 
think aloud increases the gross amount of verbalisation, 
however the instructions for groups 1 and 3 have a greater 
impact than the instructions for group 2. Comparisons
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between the three think aloud groups showed that none were
significantly different from each other.
Across all groups respondents tend to say less on the 
behavioral questions (questions 1, 2, 3, and 4) than they do 
on the attitude questions (6, 7, 8, and 9). Question 5 (ANNOY 
LIB), the subjective behaviourial question is more similar to 
the attitude questions in the amount of words spoken than to 
the behavioral questions. The fact that the attitude 
questions come after the factual questions suggests that the 
difference in amount of words between the question types might 
simply be a practice effect. However, the pattern across 
questions does not show a simple increase from earlier to 
later questions. (See figure 3.2 below) For example, question 
8 (ECSCRAP), an attitude question, is more similar in amount 
of words to the factual questions. Theoretically, this is 
what one might expect given that it comes directly after a 
question on the same topic (ECBENEFIT).
FIGURE 3.2
Mean number of words per question for think aloud 
groups (groups 1-3)
m ean num ber of words
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A breakdown of the average number of words per group per 
question is given in appendix 3. Mostly, the different groups 
show a similar pattern across the questions.
The number of words used provides a relatively objective 
measure of the gross amount of think aloud, however, it does 
not indicate whether what is said is meaningful. An 
instruction to 7 talk constantly' may simply encourage 
respondents to use more words to say the same thing. Looking 
at the number of codes used, whilst less objective, gives more 
indication of whether the groups differ in the number of 
'thoughts' produced, rather than merely the amount of words. 
The mean number of codes used per question type and for all 
questions is given in Table 3.3 below.
TABLE 3.3
Average number of codes per question in think aloud 
protocols. (standard deviations are given in parentheses)
Behaviour 
Q's 1-4
Subj ective
Behaviour
Q5
Attitude 
Q's 6-9
Overall 
Q's 1-9
Group 1 3 .9 (2.1) 6.4 (2.8) 6 . 8  (2.5) 5.5 (2.0)
Group 2 2.4 <1.4) 6.9 (4.5) 5.4 (3.0) 4.2 (1.8)
Group 3 3.3 (1.4) 5.8 (3.3) 8.5 (5.7) 5.9 (2.8)
Group 4 1 . 8  (1.1) 4.6 (3 .7) 2.6 (1.8) 2.4 (1.4)
The pattern of codes is similar to the pattern for the mean 
number of words. These results were analysed in the same way 
as above; the one-way ANOVA was significant at F=5.79, p=.002. 
The results of contrasts are given in tables 3.4 below. All
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think aloud groups differ significantly from group 4 and none
of them are significantly different from each other.
TABLE 3.4
Results of Contrasts between Think Aloud 
Groups and Group 4 (No Think Aloud).
Group T Value D.F. T Prob.
1 VS 4 -4.001 16.3 .001
2 VS 4 -2.485 17.0 .024
3 VS 4 -3.524 13 .2 .004
A breakdown of the means for each question is given in 
appendix 3. The mean number of codes per question is similar 
to the mean number of words.
Comparison of amount of retrospection
The mean amount of retrospection per question in groups 3 and 
4, broken down into question type as above, is given in table 
3.5 below.
TABLE 3.5
Average number of words per question in 
retrospective protocols.
Behaviour 
Q's 1-4
Subj ective
Behaviour
Q5
Attitude 
Q's 6-9
Overall 
Q's 1-9
Group 3 44 (21) 75 (63) 94 (67) 69 (37)
Group 4 63 (35) 9 0 (81) 84 (61) 76 (49)
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There are no significant differences in the amount of words 
produced in retrospective reports. As with the think-aloud 
protocols, the variation between subjects is large. The 
amount of retrospection is similar to the amount of think- 
aloud, except that group 4 seems to say a bit more on the 
behavioural questions.
A breakdown of means for individual questions is given in 
appendix 3. Only one question produced a significantly 
different amount of words between the two groups; this was 
question 4 (WHAT USE). The mean number of words for group 3 
was 39.33 (sd=29.31) and the mean for group 4 was 110.5
(sd=94.15). This was significant at t=2.27, p=.044. Group 4 
respondents produce significantly more words in their 
retrospective reports than do group 3 respondents.
As for the think aloud protocols, the number of codes used was 
compared for the retrospective reports. The results resemble 
those for the number of words. The mean number of codes per 
question is presented in table 3.6 below. There is very 
little difference between them, and again the variance is 
large.
TABLE 3.6
Average number of codes per question in 
retrospective protocols.
Behaviour 
Q's 1-4
Subjective
Behaviour
Q5
Attitude 
Q's 6-9
Overall 
Q's 1-9
Group 3 3.4 (1.3) 4.0 (2.7) 6.2 (3.9) 4.9 (2.7)
Group 4 5.1 (2.4) 5.3 (3.9) 5.2 (2.5) 5.2 (2.4)
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Results for individual questions are similar to those for the 
mean number of words. Most questions produce a similar number 
of codes across groups; the exception is question 4 (WHAT USE) 
where group 4 produces significantly more codes than group 3 
(t=-2.81 p .018).
Comparison between think aloud and retrospection
The mean number of words given in think aloud and 
retrospective protocols was compared for group 3, where each 
respondent provides both a think aloud and a retrospective 
report for each question. The means are given in table 3.10 
below.
A Pearsons correlation was carried out, on the total number of 
words in think aloud and in retrospective protocols, giving r= 
.91 which is significant at p > .001 (The correlation between 
number of codes gave a similar result r=.79, p=.03) . Thus the 
gross amount of think aloud and retrospection is highly 
positively related, the more respondents say in their think 
aloud protocols, the more they say in their retrospective 
protocols.
TABLE 3.7
Average number of words per question in think aloud 
and retrospective protocols.
Behaviour 
Q's 1-4
Subjective
Behaviour
Q5
Attitude 
Q's 6-9
Overall 
Q's 1-9
Think Aloud 35 ( 20) 97 (80) 110 (93) 75 (48)
Retrospection 44 (21) 75 (63) 94 (67) 69 (37)
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Individual questions were compared using related t-tests, most 
show little difference. For question 2 (LAST WEEK USE) there 
is a significant difference between the amount of think aloud 
and the amount of retrospection; respondents say more in their 
retrospective protocols than in their think aloud protocols 
(t=-3.85 p .005). However, this seems to be due to a number 
of respondents who do not use the library giving only a short 
response at the question, but going on to say more in their 
retrospection.
3.3.2 Analysis of content of protocols.
Coding frames were developed for each question, because 
different questions asked for different information. The 
results presented here are thus by question, rather than 
across all questions. The same coding frames were used for 
retrospective and think aloud protocols. Examples of the 
coding frames are given in figure 3.3. Coding frames for all 
questions are given in appendix 4.
The analyses to be presented compare number of codes per
category across groups, rather than the number of respondents 
using a code. The latter gives too little data for
comparison. One problem with using number of codes per
category is that it does not take account of how many
respondents use the code and thus may be heavily influenced by 
one or two respondents' repeated use of a particular code. 
However, this will be taken into account where necessary when 
looking at the results.
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Figure 3.3 
Examples of Coding Frames
QUESTION 1: USUAL LIBRARY USE QUESTION 6:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY
1. Activities
a. In library 1. Aspects of democracy
b. general
2 . Defining terms
2. Amount of use
a. Hours (response) 3 . Comparisons
b. number of visits
c. Calculations of amount 4. Evaluations
3. Personal statements 5. Dealing with the scale
4. About the question 6. Personal statements
a. Repeat/rephrase question
b. difficulties 7. About the question
c. time frame consideration a. Repeat/rephrase
5. Other
question 
b. difficulties
6. Process description 8. Other
9. Process Descriptions
10 . Responses
Content of think aloud protocols across groups.
Chi- squared tests were done only between the three think 
aloud groups (groups 1, 2 and 3), as there were too few codes 
for testing in the think aloud of group 4.
For most questions the distribution of codes across groups was 
similar. For question 4 (WHAT USE) inspection of the codes 
shows that group 1 and 2 respondents mention their reasons for 
use and amount of use of library services more than do group 
3 respondents (16, 7, and 1 code used for all subjects,
respectively) . However, no test was conducted for this 
question because the low number of codes given overall would
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have required the combination of very diverse categories in 
order to carry out a legal test. In any case, the results 
from this question need to be treated cautiously, as most 
respondents say very little, with an average of less than 3 
codes per respondent. Also, the large variance means that many 
respondents say nothing (other than the response), hence this 
result is heavily biased by a few respondents who do have 
something to say.
Comparison of retrospective protocols.
For questions 2 (LAST WEEK USE) , 3 (COMPARE USE) , 4 (WHAT
USE), 5 (ANNOY LIB), and 6 (DEMOSAT) no significant
differences were found in the distribution of the codes. For 
questions 1 (USUAL USE) , 7 (ECBENEFIT) , 8 (ECSCRAP) and 9
(GOALS) the chi squares were significant. These are presented 
in tables 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 below.
TABLE 3.8
Analysis of content of Question 1 (USUAL USE)
Activities Amount of use Other Codes Total
GROUP 3 12 11 15 38
GROUP 4 3 30 10 43
TOTAL 15 40 25 81
X2=15 .12 df = 2, significant at .001
The differences at question 1 lie largely in the mention of 
"activities" and "amount of library use". Group 3 mentions 
more of the former and group 4 more of the latter. The former
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category includes statements such as "and that I normally go 
in, find out on the computer or the uh slide things the books 
that I need...". The latter category consists of general 
estimates of time spent in library such as "I've been spending 
a lot of time in there", it also includes hours per day, days 
used, descriptions of calculations, and also the response of 
hours per week.
TABLE 3.9
Analysis of Content of Question 7 (ECBENEFIT)
Beliefs/
Aspects
Evaluations Process
Description
personal
statement
Other TOTAL
GROUP 3 10 8 18 16 8 60
GROUP 4 9 13 8 9 17 56
TOTAL 19 21 26 25 25 116
X2=10.25 df = 4, significant at .05
For question 7, there are a number of small differences in the 
use of most codes except the mention of "beliefs or aspects". 
The code of "process descriptions" here includes such 
statements as "It just sort of came in a rush".
TABLE 3.10 
Analysis of Content of Question 8 (ECSCRAP)
Beliefs & 
evaluations
Process
Description
Other TOTAL
GROUP 3 8 12 14 34
GROUP 4 3 3 27 33
TOTAL 11 15 41 67
X2=ll.77 df = 2, significant at .01
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The differences for question 8 are mostly from the mention of 
more of a variety of "other" codes by group 4 and more use of 
"process descriptions" by group 3.
TABLE 3.11 
Analysis of Content of Question 9 (GOALS)
Mentions/
reads
evaluations beliefs/
aspects
Process
Description
Other TOTAL
GROUP 3 12 25 14 24 13 88
GROUP 4 5 19 13 3 12 52
TOTAL 17 44 27 27 25 140
X2=11.68 df = 4, significant at .05
The differences for question 9 are largely due to the use of 
more "process descriptions" by group 3, with other minor 
differences.
Think-aloud compared with retrospection
Comparing the codes used by respondents giving both think 
aloud and retrospective protocols gives some indication of the 
similarities between the two reports. A strict comparison of 
codes shows that there is a good deal of difference in the 
codes used. Table 3.12 below gives the proportion of codes 
which occur in both the think aloud and retrospective 
protocols.
TABLE 3.12
Proportion of codes which differ between think aloud 
and retrospective protocols.
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
38 .32 .36 .17 .53 .47 .38 .37 .34
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There are a number of reasons for this difference in the 
number of common codes. Firstly, the retrospective protocols 
use more process descriptions than the think aloud protocols. 
The 'process description' code was used only when it was 
purely a process description; if a unit was partially a 
process description, but could be coded into a different 
category, then it was. Two statements from question 9 (GOALS) 
will serve as an example:
1. "and I remember reading two and thinking that I quite liked
two".
2. "..and like trying to evaluate them as quickly as
possible".
This first statement was coded as an evaluation; while it 
partly describes thinking, it also makes a direct evaluation. 
The second statement was coded as a process description, 
because there is no actual evaluation of any response 
category, but only a statement that this process was carried 
out.
Secondly, the differences in content between think aloud and 
retrospection come from respondents who say very little in 
their think aloud protocols, sometimes only the response, but 
then go on in their retrospective protocols either to give 
reasons for the response or to describe their thought 
processes. Below are examples of these.
133
RESPONDENT 30 QUESTION 8 (ECSCRAP)
TA
I'd be sorry 
RETROSPECTION
Um passports, uh because my italian passport's going through 
and I wouldn't be able to travel round freely any more 
So I'd be personally very sorry.
RESPONDENT 21 QUESTION 4 (WHAT USE)
RETROSPECTION 
Those were all very simple questions, 
and the answer immediately came to mind, 
so there were no real thought processes.
I just knew the answer immediately.
Other differences stem from respondents summarising what they 
said in the think aloud; and some from respondents expanding 
on what they have said. Others, however, do seem to report 
different things in the retrospection than they did in the 
think aloud. For example:
Respondent 23 Question 6 (DEMOSAT)
THINK ALOUD
Okay, well I'm looking at all these numbers. I'm looking at all these 
numbers.
Um, I think my personal satisfaction would be quite high.
Um I'm uh I think I don't know I wouldn't put ten, because that seems a 
bit extreme. I don't know why, but it just seems a little bit much.
I think I think I'd compromise a little bit and put perhaps an eight.
I mean I'd say that was fairly high satisfaction.
RETROSPECTION
Um yeah, it was quite, just sort of quite interested, quite an unusual 
question.
First reaction was to think well no I'm not satisfied at all.
Uh but but then I suddenly remembered that I'd been travelling in 
countries where there isn't very much decent democracy.
And really although we bear a few old grudges etcetera, we do quite 
well compared to many parts of the world.
So I think you know that all things relative, you've got to give it a 
high mark because that's the way the world is.
For this respondent the think aloud protocol largely consists 
of choosing an answer, whereas the retrospective protocol 
reports thoughts about the question generally. It is 
important to note that after hearing this question the 
respondent has about 5 or 6 seconds of thinking time while the 
interviewer reads out the scale procedures.
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3.3.3 Structure of language
In this section a qualitative assessment is made of the 
language used in protocols. The fluency of the language is 
assessed, as well as the kind of statements used. Also, a 
general assessment is made of the sequencing of statements as 
well as how well they relate to the question.
Think aloud protocols.
For all questions and across all groups, the language is 
fairly fluent and the sentences well formed. However, there 
are a number of repeated words, false starts and poorly 
structured sentences. There tends to be a similar amount of 
these type of sentences across all groups. Longer protocols 
tend to contain more of these types of sentences than shorter 
protocols. There appears to be individual variation in that, 
across questions, some subjects are consistently more fluent 
than are others. Below are examples of both mild and severe 
forms of poor sentence structure.
RESPONDENT 9 QUESTION 1 (USUAL USE)
Um depends on the days.
I'm there a couple there so it varies.
RESPONDENT 1 QUESTION 8 (ECSCRAP)
I think I'd be sorry about it
because I like, I like, I like some of the things that Europe can give. 
RESPONDENT 22 QUESTION 7 (ECBENEFIT)
They are, they're being, they're not being, just they want the best of both 
worlds.
They are comparing the costs according, I mean comparing, they're just 
taking the costs and not seeing the benefits.
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RESPONDENT 19 QUESTION 5 (ANNOY LIB)
It depends on whether, I well it, on whether I look things up or it depends 
on whether I'm you know.
I would say it a I don't look things up every day.
Respondents tend to address the question, ie. what is said 
appears to be relevant to the question they were asked. 
Protocols tend to be bound to the context, eg. there are a 
number of ill specified referents which cannot be understood 
without reference to the question.
Generally, the sequence of sentences seems good. Due to the 
ill defined nature of the task (as noted in the introduction) , 
it is difficult to know what a 'good7 sequence is. Responses 
tend to come last, or near last, although this is certainly 
not always the case. With some very short protocols, the 
answer can be first with other statements following. This is 
more common on factual questions where the respondent responds 
fairly quickly and then backs up his/her response with a 
further statement. With some attitude questions, the response 
may come relatively early on but with more statements ( 
occasionally a lot more) after that. Repetitions of part of 
the question, or rephrasing of the question, tend to occur at 
the beginning of the protocol, or after a prompt from the 
interviewer.
Protocols tend to consist of plain statements with very few 
descriptions of processes. The latter form only a small 
proportion of the total number of statements. Some of these 
take the form of a sort of introduction to speaking, such as
" well my first thinking is" or "well the first thing that 
comes to mind".
Others describe recall processes. For example:
"looking over last week",
"trying to remember how much work I did last term",
"I'm trying to think back of any special event",
Questions 6 (DEMOSAT) and 9 (GOALS) produce descriptions of 
response activities such as:
"I'm just looking at the scale",
"well reading through them".
A few describe other processes to be performed.
"so then I have to try to figure out how much I think 
Britain is democratic".
"I have to go to a daily and then multiply it",
"I'm going to have to give a guesstimate" ,
A couple of statements describe processes in the past tense, 
but they are describing thoughts which occurred while the 
question was being asked, before they could think aloud.
There are only a small number of more worrying statements 
which seem to describe previous processes. A couple of 
respondents from group 3 occasionally seem to start 
retrospecting in their think aloud protocols. But these kinds 
of statements are few, and so are not a serious problem.
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Retrospective reports
For group 3, retrospective reports tend to have better 
sentence structure than the think aloud protocols. There are 
fewer repetitions of words, false starts, and poorly- 
structured sentences. The retrospection tends to consist more 
of process descriptions and statements phrased in the past 
tense. There are some present tense statements. There are 
some individual differences in method of reporting, in that 
some respondents tend to use more statements than others.
For group 4, the sentence structure is not as good as the 
retrospection of group 3, but not as bad as the think aloud 
protocols of any of the groups. It consists of a mixture of 
process descriptions, past tense statements and present tense 
statements. These latter are more common in group 4 than in 
group 3, making the structure of these protocols somewhere 
between the structure of think aloud protocols and the 
retrospection produced by group 3.
An example from group 3 and 4, illustrating this kind of 
difference are presented below:
QUESTION 2 (LAST WEEK USE)
RESPONDENT 22 -- GROUP 3
When you said last week, I just, my mind, I mean immediately went to 
the things I did last week.
Some of them were like I I was staging a play, so I thought about the 
play.
But I just distracted it because it was not related with 'library'.
I tried to separate the times I spent on my studies and my classes.
but then it just didn't work out again, 
and then at the end probably I didn't spend more than 5 minutes last 
week in the library.
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RESPONDENT 33 -- GROUP 4
Well again the main thing was, as I suggested in the answer I gave, was 
just to decide whether, really whether you meant last week, what you 
meant by last week.
Sort of people generally, usually do mean different things.
They mean last actual calendar week.
Or last week as in the last week that's just gone.
Uh again since the answer would be very different for the different
definitions of week, 
it seemed sensible to clarify that for the answer.
But then after it was fairly easy.
because there was so few lectures and classes in then
That I do spend more or less the amount of time, the average amount
each day, with not too much diversion
So really that was easy.
It is worth noting that several protocols provide information 
that one would not expect, mostly in group 4. For example, 
one respondent changes his response on recall of another piece 
of information. Another, for almost the entire retrospection, 
goes back and changes his answer and describes a new piece of 
information. A couple of respondents mention what they did not 
think about.
3.3.4 Time taken for verbalisation.
The amount of time taken for think aloud was calculated for 
each group. The measure of time was taken from the moment the 
question had been asked until the moment the respondent 
stopped talking. The same was done for group 4, thus their 
responses and any thinking aloud they may have done was 
included in the measure. The amount of time taken to read the 
question was not included in the measure; at question 4 each 
sub-question asked was excluded from the overall amount of 
time taken to respond to the question.
Amount of time taken to respond was calculated for each 
question and then summed across all questions, giving a total 
amount of time spent responding for each respondent. The
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means for the total amount of response time, in minutes, is 
given for each group in table 3.13 below.
TABLE 3.13 
Mean response time - in minutes
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4
4.35 3 .41 4.79 2.68
(3.05) (1.91) (2.43) (1.80)
The analysis of variance carried out was not significant. A 
priori contrasts showed that only group 3 differed 
significantly from group 4 in the amount of time taken to 
respond. None of the think aloud groups differed 
significantly from one another. The results of comparisons 
between the think aloud groups and group 4 are given in table 
3.14 below.
TABLE 3.14
Comparisons of response time between Think Aloud 
Groups and Group 4
Group T Value D.F. T Prob.
1 VS 4 .803 17.9 .432
2 VS 4 .879 17.9 .391
3 VS 4 2 .204 16.6 .042
The mean number of words per minute (wpm) was calculated for 
each group, although the rates for the think aloud groups are 
the most important. The mean wpm for each group is given in 
table 3.15 below.
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TABLE 3.15 
Mean Number of words per minute
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4
Mean WPM 125 .24 116.94 134.94 68.47
SD (25.36) (30.97) (16.03) (27.47)
Whilst there is a good deal of variance between subjects in 
how much they say, and a fair amount of variance in the time 
taken to respond, the rate of speech among think aloud groups 
has less variance, especially in group 3. None of the think 
aloud groups differ significantly.
These rates of verbalisation compare favourably with amounts 
reported by Ericsson and Simon (1984). They report that 
normal relaxed continuous talking produces about 150 to 200 
wpm, while rates of between 50 to 110 are reported for think 
aloud in problem solving studies (they do note one expert who 
verbalised on a problem solving task at a rate near to normal 
speech).
Comparisons show that all three think aloud groups verbalise 
at a rate significantly different from group 4. Thus, the 
time taken to verbalise for groups 1 and 2 is not different 
from group 4 but their rate of verbalisation is greater. For 
group 3, although respondents take longer to answer than group 
4 respondents, those in group 3 are verbalising at a much 
quicker rate.
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Respondents in the think aloud groups tend to begin vocalising 
as soon as the question is asked, and, as can be seen from the 
rates of verbalisation, are fairly fluent. Respondents in 
group 4 who verbalise tend not to do so immediately, but after 
a pause, presumably while thinking.
Words per minute is useful for comparisons with normal speech, 
but is less useful for comparing across tasks, where for some 
tasks one word represents an entire thought while for others 
a sentence may be needed. In the present study, the nearest 
approximation to a measure of "thoughts' is represented by 
codes. Some codes may be only one word, while a few are made 
up of a number of sentences. The mean number of codes per 
minute for each group is given in table 3.16 below.
TABLE 3.16 
Mean Codes per minute
GROUP 1 GROUP 2 GROUP 3 GROUP 4
13 .51 12 .31 11.47 8.63
(4.16) (2.82) (1.58) (2.09)
Again, this compares favourably with amounts reported by 
Ericsson and Simon where in various problem solving tasks they 
report rates of 8 to 11.
3.4 DISCUSSION
The discussion of these results will focus on the two main 
aims of this study, that is 1) Which reports are most
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complete and 2) How valid are the protocols as measures of 
ongoing processes?
3.4.1 Which report/s are most complete?
For the think aloud reports the amount of think aloud, 
measured both by the amount of words and by number of codes, 
does not vary significantly across groups. The pattern is 
similar for both measures: Group 3 respondents say the most,
then group 1, and then group 2. There is a slight tendency 
for group 3 respondents to say more than group 2 respondents 
in both words and codes, but there is a large amount of 
variability in these measures.
It may be that the instruction to ' talk constantly' , included 
in the instructions of both groups 1 and 3, increases slightly 
the amount of think aloud (across both these groups this is 
the second best recalled part of the instruction, second only 
to naming think aloud). The addition of an instruction for 
retrospection may have the same effect, thus leading group 3 
respondents to say the most.
If retrospecting does increase slightly the amount of think 
aloud this might be for at least two reasons: 1) Producing
both types of reports may give a better understanding of what 
' thinking aloud' means (Ericsson and Simon 1984) which may 
facilitate the production of think aloud. 2) It could be a 
practice or facilitation effect. Asking people to produce two 
types of reports rather than one means they are asked to talk 
more; this may lead to an all round increase in talking.
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The rate of verbal production is also relevant here. Group 2 
respondents, who say slightly less, verbalise slightly slower 
than Group 3 respondents who say most and say it more quickly. 
This suggests that Group 3 respondents have slightly more 
fluency in reporting their thoughts.
Of the three think aloud groups then, the think aloud of Group 
3 may by slightly more compete than the other groups. Added 
to this there is also the extra information often collected in 
the retrospections of this group, making the reports more 
complete.
The amount of information provided in the retrospective 
reports of Group 4 (retrospection only) compares favourably 
with the amount of think aloud produced by the other groups.
Thinking aloud generally increases the time taken to complete 
a task (Ericsson & Simon 1980,1984; Payne, Braunstein & 
Carroll 1978; Fidler 1983). This is because translating one's 
thoughts into words takes time. An increase in the time taken 
for completion does not, however, necessarily indicate a 
change in processing.
In this study Group 4 do not think aloud, but only retrospect. 
This is the closest condition to a 'response only' group in 
this experiment, and may provide a base rate against which to 
compare response time. Using this group as a base rate is to 
some extent problematic - - as noted above the instruction to 
retrospect may increase talking generally. Group 4 do produce
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some verbalisation during response. This latter however, need 
not be seen as a problem. The 'natural' base rate should not 
be one of no think aloud but one which reflects what happens 
in a normal survey interview.
Whilst information on normal response behaviour in the survey 
interview is scarce, some evidence suggest that respondents do 
tend to verbalise more than simply a response. A study by 
Sykes and Morton-Williams (1987) uses interaction analysis, 
a method which as they say ' depend [s] on the outward 
manifestations of mental processes'. Behaviour from the 
respondent includes such things as questions, speculating on 
meaning, inappropriate responses, digressions, and 
qualifications of responses. Dijkstra, van der Veen, and van 
der Zouwen (1985) report similar respondent actions. These 
types of 'verbal reports' are similar to the verbalisations 
during response given by respondents in group 4. Thus, the 
base rate provided by group 4, while not perfect, is probably 
adequate.
Surprisingly, only for group 3 respondents is response time 
significantly slower than for group 4 respondents. This may 
simply indicate that group 4 does not present a good base rate 
for response time. If group 4 does provide an adequate base 
rate for response time, then this result may be echoing the 
suggestion above that group 3 respondents are reporting more 
fully than the other two think aloud groups, taking more time 
to translate thoughts into verbal code.
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3.4.2 How valid are the protocols?
Problems with validity for think aloud protocols stem from the 
possibility of interference with the ongoing process. 
Problems with retrospective reporting derive from the 
respondent having an overview of the completed task and thus 
an opportunity to rethink it.
Byrne (1983) suggests that think aloud should be used only for 
those tasks on which respondents find it easy to think aloud. 
The reason being that, in these cases, think aloud is less 
likely to interfere with processing. From the results 
presented here - the fact that there is some verbalisation in 
group 4 and the fact that respondents tend to talk quickly - 
it seems that, while there may be individual variation, most 
respondents found thinking aloud both an easy and a natural 
task. Some respondents7 post interview reports also support 
this.
The structure of the language can provide clues to the 
validity of the data, especialy for think aloud protocols. In 
the think aloud protocols produced here the structure of the 
language is consistent with what would be expected if 
respondents were reporting the contents of currently heeded 
thoughts (Ericsson and Simon 1984). Statements are generally 
in the present tense, or reports of information retrieved. 
There are few statements of what was "thought", and few 
descriptions of processes. Thus, think aloud protocols 
contain the information that was processed, not discriptions 
of how it was processed (Svenson 1989) .
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The language, while generally fluent, does not appear to be 
carefully planned, containing as it does a number of poor 
sentences from generally articulate speakers ie. the syntax 
also varies from normal speech (Bainbridge 1985). Respondents 
tend to begin verbalisation immediately and to talk relatively 
quickly. Thus, at this level, there is no evidence
indicating that think aloud reports in all groups are not 
reports of currently heeded information.
Thus far, the results regarding the structure of the language, 
the time taken to verbalise, and the ease of verbalisation, 
all support the proposition that think aloud does not alter 
processing.
Retrospective protocols can be regarded as a less obtrusive 
measure than think aloud. In this case one might expect a 
comparison of the content of the retrospective protocols of 
group 4 with the think aloud groups' protocols to reveal any 
inadequacies with think aloud. If the protocols are similar 
then it can be argued that think aloud has not interfered, if 
different then it has. However, as Svenson (1979) points out 
retrospective reports require special care in interpretation 
because they provide the respondent both with sufficient time 
and with a completed process which may allow them to apply 
their own theory of the process. Thus, retrospective reports 
may be more open to the kind of criticisms of verbal reports 
voiced by Nisbett and Wilson (1977).
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In fact the content of Group 4 respondents' retrospection is 
generally more similar to think aloud protocols than to the 
retrospective protocols of group 3. However, there are some 
notable worries about the retrospection of group 4.
Firstly the differences between the retrospective protocols of 
group 3 and group 4 seem mainly to be due to a difference in 
reporting style. A large amount of the differences between 
groups 3 and 4 in the content of their retretrospections 
derives from the use of process descriptions by group 3, but 
not by group 4. Also group 3 contains little direct 
repetition of what they said in the think aloud protocols, 
rarely is the actual response given whereas in group 4 this is 
more common.
The retrospection of group 3 respondents should not be 
interpreted without taking into account the context that they 
have already thought aloud. They have already said what they 
are thinking, in many cases, and to report again so quickly in 
the retrospection may be a violation of a conversational 
'given new' contract (Grice 1975). In essence, respondents 
may think 'well she obviously doesn't want to hear what I've 
just said, because I've just said it, so now what else was I 
thinking about', or 'what was my thinking like'. This seems 
to be the case for one respondent who says for her 
retrospection 'And that was it, I didn't think of anything 
else, except what I said'.
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Perhaps respondents think that they can't just repeat exactly 
what was said, so, they sum it up, elaborate on instances 
mentioned, or mention other thoughts or describe 'how' they 
thought. Group 4 respondents, not having the think aloud, do 
not have to do this and so report more statements.
Thus it may be that many of the differences between the
retrospective reports is not due to think aloud changing 
processing, but rather that think aloud changes what is 
reported in the retrospective reports, or how it is reported. 
The face-to-face interview setting may enhance this effect.
Process descriptions can be problematic because it is
difficult to maintain that these are reports of thoughts 
rather than theories about thinking. Though these kinds of 
statements occur in both groups, they are more common in group 
3. However, when they corroborate statements given during 
think aloud, they become less problematic.
One factor which may influence the reporting of processes is 
the prompt used for retrospection - - "Now, please tell me all 
that you can remember about your thinking". This prompt might 
be interpreted as asking the respondent about the way they 
were thinking. A prompt such as "tell me what you were
thinking about", may focus more on the content of thought.
Having thought aloud this interpretation may provide an easy 
answer to the problem of redundancy for group 3 respondents. 
Thus, the prompt might have encouraged respondents to give 
their ideas about their thought processes.
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In the content of the protocols there are some differences 
which cannot be accounted for by the differences in the style 
of the reporting by groups 3 and 4, and are thus more 
worrying, as is the one difference in amount of retrospection 
on question 4, where group 4 say substantially more than other 
groups. These differences suggest more a problem with 
retrospective protocols than a problem with think aloud.
Some of the problems in retrospective reports are evident in 
the following statements, both taken from group 4 respondents. 
Are these reports of what was thought while responding, or are 
they reports of ' the kind of things I must have thought 
about' ?
"I can remember just picturing certain things. I mean those 
sort of kind of images which come to mind. Um I mean images 
say of the catalogue " or
"so normally I go to the other ones, to the microfiche or the 
catalogue, no I've never been to the catalogue only the 
microfiche when I got problems. For example Um when there are 
some things you have to find at the I mean the main desk".
The difference in amount of retrospection for question 4 (WHAT 
USE) is difficult to explain. Theoretically, one could argue 
that this type of short, recall question should be more likely 
than other questions to produce automatic, or at least very 
quick processing, and, thus, one would expect very little 
think aloud and similarly little retrospection. This is what 
one finds in the think aloud and so this result would argue
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for faults in group 4 retrospective reports rather than 
problems with the other groups.
Burton and Blair's (1991) view was that the short recall task 
they studied may be disrupted by a think aloud procedure 
making retrospective protocols superior. In contrast to this 
view the present study suggests that think-aloud may be more 
accurate than retrospective protocols. Perhaps in the 
retrospective reports respondents feel more pressure to report 
something, even if there was very little actually remembered 
thinking.
The other evidence (from the structure of the language in 
think aloud protocols, the rate of verbalisation, the fact 
that think aloud seems to be relatively easy for subjects) 
argues, that while there may be some minor problems, the think 
aloud procedure is valid for gathering information in this
way. It seems, as others have found (eg Fidler 1983) , that
retrospective reports may occasionally be more problematic 
than think aloud reports, and that retrospective reports may 
be more reliable when given after think aloud than when not, 
because of a stronger memory trace, and through the
correspondence between the two reports.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
The results suggest that think aloud is likely to be a valid 
method for use with survey questionnaires. Of the 
instructions used here, instruction C (think aloud plus
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retrospection) , seems to be the best because it seems to 
encourage respondents to speak more. Problems were noted with 
retrospective reports. However, it should be noted that these 
can be very useful when used in conjunction with think aloud, 
because they allow further information on very brief 
processing.
The interpretation of the results suggests that some 
modifications be made to the instructions. Firstly, the 
prompt given for retrospection should be changed in order to 
discourage explanations of processing. Secondly, more time 
should be taken to ensure that respondents understand what 
they are meant to do. This could be in the nature of a 
discussion of the instructions with respondents as suggested 
by Svenson (19 89). This might also help to deal with some of 
the variation between respondents.
One aspect that has not thus far been explicitly addressed is 
the amount and type of information that is not reported in 
think aloud. Here, the problem is that while what is said is 
obvious, there is often little evidence of what is not said. 
It is very likely that respondents are not reporting all their 
thoughts, partly because there are too many rapid thoughts to 
report. There is some direct evidence of this in the 
protocols, however, there are probably many more cases where 
no report is given because of automatic processing which goes 
unnoticed by the respondents.
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For example, many processes involved in comprehending the 
question may be very quick and may begin before the question 
has been fully asked. Robertson, Black and Lehnert (1985) for 
example suggest that the first word of a question such as 
'how' or 'when' already leads subject to access expectations 
of types of answers that will be possible. Also, if as 
Robertson et al suggest, question understanding is an 
integrated rather than a modular process then one might expect 
that, as well as some understanding processes, sources of 
knowledge have been accessed and pieces of information have 
been retrieved before the interviewer has finished asking the 
question. It is unlikely that these types of processes will 
be reported in think aloud protocols, and, indeed, there is 
little evidence for them from this study.
There are, though some very explicit attempts to comprehend 
the question. Some of these attempts do not come immediately 
after the question has been asked but at a later stage, 
suggesting, perhaps, there is an attempt to re-understand the 
question ( Galambos and Black, 1985) . These more thoughtful 
attempts to understand the question seem reportable. However, 
many of the quick, implicit attempts at understanding go 
unreported and perhaps do not leave their trace in further 
statements from which they could be inferred.
While think aloud protocols are useful for getting at the 
conscious attempts to answer questions, there are likely to be 
a number of processes that go on below the level of 
reportability (perhaps what Byrne 1983 refers to as the
7 comment level'), leaving no evidence of their occurrence in 
the protocols. Thus, questions which require more conscious 
effort on the part of respondents seem likely to be most 
amenable for study with this method. Short recall questions, 
which require only a yes or no response, seem least amenable 
to this procedure. Other recall questions will vary depending 
on the amount of information or judgement needed by the 
respondent to answer.
This does not invalidate the use of verbal protocols, but 
suggests that, like most other kinds of data, they have their 
limitations and must be supplemented by other techniques 
aimed at addressing the types of information which think aloud 
does not provide. Given the relative recency of theorising on 
the processes underlying questionnaire response, think aloud 
has much to contribute since our knowledge, even of the more 
conscious processes of question answering, is limited.
154 -
CHAPTER 4. EXPERIMENT 2 - PART I. 
COGNITIVE PROCESSING FOR BEHAVIORAL QUESTIONS
SUMMARY
Having determined in the previous study a suitable 
method for collecting verbal reports of cognitive 
processes in the survey, the present study then uses 
this method to gather data about these processes. 
Respondents verbalised their thoughts while responding 
to one of two versions of a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire contained both behavioural and 
attitudinal questions. In this chapter the results of 
the behavioral questions will be presented; the 
following chapter will deal with the attitudinal 
questions.
4.1 INTRODUCTION.
It is assumed that a variety of inferential strategies are 
used to answer behavioural questions. Yet, details of the use 
of various strategies have not been extensively investigated. 
Some studies have provided evidence of the use of inference 
strategies with behavioural questions (Blair & Burton, 1987; 
Burton & Blair, 1991); these have been discussed in chapter 1. 
The present study aims to extend this work by examining the 
strategies used when answering a number of behavioural 
questions, using verbal report techniques. Thus a general
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aim of this study is to examine the types of processes used by 
respondents to answer behavioural questions.
As well as being useful for explorations of cognitive 
processes, verbal reports can also be used for hypothesis 
testing (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). The present study uses them 
for both purposes. Two particular hypotheses regarding the 
way in which response scales can provide information to 
respondents are investigated. Specifically these are the 
7 comparison shift7 hypothesis and the "meaning shift" 
hypothesis. Both of these hypotheses are discussed in chapter 
1 (pages 40 - 42) but I will give a brief recap of them here.
The comparison shift hypotheses states that response scales at 
a previous question can influence responses to later questions 
by providing information to respondents about how they compare 
with others (Schwarz, Hippier, Deutsch & Strack, 1985). The 
scale is seen as providing a distribution in which people can 
place themselves. This type of informational influence may be 
most likely with questions concerning unambiguous behaviours. 
The meaning shift hypothesis states that scales provide 
information to respondents about the meaning of a question, 
and is likely to operate when the behaviour in question is 
ambiguous (Schwarz, Strack, Muller, & Chassein, 1988). 
Priming the area has been shown accentuate the meaning shift 
(0"Muircheartaigh, Gaskell, & Wright, 1992).
These hypotheses have previously been investigated through 
split ballot techniques (O'Muircheartaigh et al, 1992; Schwarz
et al 1985) . The aim of the present study is to look for 
evidence of the hypothesised underlying processes in verbal 
protocols. Thus, for the comparison shift hypothesis the 
protocols should provide evidence of people using the scale to 
locate themselves in comparison to others. To test this 
hypothesis an unambiguous behaviour, concerning the amount of 
coffee drunk is used. For the meaning shift hypothesis the 
protocols should provide evidence of people using the scale to 
interpret the meaning of the question. To test this a 
question about annoyance with television advertising is used, 
an ambiguous behaviour.
Thus the protocols should provide evidence of the cognitive' 
processes used by respondents to answer behavioural questions. 
If the comparison shift and meaning shift hypotheses are 
correct, these processes might be expected to include 
references to the scale either as a comparison point, in the 
former case, or as a means of interpreting the behaviour in 
the latter case.
4.2 METHOD
Questions were varied between experimental conditions. Each 
group answered one of four 11-item questionnaires. 
Respondents were instructed to think-aloud while responding 
and to recall their thinking after each question. 
Questionnaires were administered in a face-to-face format. 
Three different interviewers were involved. Respondents then 
completed a short computer task which will be described in the
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next chapter. The first four questions were behavioral 
questions, the next three questions measured relationship and 
life satisfaction, whilst the final four questions were 
attitude questions (the questionnaires are given in appendix 
5) . In this chapter the four behavioral questions will be 
discussed.
With one exception these questions are drawn from a survey 
study by O'Muircheartaigh, Gaskell, and Wright (1992; Gaskell, 
Wright, & O'Muircheartaigh, 1992), allowing for the laboratory 
testing of field generated hypotheses, and comparisons between 
think aloud and known survey findings. The exception is the 
priming questions used (TVHOURS and CLASSHOURS) to test the 
meaning shift hypothesis. The original study showed that 
priming increased the meaning shift effect and was therefore 
an important factor in looking at the meaning shift 
hypothesis. However, the original study had a number of 
priming questions which would have been too large for the 
present think aloud study, and so only one general question 
was used.
4.2.1 The respondents
Forty-one men and women were recruited from coffee bars and 
classes around the LSE. Most were students. Their ages 
ranged from about 18 to 50, with most in their twenties.
4.2.2 Procedure
In the same way as for the previous experiment, respondents 
consented to be recorded and then read the instructions on
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think aloud and immediate retrospection. These instructions 
were the same as condition C in experiment 1 (see appendix 1) . 
A minor change was made in that the prompt to retrospect was 
changed to 7 Now tell me all you can remember thinking about7 .
Once respondents had finished reading the instructions, they 
were asked to tell the experimenter briefly, in their own 
words, what they thought the instructions meant. Any 
misunderstandings were then clarified by the interviewer. 
Again, two practice questions were then administered the first 
being the same as in experiment one. The second, was a more 
attitudinal type question which was thought to more clearly 
represent the balance of the questionnaire to follow.
During the practice session the interviewer attempted to give 
feedback on whether the think aloud and retrospection was 
being done properly. Thus, there were more attempts than in 
experiment one to clarify with the subject how to think aloud 
and retrospect. The questionnaire was then administered. 
Finally, after completing the questionnaire respondents were 
asked to complete a short task on the computer which was to 
compare items for similarity / dissimilarity. Respondents 
were paid for taking part.
4.3 RESULTS
Each question, or set of questions, can be seen as a separate 
experiment. Questions which address different hypotheses will
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be grouped together, giving an introduction to the questions 
and the hypothesis, the results and a discussion of how the 
results address the particular hypothesis.
4.3.1 The comparison shift hypothesis.
Two questions are involved in looking at the comparison shift 
hypotheses.
The questions
The first question (AMOUNT COFFEE) asked respondents to report 
the amount of coffee they usually drink in a day. This 
represents a mundane, unambiguous behaviour, and asks for 
usual behaviour. There were two versions of this question. 
One group received a High Frequency response scale and the 
other received a low frequency response scale (see figure 4.1 
below) . A response card with precoded categories was used for 
response. It was expected that there would be little 
differences in either responses or strategies to this question 
as a function of the scale; because the behaviour is 
unambiguous the respondents should not look to the response 
scales to provide an interpretation of the behaviour.
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Figure 4.1 
COFFEE QUESTION AND RESPONSE SCALES
Q. How many cups or mugs of coffee or tea do you 
usually drink in a day?
Response Scales
High Frequency Low Frequency
16 or more 4 or more
10-15 3
4-9 2
2-3 1
1 less than 1
never never
The second question (COMPARE) asked people to estimate how 
much coffee they drink compared to others. For this question, 
we might expect to find differences between those who have 
been presented with a high frequency scale at question 1 and 
those presented with a low frequency scale. In particular, 
those given a low frequency scale should see themselves as 
drinking more coffee than those presented with a high 
frequency scale. That is here we would expect a 'comparison 
shift'. This question was the same for all respondents, and 
is given in figure 4.2 below.
Figure 4.2 
COMPARE QUESTION
Q. Taking your answer from this scale, compared to other 
people, how often would you say that you have coffee 
or tea to drink?
Much more than most 
A bit more than most 
About average 
A bit less than most 
Much less than most
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In terms of the protocols the comparison shift hypothesis 
suggests that people will refer to the scale at the previous 
question, AMOUNT COFFEE, to provide an estimate of what an 
'average7 coffee drinker is and how they fit into that 
distribution.
Results
Question 1 - AMOUNT COFFEE
Responses
The distribution of responses between groups is given below 
(Table 4.1). Categories have been combined to make 
comparisons possible.
TABLE 4.1 
Responses to COFFEE
High Freq Low Freq TOTAL
4 or more 17 12 29
2-3 cups 3 4 7
1 or less 1 4 5
TOTAL 21 20 41
There are only minor differences in response across the 
groups. This is expected. As the question is unambiguous as 
to the type of behaviour required, differences in the response 
scale should not influence choice. In a sample survey using 
the same question Gaskell, Wright & O'Muircheartaigh (1992) 
found similar results.
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Protocols.
In terms of describing the processes used to answer this 
question, the main strategies used for response were 
identified. For question 1 two main strategies can be 
discerned. The first is to log through the day and count the 
number of times coffee or tea was drunk (TimesDay). The 
second is simply to make a direct estimate, to grab a number. 
This can either be a response from the scale or not. Table
4.2 summarises the main response strategies breaking them 
down across groups.
TABLE 4.2
Response Strategy for COFFEE by group.
Hi Freq Lo Freq TOTAL
Timesday 12 8 20
Direct Estimate 5 4 9
Response 4 4 8
Other 0 4 4
TOTAL 21 20 41
Respondents who use a TimesDay strategy vary in how completely 
they use this strategy and quite how they link it in with a 
day. Half of all respondents use some form of this strategy. 
There is a small difference in the amount this strategy is 
used across conditions. More respondents use it in the high 
frequency than in the low frequency group. This appears to be 
partly due to the fact that for some respondents in the low 
frequency group the scale 'provided' the answer for them; that 
is, since 4 was the highest category, they did not need to 
count the number.
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An example of a strong use of this strategy is given by 
respondent 56: "I usually have about - one at coffee, one at 
lunch, one in the afternoon, a cup in the evening....".
The day tends to be divided into segments of morning, 
afternoon and evening; or breakfast, lunch and dinner; or 
simply 7 times I stop for a break7 . The number of cups in each 
segment is counted and added, though this is not usually 
explicitly stated in the protocol.
This strategy is a decomposition strategy, perhaps reflecting 
a general day schema, looking for 7natural7 breaks in the day 
when coffee or tea is likely to be drunk. There is very 
little recall of specific events, rather there is recall of 
generalities.
17 respondents make a direct estimate, of these 9 give 
categories from the response scale while the other 8 give a 
response. It is, of course, possible that the people adopting 
this "strategy7 are simply not reporting all their thinking. 
However, many of these people do say quite a bit, none of 
which reveals counting through the day.
The above represent general strategies, but a number of other 
processes are also evident in the protocols. Some are 
peripheral, whilst others seem to contribute to the general 
strategy.
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Location indicators play a part in both strategies (kitchens, 
cafes), whilst time indicators are restricted to the Timesday 
strategy. For a number of respondents imagery plays a role, 
with images of cups and kettles being common.
Very few respondents mention difficulties in recall or 
estimation, and there is very little change of strategy. Only 
one respondent reports thinking about what drinks to include. 
Thus, for the majority of respondents, it seems the question 
is taken to be relatively straightforward and unambiguous.
QUESTION 2 - COMPARE
Responses
The breakdown of responses to question 2 across groups 
receiving different frequency scales at question 1, COFFEE, is 
given below.
TABLE 4.3 
Responses to COMPARE
Hiqh Freq 
at Ql
Low Freq 
at Ql
Total
much more 2 1 3
a bit more 6 6 12
about average 8 4 12
a bit less 5 5 10
much less 3 3
dk 1 1
TOTAL 21 20 41
There are only slight differences in the distribution of 
responses with this data. Using the same questions in a large
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scale survey, Gaskell, Wright & O'Muircheartaigh (1992), found 
that those given the low frequency scale were more likely to 
say they drank more than most than those given the high 
frequency scale. The data in table 4.3 above do not conform 
to this pattern, however, because of the small sample size, 
and the resultant small numbers giving extreme responses, this 
response data is less reliable than the larger sample used by 
Gaskell et al.
Protocols.
Firstly the protocols were examined for reference to the 
previous scales and for estimates of what average is. No 
references to the previous scale were found and very few
people indicated what they thought average coffee consumption 
was. General strategies were then compared.
The strategy used by most respondents is to compare themselves 
to others who they know (KnownOther) . For example one
respondent reports " I compared myself to my family, who,
that's who I usually sit and have my drinks with", or I
compared myself to her because she's the only person I know 
who drinks a lot of coffee".
There are a number of other, less commonly used, strategies. 
The second most common strategy is thinking about what most 
people, or what an average person, would drink. Usually there 
is no clear indication of what is 'average', but rather a more 
vague sense of what most people do. Those who base their 
comparisons against 'most people' do not go into great detail
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working out what 'most people' or an average person would 
drink. For example "It just occurred to me what people , what 
an average person would drink. And, who didn't like coffee 
and who likes lots. And, it sort of equals it out in the end." 
Seven people use this strategy. Another 2 are unsure of their 
response because they don't know, or are unable to generate, 
an estimate of what most people drink, though they attempt to 
do so.
Other strategies include five respondents who say that other 
people tell them that they, the respondent, drink a lot or a 
little; two respondents who 'Just Know' how they compare to 
others; four respondents who give only a response; and three 
who use other strategies.
TABLE 4.4 
Response strategies for COMPARE
High Frequency Low Frequency Total
KnownOther 12 6 18
Most - Average 4 5 9
PeopleSay 3 2 5
Justknow 0 2 2
Response 0 4 4
Other 2 1 3
Total 21 20 41
Thus, 27 respondents attempt in some way to compare themselves 
to others, or to think about how much others drink, while 14
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do not. However, most people are not comparing themselves to 
an average, but simply to people they know.
These strategies vary across conditions. Those who receive 
the high frequency scale with question 1 tend to compare 
themselves to people they know more than those who receive a 
low frequency scale who tend, on the other hand, to respond 
somewhat more superficially.
Discussion of comparison shift
Although there is no direct evidence to support a comparison 
shift (that people see the scale as representing a 
distribution of the behaviour) there are differences in the 
strategies used between the groups. This suggests that the 
scales affect response, but perhaps do so in a more subtle 
way.
Quite why one scale, the high frequency scale, should lead to 
more comparisons with others is uncertain. One possibility is 
that the high frequency scale alerts respondents to the range 
of behaviour, thereby making some kind of comparison more 
salient. Perhaps a more precise scale deserves a more precise 
answer. It is notable that the high and low frequency scales 
used here, although having the same number of categories, 
have very different ranges within the scale, taking the top 
mentioned number as an end point the ranges are 16 and 4 
points. Thus, it may be simply the breadth of the range, 
rather than its particular end points, which is influential. 
It would be useful to compare scales with the same breadth but
- 168 -
different end points. Given that a large range is made 
salient, the comparative aspect of the question may become 
more salient. The tendency for some people to compare 
themselves with 'coffee drinkers' may account for why more 
people see themselves as drinking less coffee at the high 
frequency scale according to the comparison shift hypothesis.
Another possibility comes from work done by Martin & Harlow 
(1992) . Looking at the effects of ^ ^ ^ r ^  quest ions, they 
suggest that answering filter questions, questions such as who 
one's political representative is, can lead to affirmation or 
disconfirmation of self-concepts. The immediate effect of 
this on thinking, they suggest, is that those who are 
successful in answering such questions are likely to bask in 
success, thinking of the issues related to their successful 
confirmation. Those who are unsuccessful, receiving a blow to 
their self-concept, are likely to attempt to think about 
something else, to distract themselves from their failure. 
And indeed, they provide evidence to support this hypothesis.
Perhaps this disconf irmation of the self extends to other 
types of manipulations which threaten the self. If when 
placing themselves on the scale people do treat it as 
representing the distribution of coffee drinkers, then those 
answering on the low frequency scale would appear to drink a 
lot of coffee. This may arouse anxiety; there is evidence in 
the protocols that people are worried about drinking too much 
coffee. In this case people may not want to think about the 
subject which arouses anxiety and so give more superficial
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responses, not deliberately comparing themselves to others. 
The response may then be drawn, subconsciously, from the 
implicit judgement made at the previous question.
4.3.2 The meaning shift hypothesis
In this study the hypothesis was assessed by the use of an 
ambiguous behaviour -- frequency of annoyance with television 
adverts. The question received a 2 by 2 treatment. It was 
either primed or not primed. Thus half the respondents first 
received TVHOURS asking for the amount of TV watched last 
week, which serves to prime television viewing. The other 
half received the question CLASSHOURS, asking for the amount 
of time spent in lectures and classes last week, which acts as 
a no-prime filler question. Both questions have open 
responses. These questions are present in figure 4.3 below.
A question asking for the frequency of annoyance with 
television adverts (ANNOY) then follows. This represents a 
vague (and subjective) behavioral question. In each group 
(prime vs no-prime) half the respondents receive a high 
frequency scale and half receive a low frequency scale. It is 
expected that this question would produce a 'meaning shift', 
that is, respondents will use the scale to interpret the 
meaning of annoyance with an advert. The questions and 
response scales are given below.
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FIGURE 4.3
Questions and Response Scales for testing 'Meaning 
Shift' hypothesis.
PRIME NO PRIME
TVHOURS CLASSHOURS
Q3. Last week how many Q3. Last week how many
hours did you spend hours did you spend in
watching television? lectures and classes?
Q4. How often do you feel annoyed by an advert or
commercial on television? (ANNOY)
High Frequency Low Frequency
Everyday Once a month or more
Most days Once every few months
Once a week Once every six months
Once a month Once a year
Less often Less often
Never Never
QUESTION 3A - TVHOURS
Response
The mean number of hours television watched is 5.6 with a 
standard deviation of 5.9.
Protocols
For this question, it is difficult to encapsulate the types of 
strategies used. Partly, this is because many subjects use a 
variety of strategies to respond. A table of strategies is 
presented below.
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TABLE 4.5
Strategies for TVHOURS
GENERAL STRATEGY FREQUENCY
General activity + other methods 8
Attempts to recall/thinks of what watched 4
Concentrates on normal viewing 2
Direct estimate 3
General estimates 3
Other 1
TOTAL 21
A number of respondents begin by trying to recall their 
general activities last week; some then explicitly infer the 
general amount of TV viewed on this basis. For example, one 
respondent says " I think I spent a lot of time writing essays 
and preparing seminars so I actually spent very little time 
watching TV, maybe one hour a night, that would cover news 
programmes mainly." They may then go on to recall a specific, 
vivid programme watched, general programmes watched, or try, 
but fail, to recall what they have watched. In the latter 
case, those respondents may then go on to relate last week to 
their "normal' television viewing.
There are also a number of minor strategies. Firstly, 3 
people who rarely watch or don't own a TV give a direct 
estimate ('none'). Three attempt to recall what they have 
watched but fail and resort to a number of estimation 
strategies, including guessing. One, knowing he can't recall 
what he saw, simply guesses. Two think of regularly watched 
programmes and calculate from this -- one taking into account 
other vivid programmes, the other not doing so. Three use
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general estimates of amount for different time periods. One 
uses an idiosyncratic strategy.
As can be seen, not only are there a number of general 
(overarching) strategies, but, in most cases, these are not 
pure strategies. Respondents are often using a number of 
different recall and estimation strategies to produce an 
answer, usually at a fairly superficial level, often little 
more than a guess.
Many people have difficulty in thinking how to answer the 
question, as evidenced by changes in strategy in the course of 
responding; when one avenue fails, they try something else. 
Many are aware of the difficulties and a number of respondents 
state that they are uncertain about their answers or their 
memories or that they find it difficult to recall their 
behaviour last week.
QUESTION 3b - CLASSHOURS
Response
The mean number of hours of lectures attended was 8.1 with a 
standard deviation of 5.3.
Protocols
For Classhours, (n=20) , most respondents use some kind of rule 
based estimation to calculate an answer. Either starting from 
their normal hours and adjusting, or multiplying the number of 
courses by the number of hours or days. Only 2 respondent use 
(or try to use) episode enumeration.
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TABLE 4.6
Strategies for CLASSHOURS
STRATEGY FREQUENCY
Number of Classes X Hours 7
Total hours + adjustment 5
Episode Enumeration 2
Direct Estimate 4
Other 2
TOTAL 20
It is notable that calculating is virtually the only thinking 
going on. Very few people say, and thus think, of anything 
but the rule and the calculation. Very few recall either 
specific incidents last week or recall in general any imagery 
or otherwise surrounding their lectures and classes.
Of those who start from normal hours and then subtract some 
amount from that, most do not recall specifically missing 
classes or lectures but subtract because 'I usually don't 
attend them all'. Also there are few shifts in strategy. 
Most people stick to the strategy they first come upon. In 
this way there is less variation in the thinking behind 
answering this question than that involved in other questions. 
There is less reliance on individual episodic memories and 
more on rules. This is just what one would expect from this 
kind of question, that is, one which asks about a regularly 
occurring activity.
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QUESTION 4 - ANNOYED WITH TELEVISION.
Responses
The responses to the questions are given below. Categories 
were collapsed for comparison across conditions.
Table 4.7 
Responses to ANNOYED by group
Prime Prime No-Prime No-Prime
High Low High Low
Once month + 6 8 5 7
Less Often 4 3 2 2
Never 3 1
There are only minor differences between the groups. Using this 
same question in a large scale survey O'Muircheartaigh et al 
(1992) found a small, but significant increase in the number of 
people reporting annoyance once a month or more for the high 
frequency scale.
Protocols.
First the protocols were examined for references to the scale, 
however, none were found. Questions were coded to determine the 
main strategies used by respondents. Table 4.8 below gives a 
breakdown of these strategies across the four groups.
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Table 4.8
Strategies for ANNOYED by group
Prime
High
Prime
Low
No Prime 
High
No Prime 
Low
Total
Exemplar (Ad 
or
Annoyance)
1 7 1 2 11
Weak
Exemplar
3 3 1 2 9
Inferential 5 0 1 1 7
Mix-Exemplar 
+ Inference
0 0 2 1 3
Superficial 1 1 5 4 11
Total 10 11 10 10 41
All these strategies represent the respondents main strategy. 
The mixed strategy is one where two strategies appear to be used 
equally.
The 'Exemplar' strategy is where the respondent reports either 
thinking of a specific annoying advert or type of annoying advert 
or where they try to determine what is an annoying experience. 
For example, "I'm thinking about all those soap powder ads", or, 
another respondent described a greeting card that annoyed her and 
explained: "I just thought of something that really annoyed me, 
that made me angry", and then related this experience to 
adverts. Those coded as weak exemplars are respondents who 
simply stated they thought of 'various adverts' or where they 
tried but failed to think of an annoying advert.
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The inferential strategy is one where the respondent bases their 
estimate of annoyance on the amount of TV they watch; for 
example, "I don't watch tele everyday and see adverts so, 
probably less than once a month". The mixed strategy is a
combination of this and the above exemplar strategy.
Strategies were coded as superficial if they consisted either of 
a simple response, or if the respondent simply reported their 
general attitude, or some other general statement (eg 'I'm a 
fairly tolerant person').
The strategies are differently distributed across the groups. 
Looking first at the differences between primed and unprimed 
groups, the major difference seems to be that while in both 
primed groups there appears to be a dominant strategy (one used 
by at least half the group), in the no prime groups there is no 
dominant strategy. In general, the respondents in the no prime 
groups reply more superficially.
In the primed groups the strategies respondents use differ across 
response scales. More respondents in the primed high frequency 
group base their responses on the amount of television watched 
than do respondents in the primed low frequency group. This
latter group think of an exemplar (or try to think of an
exemplar). Generally, there is more thinking in these protocols 
than for the primed high frequency group. All the respondents 
who use an inferential strategy in the primed high frequency 
group use only this strategy; they mention nothing else.
177
It is also notable that the low frequency groups (both Prime and 
No Prime) are the only ones where some respondents explicitly 
attempt to define annoyed, or raise questions or doubts about 
what annoyed means. Seven of these respondents explicitly 
question, or try to define, annoyed or annoyance with adverts in 
some way.
Discussion - meaning shift
As with the comparison shift hypothesis there was no direct 
evidence for the meaning shift hypothesis. However, there was 
a difference in the strategies used between groups.
The results here are generally in accord with the meaning shift 
hypothesis, but qualify it somewhat. According to this 
hypothesis what might be expected in the protocols is reference 
to the scale during attempts to understand the question. In 
fact, there are no such explicit references to the scale. 
Instead, there are strategies which attempt to understand what 
annoyed is or which try to generate annoying instances. 
According to meaning shift, we might expect these strategies to 
be equally apparent in both groups, but, to involve different 
examples of annoyance between groups, unusual or more severe 
ones for low frequency respondents, trivial ones for high 
frequency respondents. But this is not what occurs.
It seems that what may be happening in this study is, firstly, 
that a prime focuses respondents onto a relevant strategy. The 
strategy used depends upon the response scale. Thus, for example, 
for a high frequency scale the amount of TV viewing may be
relevant (if you do not watch TV everyday you can't be annoyed 
at TV adverts everyday) . For the low frequency scale the 
response categories do not suggest a need to look at the amount 
of TV watched as a priority (since most people will watch TV at 
least once a month) . It could be that a low frequency scale 
prompts a strategy which concentrates on the other salient 
features of the question such as annoyance and adverts.
Secondly, there is a suggestion that the interpretation of 
'annoyance' depends on the scale received. One of two things 
seem to be possible when the respondent hears the question: 
either they form an interpretation of annoyance or they register 
it as ambiguous. Upon receiving the high frequency scale their 
interpretation is either confirmed or their doubts cleared up. 
It may be that for the high frequency scale the interpretation 
of annoyance is made unconsciously, perhaps because that type of 
frequency scale fits with their everyday definitions of annoyance 
in the context of advertisements. Thus there is no explicit 
decision about what annoyance is and not much thought about what 
an annoying advert is. However, in the low frequency group, for 
some respondents, the scale may either clash with their idea of 
what annoyed means or fail to easily clarify what annoyed means, 
thereby creating uncertainty over the behaviour and a need to 
think about what annoyed might mean. These respondents attempt 
either to define annoyed in some way or to generate instances of 
annoying adverts.
In fact this interpretation fits quite will with the results 
found by Schwarz et al (1988) when they asked respondents how
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often they were annoyed. As well as the two conditions where a 
frequency scale was presented (high or low) another condition had 
an open response format. After responding to the question 
respondents were asked to report a typical example of the 
annoying experiences they had had. These examples were then 
rated for severity and concreteness. Those given the high 
frequency scale and those given the open response format reported 
examples of a similar level of severity; those given the low 
frequency scale reported more severe examples of annoyance. This 
fits with the present suggestion that the high frequency scale 
fits more with the respondents definition of annoyance. 
Furthermore those given the low frequency scale reported more 
concrete examples than those given the other reporting formats. 
Schwarz et al suggest that this indicates that the more annoying 
experiences were represented in memory in more detail. The 
present results suggest this may be because in the case of the 
low frequency scale respondents had previously generated examples 
while responding, whereas those in the high frequency scale had 
not.
Together these results suggest that when scales do not fit with 
a more normal understanding of a term, respondents may engage in 
attempts to understand what the behaviour is. This may or may 
not push them in the direction of defining the behaviour as more 
severe (or less depending on which scale causes ambiguity) 
depending on how easy it is to generate examples of this type of 
extremity, which in turn probably depends on their knowledge of 
the behaviour. With the questions used by Gaskell et al (1992) 
the behaviours queried are less ambiguous than that used by
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Schwarz et al; annoyance with television adverts produced the 
greatest response effect. It may be for these behaviours that, 
although respondents consider the meaning of the scale that does 
not fit, they are unable to generate more severe example.
4.4 DISCUSSION
Inference strategies and accuracy
In this section I want to discuss more generally how people have 
responded to the behavioural questions: what types of processes
occur, how prevalent their occurrence is and whether they differ 
across question types.
The first thing to note is the diversity of processing both 
across questions and, for most, within questions. The questions 
used call for different types of behavioural estimates: estimates 
of number in a specific period (CLASSHOURS and TVHOURS), the rate 
of occurrence (ANNOY), usual behaviour (COFFEE), behaviour 
compared to others (COMPARE) . In part this diversity may be due 
to the different types of estimates required.
Firstly there is extremely little use of episode enumeration 
strategies. This strategy might be most expected at CLASSHOURS 
and TVHOURS which both ask how much the behaviour occurred in a 
specific period. From the literature on survey methods and 
cognitive theory however, these questions might not be expected 
to produce this type of strategy. CLASSHOURS asked for an 
estimate of a regularly occurring activity and TVHOURS for an
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estimate of a relatively mundane activity. For both of these 
activities particular episodes might be expected to be blurred, 
and respondents are more likely to report on the basis of generic 
memory or memory schemas. Smith, Jobe and Mingay (1991) report 
use of generic memory for dietary recall, also a frequent and 
perhaps repetitive event.
For TVHOURS a number of subjects actually approach the question 
in a way that suggests they want to use a type of episode 
enumeration, but find it too difficult. One respondent says "I'm 
trying to remember. I like to think that I only watch TV for 
specific programmes and therefore I should be able to reconstruct 
quite accurately if I could remember the programmes, but of 
course I can't" . Thus other inference strategies are used, most 
commonly inferring from their general activities in the period 
and from their normal TV habits, occasionally decomposition by 
type of programme or by time of week (weekday or weekend) is 
used, but only minimally.
For CLASSHOURS only two respondents approach the question by 
looking at last week. Most respondents base their estimate on 
their normal behaviour. Inference strategies include direct 
estimates, anchoring and adjustment and rate based calculations 
from normal behaviour.
Thus for a regularly occurring behaviour like CLASSHOURS we might 
expect respondents simply to go by their normal behaviour. These 
types of regularly occurring activities are often important in 
surveys; number of hours worked in a reference period is an
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important question on labour force surveys for example. The 
worry with this type of data is that it will be biased towards 
normal behaviour, even many of the adjustments made are based 
on normal practices. Abelson, Loftus, and Greenwald (1992) 
shows how habit can bias reports of voting. Habitual voters 
overreport the behaviour whilst habitual non-voters 
underreport. The same kind of reporting may occur here. 
Those who usually attend classes may overreport last week's 
attendance, whilst those who usually don't attend everything 
may underreport. The protocols make clear why this might 
happen. Indeed, at least two respondents indicate after 
giving their retrospective reports that they have given an 
incorrect response because they recall an extra or a missed 
lecture.
Precise estimates of mundane activities seem most difficult 
for respondents. TVHOURS and to a lesser extent ANNOY produce 
the most expressions of difficulty from respondents. ANNOY 
seems to be difficult because people aren't quite sure what it 
is, whereas TVHOURS is simply a difficult memory problem. One 
has to question the value of obtaining precise numerical 
estimates from respondents on this type of behaviour, since 
the responses given are clearly not precise. A number of 
respondents admit they are simply guessing whilst others 
indicate they are not being precise. The danger in collecting 
this type of report is in treating the numbers as more precise 
than they actually are. Much more intensive questioning would 
be required to produce estimates which are more reliable.
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It is also worth noting that very few people define the reference 
period they are using. They seem to make an assumption about 
what last week is. This may vary across respondents.
Decomposition type strategies are most common for COFFEE. A 
number of decomposition type strategies are used, sometimes in 
combination. The most common is a time of day based 
decomposition. Although, as for most questions, respondents are 
not too careful in their estimates, in some ways these appear to 
be reasonable estimates of usual behaviour. However, there are 
some elements which may lead to bias.
The type of decomposition used focuses on " the number of times 
I stopped for a drink". There is little decomposition based on 
types of drink, so it is possible that respondents may be 
including other types of drinks. One respondent doesn't seem to 
think it that important which drink is consumed: " I'm not sure
whether it's coffee or tea but it's a hot drink". Also there is 
little questionning of what a 'usual' day is. Only one 
respondent differentiates between weekdays and weekends, and one 
between college and home days. Most take a college day to be a 
'usual' day. This is in fact when the interview takes place, so 
this may represent a bias towards the type of day on which 
collection takes place, or it may simply be a reflection that 
this is a more typical day. Also, no one, for example, considers 
such things as seasonal variations in drinking habits, perhaps 
more cold drinks are drunk in the summer. This suggests that 
estimates will be biased towards the time of collection. In 
short whilst decomposition strategies are used, they perhaps only
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partially decompose the problem, and do not consider other 
aspects.
The use of exemplars is common for both ANNOY and COMPARE. 
Exemplars may be seen as the use of an availability heuristic, 
one uses the most available pieces of information to form a 
judgement. Kahneman and Miller (1986) have extended the work on 
availability (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) with norm theory, which 
proposes a model of how exemplars are used in judgement. They 
propose that a norm is produced for a category by combining a set 
of retrieved representations, these representations are salient 
or accessible exemplars.
Smith and Zarate (1992) also propose a model of social judgement 
based on exemplars rather than algebraic or schematic models. 
Rather than comparing to a prototype people may compare to 
exemplars; the exemplar does not have to be a particularly good 
example of a category to be used for comparison.
The accessibility of exemplars is obvious in COMPARE. Usually 
people compare themselves to friends or family -- people they are 
regularly with. Even when comparing more generally, without 
specific people, respondents generally compare themselves with 
their group - students. Few people take into account other types 
of people. One person recognises this but says "I have to decide 
what the other people are for myself, and I think it's fair 
enough to to just think of say you know my friends that I live 
with as as typical human beings." Thus, thinking of people one
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knows simplifies the response problem. But it also shows how 
people can think that they, or their group, are the norm.
The problems associated with availability are apparent here. The 
people one knows may not necessarily form a good basis for 
comparison. Estimates from different subgroups may produce 
different estimates if these groups differ in the amount they 
engage in the behaviour. A heavy coffee drinker, surrounded by 
other heavy coffee drinkers may report they drink an average 
amount of coffee, but so too would a light coffee drinker 
surrounded by other light coffee drinkers. Wright, Gaskell and 
O'Muircheartaigh (1994) showed how both the individuals own 
behaviour, and the social group to which they belonged effected 
estimates of how much television a typical person watched.
There are differences in the number of exemplars used. Sometimes 
just one exemplar is used. One person compares herself to only 
one friend, or only one particular annoying advert is recalled. 
Others recall more. One respondent mentions two friends, one who 
drinks a lot and one who doesn't drink any, and puts herself in 
the middle. This example shows how the person used two extreme 
examples to arrive at a norm for coffee drinking. This recalling 
of both extremes is unusual however. Mostly people generate 
examples of people who engage in the activity or of annoying 
adverts. Those who like adverts don't generate examples of good 
adverts. The focus is very much on instances of the behaviour 
rather than contrary examples.
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This tendency to generate confirmatory examples can also lead to 
biases. Concentrating on annoying ads, without considering all 
the ads that aren't annoying, may lead one to consider that the 
incidence of annoying ads is greater than it actually is.
Thinking of instances, rather than of generalities, can be found 
in other statements. People remember particular conversations 
or particular articles they have read which relate to the 
question.
Some people, especially for ANNOY, base their response not on the 
behaviour but on their general attitudes. At ANNOY it is their 
attitude towards advertising which may be the basis of the 
response. In some cases the attitude can completely dominate the 
response to the extent that one's estimate of the amount of 
annoyance bears no relation to the amount of television watched 
and thus to actual behaviour. For example, one respondent says 
she is annoyed by an advert everyday, previously she had reported 
not watching television. Another respondent says "I immediately 
thought my big thing is about how subversive ads are, and I was 
thinking gosh it's subversive. And if she gives me anything that 
says every 5 minutes then that'll be the one I'll choose. I 
liked the question, I thought that was a good question cos it's 
one I can respond strongly to." In these cases it seems the 
strict accuracy of the response to the question as posed is not 
what is centrally important to the respondents. What is 
important is getting their strongly held views across. This 
provides a nice example of the way in which the survey functions
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as a communicative event, and illustrates how respondents 
interactive goals can influence response accuracy.
Sometimes the response is based on ideas about self, or theories 
of self. Here the respondent thinks about what they are like, 
and it seems implicitly infers from this how often they would 
engage in the behaviour. This is an estimation based not on 
retrieved events but on what a person like me would do.
Lay theories of memory also play a minor role. For ANNOY when 
people fail to generate an exemplar they may rely on implicit 
ideas about memory to judge what this failure means. Either 
deciding that because they can't recall, they can't be annoyed 
very often, or just because they can't recall doesn't mean they 
aren't annoyed.
In the protocols then we can observe a number of strategies which 
have been suggested to occur based on the application of 
cognitive theory to survey methods. A number of types of 
inference strategies occur based on comparisons with normal 
behaviour, anchoring and adjustment, exemplar based strategies 
and to a lesser extent theories of the self and memory. Some of 
the ways in which these processes may lead to errors was also 
discussed.
These processes reported above are, of course, all conscious. 
It is almost certainly the case that other processes, perhaps 
more of the same, perhaps different processes, have occurred 
which have not been reported. Some of these seem to be implied
by the protocols, but others probably are not. Four general 
types of processes are assumed to occur in response to survey 
questions (Tourangeau, 1984). These are comprehension, 
retrieval, judgement and response. Most of the types reported 
above would probably be seen as either retrieval or judgement. 
Comprehension and response processes are less represented. I 
want to look briefly at these processes and some other minor 
processes not represented in this four stage scheme.
Comprehension, Response and Other minor processes
There are few explicit statements about comprehension. Attempts 
to define what annoyed means generates the most comprehension 
problems. This is a vague term and thus is what one might 
expect. However, rather than simply occurring at the beginning 
of a response, these tend to occur later in the protocols, or 
throughout them. Some respondents focus almost exclusively on 
trying to understand what an annoying behaviour in relation to 
an advert would be.
Over all questions only a couple of respondents report any kind 
of immediate understanding of a question. It seems that, for the 
most part, comprehension occurs as a relatively automatic 
process, leaving little trace in memory. Comprehension processes 
may only become conscious when there are problems of 
comprehension.
As well as these kinds of definitional comprehension 
understanding what the question means - there is also evidence 
of a more procedural kind of comprehension. This is more
understanding the question, and how to respond in a more general 
way, including requests for repeats of the question or specific 
items within the question as well as what they are meant to do 
with the response card provided. These types of statements occur 
for all questions but somewhat more for ANNOY.
Responding, as with comprehension, seems to proceed largely 
automatically. Mapping the response onto the response scale, 
produces little information from respondents. A few respondents 
indicate that they are looking for their formulated response on 
the scale. There are some indications of satisficing principles 
at work in response to both amount coffee and annoy. A few 
respondents pick a category because they 'like it' and a few also 
exclude categories. Some respondents at COFFEE indicate that the 
scale has provided them with the response, that it curtailed 
their need to think.
There is also evidence of response anxieties from a few 
respondents at amount coffee and at TV hours. However, this does 
not appear to be necessarily associated with a response stage, 
but rather seems to be a more general emotional reaction to the 
question. For one respondent their anxiety about drinking too 
much coffee dominates the response, and perhaps interferes with 
response.
Other minor processes also occur. There is some evidence of 
respondents setting up retrieval cues. These tend to be very 
general rather than specific. Some respondents indicate their 
level of certainty of the estimates provided, and estimate how 
difficult the question is. Largely, this is when they are
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uncertain or when the think the question is difficult, although 
some indicate when they are certain of their response. There are 
very few judgements about the accuracy of a retrieved piece of 
information, and very few decisions to discard retrieved 
information.
Strategy decisions are also sometimes stated in protocols, a kind 
of meta-stage decision on how to go about answering the question, 
or even whether to answer it. Only a few respondents actually 
mention these strategy decisions, and they tend to come early on 
in the protocol, although there are some points where explicit 
strategy changes are made later in the protocols. Another 
example is the two respondents who decide whether or not to 
respond to the question. Although few respondents explicitly 
mention these procedures, it is possible that they are more 
common but more automatic.
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
Firstly, the protocols reveal that, in general, respondents tend 
to approach the questions in a more or less conversational way. 
Most do not really try to be exactly accurate. They guess, give 
rough estimates and rarely ever check recalled information for 
accuracy. They rely on a number of inference strategies which 
may lead to a number of types of biases in reports.
Secondly, in regards to the question of accuracy of verbal 
reports, the implications of these results are positive. The 
protocols differed across conditions as expected. Thus, as
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Burton and Blair (1991) have found, experimental manipulations 
can lead to differences in verbal reports. By using verbal 
reports in an experimental setting it is thus possible to further 
look at their accuracy. Also, for some questions the types of 
strategies which might be expected to occur were found in the 
protocols.
In regard to the completeness of verbal reports, it is almost 
certainly the case that verbal reports do not capture all the 
processes which are occurring, and, especially for the relatively 
quick comprehension and response processes, other methods will 
be needed to better understand these processes. However, the 
information that is provided is relevant to the investigation of 
cognitive processing in the survey. Not only can it provide 
information on particular hypotheses, but it has been useful in 
providing information on a number of other types of processes.
Finally, the protocols have provided further information about 
the specific hypotheses tested. It should also be noted that the 
lack of evidence for some conscious processing is also 
interesting here. Where Schwarz and colleagues had predicted a 
"meaning shift" and a "comparison shift", although processing is 
altered, there is no reference to the response scales in the way 
which Schwarz and colleagures hypothesised. This suggests that 
while these factors are influential, they either do not influence 
thinking in quite the way hypothesised, or they do not do so at 
a conscious level. That is, even with a sophisticated sample, 
respondents do not consciously consider the response distribution 
as a population distribution, nor do they make conscious
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decisions about the meaning which a scale provides. The way 
these hypotheses have been stated in the past, one might have 
expected respondents to do so. Instead, at least at a conscious 
level, different scales seem to influence the strategies used for 
response.
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CHAPTER 5 - EXPERIMENT 2 --PART 2 
VERBAL REPORTS AND ATTITUDE QUESTIONS.
SUMMARY
This chapter reports the results of the attitude 
questions asked as part of the experiment described in 
the previous chapter. A number of attitude issues 
were addressed with verbal protocols, both examining 
existing hypotheses and generating data on more 
general issues.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The processes underlying response to attitude questions are 
not well understood. In part, because there is a paucity of 
actual process data. This study aims to address this lack of 
understanding by using verbal protocols to generate data on 
response processes with attitude questions. There are a 
variety of factors which may affect the processing of attitude 
questions, including the particular wording of a question, the 
type of response scales provided, the order of questions, and 
the context in which the question is asked.
Much of the research on attitude questions within the CASM 
framework has focused on context effects. However, rather 
than concentrate on this one factor, context, this study aims 
to explore a number of factors which may influence responses 
to attitude questions. The aim of this approach is to provide 
information on a range of factors to which think-aloud may be
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applicable, and also to explore the processing involved in 
responding to attitude questions over a range of issues.
As each set of questions used in this study deals with a 
different issue, each will be treated as a separate 
experiment. Each issue will contain an introduction to the 
problems, the results of the experiment, and a discussion of 
the results. The method, procedure and respondents used is 
the same as for the previous chapter (see pages 157 - 159).
The first questions to be dealt with here concern life 
satisfaction and deal with a clear hypothesis about the nature 
of assimilation and contrast effects. The questions are drawn 
from previous research which has shown response effects for 
these questions on split-ballot surveys. A specific 
hypothesis developed from split ballot surveys was tested. 
This will be described below.
The other questions used were not drawn directly from work 
done with large scale split-ballot surveys. Rather, drawing 
on theories of responding, a number of areas where response 
effects might be expected are examined. These include the 
following questions: satisfaction with democracy, which
varies the scale used to look at the issues of mapping 
responses onto a response scale; questions concerning European 
Union membership, which looks at the issue of question order; 
and a question on post-materialist values, which looks at the 
measurement of values and their stability between different 
response alternatives which, supposedly, measure the same
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thing. Finally a general discussion of response processes at 
attitude questions, based on the findings from the above 
questions will be presented.
5.2 ASSIMILATION / CONTRAST EFFECTS FOR LIFE 
SATISFACTION.
5.2.1 Introduction
Previous research has found that asking a question about 
marital happiness before a question about general happiness 
led to respondents describing themselves as less happy 
generally than when the general question came first (Schuman 
& Presser, 19 81). It was suggested that when the marital 
question is asked first, marital happiness is subtracted from 
general happiness. However, others found the reverse (Smith, 
reported by Tourangeau, Rasinski, & Bradburn, 1991). In this 
case the marital question is seen as priming marital 
happiness, making it accessible. Strack, Martin, and Schwarz 
(1988) hypothesised that these effects may be due to the use 
of conversational norms. Depending on the conversational 
context of the questioning, this context may cause the 
specific area to be seen as part of general life satisfaction, 
and therefore relevant to the evaluation of general life 
satisfaction. As the area has just been mentioned it is 
accessible and therefore more likely to influence the judgment 
of general satisfaction, producing an assimilation effect. On 
the other hand the conversational context may cause the 
general question to be seen as asking for new information,
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apart from the specific area already reported on. Here the 
specific area is discounted from the judgment of life 
satisfaction, producing a contrast effect.
Schwarz, Strack, and Mai (1991; also Strack et al 1988) 
demonstrated this by asking about dating satisfaction before 
general life satisfaction either with a lead-in to the 
questions which suggested the questions represented two 
separate domains or without this lead in. When the questions 
were asked without a lead in there was greater correlation 
(.67) between the two areas of satisfaction than when a lead 
in was used (.18). Tourangeau, Rasinski, and Bradburn (1991) 
provide similar results when the specific area is marital 
happiness.
If this hypothesis is correct then in think aloud protocols 
those respondents who do not receive a lead in should refer 
more to evaluations of their relationship when evaluating 
overall life satisfaction than when there is a lead in. In 
addition, discounting of the relationship satisfaction should 
occur when a lead in is present but not when it is absent.
In this experiment the questions and lead in from Strack et al 
were used, but with the more normal 3-point verbal scale 
(rather than 11 points as used by Strack et al; Tourangeau, 
Rasinski, & Bradburn, 1991) . These are given below.
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Figure 5.1
Life satisfaction Questions and Lead-in
LEAD- IN.
I would now like to ask you to report on two aspects 
of your life, which may be relevant to people's 
overall well being:
1) marital/relationship/dating satisfaction.
2) satisfaction with life as a whole.
QUESTIONS.
1. Taking things altogether how would you describe 
your (relationship). Would you say that your are 
very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy with 
your (relationship)?
2. Taken altogether, how would you say things are 
these days? Would you say that you are very happy, 
fairly happy, or not too happy?
Note: a previous question was asked to establish marital
status.
5.2.2 Results
Responses
Relationship satisfaction and life satisfaction are positively 
correlated for both groups. For the group with a lead in the 
correlation is .52 (p=.032); for the group without a lead in 
the correlation is .75 (p=.000) . Thus, the difference in the 
size of the correlations between the two groups is in the 
direction expected, but is much less than that found by 
Schwarz et al.
Protocols
Analysis of the protocols showed very few explicit inclusions 
of relationship at the general happiness question; 3 people 
included their relationship in the group without a lead in and 
2 in the group with a lead in. There were no explicit 
exclusions of relationship. A few respondents raised
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questions as to whether the relationship should be included 
but did not resolve these questions.
For the behavioural frequency questions, when faced with a 
lack of data which directly addressed the hypothesis, we 
turned to look at general response strategies. However, in 
the case of life satisfaction, respondents, firstly, do not 
say very much. And, secondly, what they do report is mostly 
a general evaluation or affective response, sometimes with the 
addition of one particular aspect (eg financial 
circumstances) . Only a few respondents break their 
evaluations down into a number of areas of satisfaction or use 
a comparative strategy (eg life now compared to life before).
Table 5.1 
Strategies for life satisfaction
NO LEAD-IN LEAD IN TOTAL
GENERAL 10 8 18
GENERAL + ASPECT 3 4 7
ASPECTS 4 5 9
OTHER 3 2 5
RESPONSE ONLY 1 1 2
TOTAL 21 20 41
5.2.3 Discussion
Although the finding that respondents' use of 'general 
affective' statements in response to life satisfaction 
questions is interesting in regard to satisfaction in general,
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it is of little interest in regard to testing the present 
hypothesis.
Given the survey results from other researchers, one would 
expect that assimilation and contrast effects would have 
occurred in this study. If assimilation and contrast did 
occur here, then they did so at a non-reportable level. And, 
moreover, both inclusion or exclusion of relationship 
satisfaction have gone into the overall evaluation of 
satisfaction without, in most cases, the respondent's 
conscious awareness of this inclusion or exclusion. How the 
general evaluation is produced is not evident, and the 
influence of the previous relationship question on this 
evaluation is also unclear.
For the behavioural questions reported in the previous 
chapter, while the direct link between independent variable 
and response was not articulated by the respondents, there was 
a clear way in which the strategies used could be influenced 
by these variables. Here, however, neither the independent 
variable nor, for the most part, the 'strategies' seem 
reportable. Thus, the influence of conversational norms and 
of the accessibility of information, remains obscure.
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5.3 COMPARING SCALES -- SATISFACTION WITH 
DEMOCRACY.
5.3.1 Introduction
Response scales are commonly used for attitude questions. 
Respondents are asked to rate, for example, not simply whether 
they agree or disagree with an item but the extent of that 
agreement or disagreement. Issues surrounding the use of 
scales concern whether they should be bi-polar or unipolar, 
how many points a scale should have, and the extent of verbal 
labelling of a scale.
Whilst it has been common to assume that people have 
dimensional representations of issues, Ostrom (1987) argues 
that people find a continuous rating scale difficult because 
they have categorical, all-or-none, representations. He 
argues that people decompose continuous scales into a 
categorical form. Thus for a bipolar scale they would first 
decide which side they are on, and then perhaps further 
decompose the scale. Ostrom, Betz and Skowronski (1992) 
report a study by Krosnick and Berent which they claim 
supports this idea. They report that Krosnick and Berent 
found that test-retest reliability was higher when respondents 
first selected the side they supported and then indicated how 
strongly they were on that side.
Within the CASM framework there has not been much work on the 
effects of different scales. 7 point scales (plus or minus 2) 
have generally been seen as the most reliable (Cox 1980) .
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Alwin (1992) reports that in general the more scale points the 
more reliable the scale, the exception being two category 
scales. Alwin and Krosnick (1989) also report higher 
reliability for scales which have more verbal labels. 
Krosnick (1991) suggests that verbal response alternatives are 
easier for respondents than numerical scales with only end­
point labels as for the latter the meaning of the points in 
the middle of the scale are ambiguous.
To investigate cognitive processes and response scales a 
question was chosen from the Eurobarometer survey which has 
been asked with different response scales. The question asks 
people how satisfied they are with democracy in their country. 
The response scales given are either a 4 point verbal scale or 
a 10-point numeric scale with only the ends labelled. The 
question and scales are given below.
Figure 5.2 
Satisfaction with Democracy Question
QUESTION WITH VERBAL SCALE
Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy 
works in (your country)?
QUESTION WITH NUMERIC SCALE
On the whole, to what extent would you say you are 
satisfied with the way democracy works in (your 
country)?
Please use the scale on this card to indicate your
reply. 10 means you are completely satisfied and 1
means you are completely dissatisfied.
completely completely
dissatisfied satisfied
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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5.3.2 Results
Responses
Mean satisfaction with democracy for the verbal scale was 2.6 
(SD =.88). Mean satisfaction for the numeric scale was 5.2 
(SD=2.5) . Both means are in the middle of the scales, and 
thus show little difference across scales.
Protocols
Many respondents thought of aspects of democracy or particular 
issues - - proportional representation, informational or 
cultural barriers to access, referenda etc. For example one 
respondent says " I was thinking mostly about the first past 
the post. The fact that you can rule with 42% of the vote." 
Another says "Student rights are basically non-existent, 
women's rights are non-existent. Racial equality is 
pathetic". Others used a comparative strategy, comparing 
democracy in Britain with democracy elsewhere or with other 
types of systems, for example "compared to other countries, 
the democracy in this country is very good". Others mention 
both particular aspects and comparisons. The table below 
gives a breakdown of these categories across groups.
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Table 5.2
Strategies for satisfaction with democracy by group
Verbal
Scale
Numeric
Scale Total
Aspects/Issues 12 6 18
Aspects/comparisons 4 2 6
Comparative 1 2 3
General evaluation 1 5 6
Scale 1 2 3
Other 2 3 5
21 20 41
Some simply give general evaluations of democracy, sometimes 
linked with an attitude towards democracy and sometimes with 
more concentration on the response scale. An additional 
category reflects those who concentrate simply on the scale 
rather than on the topic of democracy. An example of a 
general evaluation is: "You gotta be optimistic about
democracy, its not a good thing but I'm going to give a good 
mark cause we have democracy and it's not good to spit on it 
so easy". And, one which focuses exclusively on the scale: 
"its something that's difficult to sort of put a numerical 
value on, but I suppose it's sort of somewhere between fairly 
satisfied and completely satisfied".
As can be seen from the table there are some differences 
between the groups. Those given the verbal scale bring in 
aspects or issues related to democracy more than do those who 
receive the numeric scale. These latter tend to have more 
varied strategies, and although some look at aspects, there is 
also more concentration on general evaluations and scaling.
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These codes were collapsed in terms of responses which give 
some thought to issues about democracy versus those that are 
more superficial. Respondents who either thought about 
aspects of democracy or who used comparative strategies (the 
categories 7 Aspects/issues', 'aspects/comparisons' and 
7 comparative7 in table 5.2) were grouped into the "considered7 
category. Those who gave general evaluations, concentrated on 
the scale or used other strategies were coded as 
"superficial7. Those given the verbal scale are more likely 
to consider a particular issue, whereas those given the 
numeric scale are equally likely to consider an issue or to 
treat the question more superficially. The table below 
illustrates this breakdown.
Strategies for 
divided into
Table 5.3 
satisfaction with 
considered versus
democracy by 
superficial
group,
Verbal Numeric Total
considered 17 10 27
superficial 4 10 14
Total 21 20 41
5.3.3 Discussion of scaling
It seems that those who receive the verbal scale are more 
likely to think about the issues involved than are those who 
receive the numeric scale. Having said this the level of 
consideration is again not large. Most people mention only 
one issue, such as proportional representation, rather than 
considering a number of relevant aspects. A few do mention
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both negative and positive aspects; and a few also bring in 
comparative arguments.
Why do we get this difference between the groups in terms of 
mentioning issues? Firstly, it should be noted that there are 
a number of differences between these scales. One is 4 point, 
one is 10 point; one is numerical, one is verbal; one is 
presented orally, one on a showcard. Any one of these, or 
combination of them, could be responsible for the differences. 
It is also possible that for the numerical scale respondents 
thought about aspects whilst the question was being read but 
then were distracted by the show card and forgot this 
thinking. Thus this result might be an artefact of the think 
aloud procedure, however, the retrospective report may have 
allowed them to recall this thinking. Another plausible 
reason is that the numerical scale is indeed distracting, but 
it distracts the respondent from thinking about the question 
in terms of the issues of democracy and focuses them onto the 
issues of placing themselves on a scale. The verbal scale is 
more comprehensible, it is closer to ordinary language and 
thus does not represent such a difficult response problem. 
Respondents using the numeric scale use ordinary language 
terms like 'fairly satisfied' before translating this into 
numbers, suggesting an additional response step is required. 
This idea that it is the numeric aspect of the scale which is 
more difficult is consistent with Krosnick's (1991) 
suggestion. He assumes satisficing will result from more 
difficult scales. Perhaps part of this satisficing is not 
simply in choosing the response, but in putting effort into
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thinking about the issues. Further research would be needed 
to determine which particular aspects of these scales make 
them more or less difficult.
A further issue in terms of the numeric scale is whether 
people tend to decompose the scale into categorical form as 
Ostrom (1987) suggests or whether they deal with it more as a 
continuous scale. For some respondents one cannot really tell 
how they have dealt with the scale; there is no trace of this 
process in their protocol. About half the respondents do 
however, show some type of scaling statements. A few 
respondents do seem to immediately place themselves on one 
side of the scale; for example, "I would probably go on the 
side of slightly dissatisfied" or "I was thinking I'll choose 
a higher number, it had to be higher than 5 or 6 because it's 
more important to me than something mediocre or average". 
Also notable in the above quotes is that people use verbal 
labels or categories to roughly place themselves things like 
"pretty dissatisfied" or "fairly satisfied" occur for a number 
of respondents. They then, presumably, have to choose a number 
which seems to fit that description. But quite how the verbal 
judgement is mapped onto numbers is usually elusive. A couple 
of respondents indicate choosing because it sounds right " I 
chose 7 because its a nice in between number". A few 
respondents do seem to provide at least one endpoint exemplar, 
for example, " we're not a dictatorship so you can't be 
completely dissatisfied". A couple, though, seem to use both 
sides of the scale to try to find their position, though not
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explicitly so; for example, "feeling that its neither not not 
the worst but not the best".
Thus whilst for about half the protocols there is no trace of 
scaling their responses, for the others there is evidence of 
the way they approached the scale. More seem to place 
themselves on one side of the scale than to consider both 
ends, this would support Ostrom's idea that people approach 
the scale in a more categorical way. Additionally, the use of 
verbal labels can act as further subdivisions of the scale. 
What may differentiate people who simply consider one side of 
the scale from those who consider satisfied and not satisfied 
dimensions may be the strength, or extremity, of their 
attitude to democracy. Whilst the protocols don't really 
provide evidence for this, it could be that those who know 
their general position can immediately go to one side of the 
scale or the other, whilst those who have not really 
considered their position before need first to consider which 
side they might be on.
5.4 QUESTION ORDER -  COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE 
RESPONSES TO EUROPEAN MEMBERSHIP.
5.4.1 Introduction
The order in which questions are asked can effect responses to 
questions. Such order effects are generally termed context 
effects. Much of the work in CASM on context effects and 
attitude questions focuses on assimilation and contrast
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effects for two types of context: part-whole question
sequences, of which the life satisfaction questions above are 
an example, and related area priming, where a related area 
which is either positive or negative to the target issue is 
first presented and acts to prime different sides of an issue.
Context may also be important where different aspects of the 
same issue are queried. It is often argued that one question 
is unreliable for measuring an attitude and that many 
different questions assessing the same attitude are necessary. 
The three component model of attitudes suggests that attitudes 
are a combination of affective, cognitive and behavioural 
components (Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960). When measuring 
attitudes one needs questions assessing these different 
aspects, and often surveys attempt to do just that.
But, might measuring one aspect affect responses to the other 
aspect? This may be the case, especially if the different 
components are inconsistent, which has been shown to make the 
attitude less stable (Rosenberg, 1960) . Asking people to 
think about why they feel the way they do has been shown to 
lead to attitude change (Wilson, Lisle, & Kraft 1990; Wilson, 
Kraft, & Dunn 1989) . Thinking which focuses on one aspect of 
the attitude (affective or cognitive) can lead to less 
relation between attitude and behaviour when consistency 
between cognitive and affective aspects of the attitude are 
low (Millar & Tesser 1989, 1992). Similarly, informational
messages have been shown to lead to more change in affective 
attitudes and emotional messages to more change in cognitive
209
attitudes (Millar & Millar, 1990) . It may be that simply 
asking a question which makes one aspect of the attitude more 
salient or accessible, will affect responses to subsequent 
questions assessing a different aspect. If first questioned 
on their beliefs people may use the accessible information, 
about beliefs, when answering the later affective question, 
and vice versa. Thus one might expect that the order of 
presentation of items tapping different aspects of the same 
issue may lead respondents to answer differently. This might 
be expected to produce a response effect when affective and 
cognitive aspects are divergent.
To look at the effect on processing of the order of questions 
dealing with affective and cognitive components of attitudes 
two questions related to European Union membership were asked. 
Respondents were asked for their reaction to the EC being 
scrapped and whether the EC had benefited Britain. SCRAPPED 
is meant to tap the affective component of attitudes towards 
Europe while BENEFIT is meant to tap cognitive components. 
Both of these questions are taken from the Eurobarometer 
survey, and are given below.
Figure 5.3 
Questions on attitudes to Europe
Q. If you were to be told tomorrow that the European 
community had been scrapped would you be very sorry 
about it, indifferent, or relieved? (SCRAPPED)
Q. Taking everything into consideration, would you say 
that Britain has on balance benefited or not from 
 being a member of the European Community? (BENEFIT)
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In this experiment the order in which the questions were asked 
was varied. Half of the respondents received the SCRAPPED 
question first, while the other half received the BENEFIT 
question first.
5.4.2 Results
Responses
The tables below give responses to BENEFIT (table 5.4) and 
SCRAPPED (table 5.5). For both questions there is little 
difference between the two groups.
Table 5.4 
Responses to BENEFIT by group
Benefit Not Benefit DK Total
BENEFIT first 13 4 3 20
BENEFIT second 17 2 2 21
TOTAL 30 6 5 41
Table 5.5 
Responses to SCRAPPED by group
Very Sorry Indifferent Relieved DK Total
SCRAPPED 1st 14 5 2 21
SCRAPPED 2nd 10 7 1 2 20
TOTAL 24 12 3 2 41
Protocols
For SCRAPPED the two largest categories are evaluations of the 
EC or affective reactions, and considering the effects of
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scrapping, either personal or social effects. The table below 
(5.6) shows that there are some differences between the group 
who were asked this question first and those who received it 
after 'benefit7
Table 5.6 
Strategies for SCRAPPED by group
SCRAPPED first SCRAPPED second
Evaluations / 
Affective reactions 9 1
Effects on personal/ 
societal life 6 13
Evaluation plus 
specific aspects 2 1
No knowledge / 
interest in area 3 2
Other 1 3
Those respondents who answer SCRAPPED first tend to talk in 
terms of affective reactions, or general evaluations of the EC 
and simply whether the prospect is good or bad. Those who 
answer SCRAPPED after BENEFIT talk more in terms of the effect 
of scrapping either on their personal life, or everyday life 
in general or in terms of the effect for the country.
For BENEFIT, many respondents refer to some aspect in which 
Britain has or has not benefited. These include economic, 
political and social /cultural areas. For example, "I would 
say that the way the European community's structured that it 
will benefit the it's designed to benefit larger economies 
like Britain" or " I was thinking about the education system
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in Britain, how they may have benefited in coming getting 
closer to the continental way of educating and how they'll 
probably also benefit from knowing other languages".
Of these respondents who consider aspects of BENEFIT, most 
consider only one issue while about a third consider more than 
one issue. The aspect most mentioned is economics. Economic 
aspects are generally seen more as beneficial than not. Of 
those few who consider more than one aspect most consider at 
least one negative and one positive aspect.
Social aspects are seen as beneficial by all who consider 
them. The only slight difference between the groups who 
receive BENEFIT first and those who receive it after SCRAPPED 
comes from the mention of social aspects. Seven people 
mention social aspects; six of these are from those who 
received BENEFIT after SCRAPPED with only 1 when BENEFIT comes 
first.
Respondents who do not consider particular aspects can largely 
be said to answer superficially, with a number of types of 
general statements, a few attitudes to the EC and assertions 
of complete lack of knowledge on the issue. The general 
statements range from simple assertions, saying Britain would 
be worse off it they weren't a member as well as more 
idiosyncratic responses. For example, "I can't think of 
anything specific, well I don't, I think just on the whole 
they have"; or " Oh actually that's very difficult for me to 
judge. I would just say that everybody benefits from it so".
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Many respondents express a lack of knowledge on this issue or 
uncertainty about their response. Almost all those who 
express a lack of knowledge do not consider aspects of 
benefit. A few respondents who admit to a lack of knowledge 
give don't know responses, most, though, try to generate some 
type of response. Table 5.7 below gives a breakdown of these 
codes across groups.
TABLE 5.7 
Strategies for BENEFIT by group
BENEFIT first BENEFIT second
Aspects of benefit 10 8
General statements 7 9
Attitude to EC 1 2
No knowledge 1 2
In summary then, a number of people consider specific aspects 
of benefit, but few consider many aspects. The only minor 
difference between the groups comes from a greater mention of 
social aspects from those who receive SCRAPPED first. Many 
people lack specific knowledge or give vague responses, but 
are still prepared to give an opinion. This certainly goes 
against any model that sees people as weighing up the pros and 
cons of an issue and forming a judgement on this basis.
5.4.3 Discussion
The small differences between the groups suggests that asking 
about affective reactions first has little implication for the
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question of BENEFIT - - the more cognitive appraisal of the 
issue. The slight difference in more mentions of social 
aspects when SCRAPPED is asked first may come from the more 
positive nature in which these issues are seen. People see 
being involved with other countries as positive. Perhaps 
having first brought to mind one's affective reaction makes 
these considerations more salient, and more likely to be 
considered as benefits. In this case then the response 
process does not seem to be affected, but different contents 
may be made more salient.
For the question SCRAPPED though it seems that it does matter 
whether the question is asked first or second. Perhaps 
bringing to mind an affective response to an issue, or at 
least to this issue, has less influence on cognitions about it 
than the reverse order. There is some suggestion that where 
an attitude has a large affective component, concentrating on 
cognitive aspects may reduce the attitude-behaviour 
consistency (Millar & Tesser, 1992). Certainly here having 
considered more cognitive aspects of European membership seems 
to affect thinking about the affective reaction question. It 
is also true that few people seem to have much specific 
knowledge of the EC, even though they have an opinion about 
it. This issue may be dominated by affective reactions rather 
than by cognitions. In this case focusing on the cognitive 
aspects of the attitude first may lead people to think about 
the affective aspects differently than they otherwise would 
have.
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From the small sample there is no evidence for this difference 
in thinking translating into a response effect. But, this 
study is consistent with studies which show effects on 
attitude-behaviour consistency or attitude change depending on 
whether people focus on cognitive or affective components of 
an attitude (Millar & Tesser, 1992; Millar & Millar, 1990). 
The present study shows how the different focus can lead to 
different ways of thinking about the issue. For the 
questionnaire designer this is problemmatic, because a simple 
change in the order of questions could potentially produce 
differences in response. A response effect is probably most 
likley where the different components are inconsistent because 
in this case the different components have different 
implications for response.
5.5 MEASURING VALUES -  RESPONSE OPTIONS FOR 
POST-MATERIALISM.
5.5.1 Introduction
Values are assumed to be more basic and enduring than
attitudes. Indeed attitudes are sometimes seen as deriving 
from values (Rokeach 1973). But, to determine what values 
people have, one still has to measure them in some way.
Usually values are measured by asking respondents to rank
issues, for example from most to least important. Rankings
are assumed to reflect the underlying value structure, that 
is, those things ranked highly reflect what is valued. 
Krosnick and Alwin (1988; Alwin & Krosnick, 1985) suggest this
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may be better than rating each issue separately. Ranking, 
being a more complex task, may demand more thoughtful 
responses from respondents. In the present study a particular 
type of value is examined, Inglehart's materialist / 
postmaterialist value dimension.
Inglehart (1977, 1990) proposed a shift in values to account 
for what political scientists see as the emergence of a new 
political agenda in western democracies. This new political 
agenda involves the concentration on a new and expanded range 
of issues in politics such as women's rights and the 
protection of the environment. Inglehart saw this value shift 
as a movement away from materialist values towards post- 
materialist values; from an emphasis on economic stability and 
security, to values which emphasise the need for participation 
in society, human rights and aesthetic needs. Whilst his 
thesis has changed in terms of the origins of this value 
change, at first linking these needs to Maslow's (1954) 
hierarchy, and later in terms of diminishing marginal utility, 
the basic theme of a change from materialist to post-
materialist values has been maintained.
The instrument for measuring post-materialist / materialist 
values consists of asking respondents to rank what they 
consider should be the long term priorities for their
government. There are two versions of the scale -- the short 
version and the long version. The short version consists of 
one four item list with two materialist and two post­
materialist values. The long version consists of three such
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lists. The short version uses the list labelled A below (see 
figure 5.4), whilst the long version consists of this list as 
well as two others, including the one labelled B below.
FIGURE 5.4 
Question and response options for 
Materialist / Post-materialist Values
Q. There is a lot of talk these days about what a country's 
goals should be for the next 10 or 15 years. On this card 
are listed some of the goals that different people say should 
be given top priority. Would you please say which one you 
yourself consider most important for your country in the long 
run. And what would be your second choice.
LIST A
Maintaining order in the nation
Giving the people more say in important government decisions 
Fighting rising prices 
Protecting freedom of speech
LIST B
Maintaining a high level of economic growth 
Making sure that this country has strong defence forces 
Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at 
their jobs and in their communities 
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful
The materialist / post-materialist items are asked within a 
survey context, notably the Eurobarometer survey has included 
the questions for a number of years. Respondents are labelled 
'post-materialist' if they choose the two post-materialist 
options, 'materialist' if they choose the two materialist 
options, and mixed if they choose a mixture.
This does seem to be a rather simple, one might say 
simplistic, measure of values. Yet the fact remains that both 
across time and across cultures, many of the expected 
relationships with this measure are supported, for example a 
relationship with social background, and with opinions on a 
variety of issues, including support for women's rights
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(Inglehart, 1981). Indeed, there is an impressive amount of 
data which support this measure of values.
Inglehart"s thesis has been criticised on a number of grounds, 
both theoretical and methodological. It is the latter which 
concerns us here. Flanagan (1982; Inglehart & Flanagan, 1987) 
claims that it confounds two dimensions: a materialist / post­
materialist dimension and an authoritarian/liberal dimension. 
And Van Deth (1983) , using panel study data, showed that 
whilst the measure may be stable at the aggregate level 
(proportions in different age cohorts as predicted) there is 
little stability at the individual level. Interestingly, 
those with less interest in politics showed less stability. 
This lack of individual stability has been put down to 
measurement error, however this is to dismiss the problem too 
easily. In this case the presence of measurement error raises 
serious questions about what exactly is being measured by this 
value scale.
In the present study this issue of what is being measured by 
the materialist / post-materialist scale was explored with 
think aloud protocols. To do this respondents were presented 
with different lists of response options. One group received 
the list labelled A above; the other group received list B. 
The different lists are meant to measure the same basic 
values, and the selection of an item is presumed to be guided 
by one's underlying values. Thus, if a postmaterialist value 
orientation is guiding response selection, the particular 
wordings of different postmaterialist and matierialist options
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should not affect response. The options should be evaluated 
in terms of of the value orientation. At the value level the 
different respective options are equivalent. This is unlike 
the proposition for attitudes that different wordings may be 
tapping different aspects of a multifaceted issue and hence 
may produce different responses. What is being proposed for 
these values is that different wordings are inconsequential.
5.5.2 Results
Responses
First, looking at the actual responses given by respondents to 
the question (that is whether they chose materialist or post- 
materialist options) there were differences in responses 
between the two groups. As can be seen from table 5.8 below, 
respondents who were given list A were significantly more 
likely to be classified as post-materialist than those given 
list B (X2 = 12.07, df=l, p=.0005). Note that the number of 
materialists in our sample was too small to analyse 
statistically and therefore "materialists' in the table below 
includes respondents who chose at least one materialist item.
Table 5.8
Classification of respondents as materialist or 
postmaterialist by group
LIST A LIST B TOTAL
MATERIALIST 3 14 17
POST-MATERIALIST 18 5 23
TOTAL 21 19 40
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Protocols
Verbal protocols resulting from think aloud were coded in 
terms of how people dealt with each item in the list. 
Categories included whether people considered aspects of each 
option, whether they gave simple evaluations or simply 
labelled the option, and whether they gave no consideration to 
the option ( they did not mention it or merely read it out 
without further comment). Table 5.9 below shows that the 
respondents presented with list B gave more consideration to 
aspects of each option than did those who responded to list A, 
who tended not to evaluate as many options.
Table 5.9
Protocol Codes for List Options of Materialist / 
Postmaterialist values by group
LIST A LIST B TOTAL
Aspects Considered 
Simple evaluation/
20 34 54
Labels 34 27 61
No consideration 29 18 47
other 1 1 2
TOTAL 84 80 164
The protocols suggest that respondents given list A tended to 
think less about the options than did respondents given list 
B. Whilst this relation obtains over all the options, the 
largest differences along these lines comes from the 
evaluation of the economic options ("rising prices" and 
"economic growth"), with "rising prices" being quickly 
eliminated but "economic growth" receiving much consideration. 
The security options ("law and order" and "defence forces") on
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the other hand, tend to be more similarly evaluated on both 
lists.
This idea that list A respondents are thinking less than list 
B respondents is further supported by an analysis of the 
amount of verbalisation. One list A respondent talks a good 
deal more than other respondents. If this one extreme 
respondent is eliminated then there is a significant 
difference in the amount of verbalisation produced between the 
groups, with list B respondents verbalising more than list A 
respondents (t=2.56, df=38, p=.015).
Also, in list B, the post-materialist option 'beauty' is less 
likely to be chosen. It is, for many respondents, seen as 
rather trivial and sometimes as dependent on economic growth 
and other options. In this interpretation the 'beauty' option 
is seen as being about nice architecture and cleanliness. One 
respondent for example says "I think people can find beauty in 
the cities and countryside if they want to. It's a question 
of outlook I think. Maybe if they've got more confidence in 
their social worlds and like the personal world as well, which 
comes from that, then they'll be able to see beauty in more 
things." However, those few who chose this option interpret 
it differently. They see it as something which 'could be' 
about protecting the environment. Hence, the meaning of this 
item is ambiguous: does it refer to keeping the cities
sparkling clean or preserving the natural environment?
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Furthermore, the economic growth option is often evaluated in 
an instrumental way; it serves to make other, valued, things 
possible. For example, one respondent says "economic growth 
is a means to an end and having everyone happy is basically 
what you're trying to do". Also, some respondents answer not 
simply in terms of what they want, but what is realistic. For 
example one respondent says "I wanted to go for 3 [say in 
jobs] cos it actually seemed nicer, but it wasn't in a sense
as realistic as maintaining a high growth....... In a hard way
it seemed to be 1 [economic growth] cos it seemed to me one 
that any others might be founded on."
A further look at post-materialism: The dimension underlying 
the measurement.
To supplement the think-aloud analysis of this question we 
also explored the dimensions underlying the question items. 
Central to the measurement of materialism/post-materialism is 
the idea that there is a dimension underlying the construct. 
Using Inglehart's technique for measuring this presupposes 
that agreement or disagreement on all the options in lists A 
and B fall along the same continuum. In order to investigate 
if this is true we had each respondent, after taking part in 
the think-aloud, make semantic differential ratings between 
each pair of options. For example, each respondent was asked 
to rate, on a scale from 1 (very similar) to 9 ( very
dissimilar) , how alike 'Making sure that this country has 
strong defence forces' and 'Maintaining order in the nation' 
were. We split the 'say in jobs and community option into two 
('allowing people more say about how things are done at their
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jobs' and 'allowing people more say about how things are done 
in their community') because we felt these might be tapping 
distinct beliefs. Thus, there were nine options and therefore 
thirty-six pairs to be evaluated. The pairs were presented in 
the optimal order for paired comparisons (see Wells, 1991).
Two of the original respondents were unable to complete the 
task and one respondent's ratings were so disparate that it is 
likely he or she failed to understand the procedure. The 
analysis is of the remaining 38 respondents.
Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) is a technique well suited for 
exploring such a data set (see Jones & Koehly, 1993) . 
Essentially this technique attempts to map out any underlying 
dimensions on which the sematic differential judgements were 
made. Because we had 3 8 respondents we used a type of MDS 
known as INdividual Difference SCALing (INDSCAL). This 
allowed us to compare individual respondents. With the 
exception of the single respondent who failed to understand 
the task, there were no outliers or systematic variations. 
Thus, only the results for the group data will be presented.
The main output from MDS is a graph of the items giving their 
positions in what is argued to be the space for how the 
semantic ratings were made. In almost all cases MDS is used 
as an exploratory technique. A two dimensional solution fits 
this data adequately (see figure 5.5. The stress value is 
.426. The overall importance of both dimensions is similar:
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dimension 1 has an importance value of .234 and dimension 2 a 
value of .207).
The first dimension does distinguish the materialism / post- 
materialism options well. However, there appears also to be 
another dimension which separates the 7 Beauty7, "rising 
prices7, and "economic growth" options from the others. This 
makes sense if we take the "beauty" option to be keeping the 
cities and countryside clean and prosperous. As a number of 
respondents in the think aloud part of the study suggest, 
respondents may see a clean and aesthetically appealing 
environment as linked to economic prosperity; beautiful cities 
may be seen as an aspect of wealth. Prosperous places are 
beautiful places.
Figure 5.5 
Examining Value Options.
Derived Stimulus Configuration for Two 
Dimensional Solution.
Dimension 1 (horizontal) vs Dimension 2 (vertical)
H--- 1--- 1--- 1--- 1--- 1
Beauty 9
— I— I— I— I— h
Prices
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- 225
5.5.3 Discussion of postmaterialist values
The responses to this question show that the two lists are not 
equivalent. Different numbers of materialists and
postmaterialists are produced from the different lists. In 
part this may be due to the ambiguity of the 7beauty' option. 
This option is problematic in that it is open to different 
interpretations, interpretations which mean that it is not 
necessarily seen as a postmaterialist value. This is apparent 
from both the semantic differential ratings and in 
considerations of the option during response. Whilst the 
semantic differential ratings do offer some support for 
Inglehart's thesis, they also show this problem with the 
"beauty' option.
But ambiguity with the 'beauty' option does not offer a 
complete explanation of why the economic option, 'economic 
growth', is then chosen. The 'economic growth' option is seen 
as desirable by those who choose it; it is not necessarily 
simply the best of bad options. In fact many respondents 
choose it as their first choice. Many respondents see 
'economic growth' as necessary for other things, including the 
other items on the list. For example one respondent says it 
"allows everything to happen" or "without a high level of 
economic growth you can't have people choosing which jobs 
they're going to do". Thus, for many, it is an instrumental 
value, a means to an end.
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The option 'economic growth' then is positively evaluated by 
many, unlike the economic option on the other list, 'rising 
prices' which is quickly dismissed. Thus these two economic 
options in particular, but more generally the lists as a 
whole, differ. Part of this difference is the amount of 
consideration given to the options, as revealed by the 
differences between the groups both in the protocol codes and 
the amount of verbalisation. List A respondents seem to 
respond more 'automatically' while list B respondents are more 
thoughtful. What is it about the lists which influences the 
amount of thought? It is perhaps the case that the options on 
list A form cliches, or slogans, which are quickly 
interpretable by respondents, while options on list B do not 
have the same instantly recognisable quality and therefore 
require more consideration. Some list A respondents mention 
their quick assimilation of options; for example, one 
respondent says "two of them were conservative ideas, two of 
them were democratic ideas" and goes on to say about the 
conservative ones "I didn't think about them, I knew they were 
steeped in dogma". Others are similarly able to place labels 
on the list A options, much more so than those given the list 
B options. Thus there appears to be a difference in the 
recognizability of options.
5.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION
For most questions differences in the strategies used were 
found between the different groups and the implications of 
this have been discussed. What is not clear, in the case of
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satisfaction with democracy and the European questions is 
whether these differences in strategy translate into response 
differences. Clearly one might arrive at the same response 
through different strategies. Testing in a survey context 
with larger samples would be needed to examine this issue.
For the one question, life satisfaction, where response 
differences have been found in large scale surveys, and where 
a clear hypothesis regarding the reasons for these differences 
exists, we found neither any direct evidence for the 
hypothesis nor any strategy differences. This does not 
suggest a failure in the hypothesis, but rather points to the 
limitations of verbal protocols. Given that differnet 
response profiles were found in survey research it must be 
assumed that the processes are not conscious. Where the 
underlying processes are not conscious and furthermore where 
nonconscious processes fail to influence the conscious 
strategy adopted, protocols fail to provide useful data for 
hypothesis testing.
Looking more generally at the thinking behind attitude 
questions, one theme running through the literature is that 
people sample from their beliefs about issues in order to 
respond. In the protocols we do indeed find evidence that 
people think in this way; many do consider aspects of issues. 
They think about proportional representation or treatment of 
minorities when thinking about democracy. They think of 
economic statistics or language use when considering the 
benefits of the EC. They give examples of the lack of freedom
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of speech or the benefits of economic growth. Yet, even for 
those who do draw on their beliefs in considering aspects of 
the issue in question, the number of beliefs recruited is, 
generally, not large; often only two or three, sometimes only 
one aspect, sometimes more.
This limited sampling may be cause for concern. Central is 
the issue of salience; that is, the beliefs drawn on are those 
which are salient. One might expect that with such limited 
belief sampling anything that makes a belief more momentarily 
salient would be likely to influence response because few 
other beliefs are likely to be drawn upon. But what makes a 
belief, or aspect, salient? Some may be chronically salient, 
strongly linked to the issue; these would presumably be less 
swayed by momentary influences. Salience is, in part, a 
function of the social and personal salience of beliefs, 
instances, aspects etc. Certainly in the protocols people 
mention the media, both in general and in specific instances 
of articles they've read. They also mention conversations and 
personal experiences -- "I was talking about this recently". 
These aspects of salience are beyond the control of the 
questioner, although, there is scope to examine the media 
coverage of topics which one might be interested in.
Aspects which are made salient by previous questioning is more 
concerning for the questionnaire designer, in that beliefs 
made salient by previous questions may unduly influence later 
questions. Especially, as noted, because so few
considerations are brought to bear on a question; people do
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seem to answer with whatever information is readily available. 
This influence of previous questions may for instance occur 
somewhat for BENEFIT and SCRAPPED. When BENEFIT is asked 
first people seem more likely to frame the affective reaction 
in terms of loss of benefits. And, to a lesser extent for 
BENEFIT, when asked after SCRAPPED, people are more likely to 
consider social/cultural aspects as benefits, otherwise 
benefits are seen mostly in economic terms. Having thought 
about their reaction in terms of personal loss - - travel 
abroad, liking links with other cultures --at SCRAPPED people 
are more likely to consider these aspects as potential 
benefits.
There is also evidence about the varying nature of attitude 
strength. Some respondents report having thought about the 
issue before. A number do so for life satisfaction; it is 
something they consider about themselves in daily life. But 
at other questions also some respondents indicate having 
thought about the issue before. This sometimes produces less 
thinking "I didn't need to think I just knew because I've 
thought about this a lot" but it also produces more rehearsed 
arguments. This may be especially true for social science 
students (some who study the European Community for example). 
Whilst this sometimes leads to a definite response, in other 
cases it does not. One respondent, for example, indicates 
having thought about the issue of European benefits, and sees 
economic benefits, but also considers that this is in the long 
run detrimental to the environment --he responds 'don't know' 
because he has not resolved this problem. Another, with
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exactly the same conflict, decides to give greater weight to 
the environment. Both of these respondents clearly are 
knowledgeable, but mixed in their attitudes, a category which 
Tourangeau, Bradburn, Rasinski, and D'Andrade (1989a, 1989b) 
identified as being susceptible to response effects. Perhaps 
different contexts would push these respondents to resolve the 
conflict in different ways.
But, as well as the many respondents who do consider aspects 
of issues, there are also many who do not. Some of these may 
be people with strong opinions who simply do not need to think 
about the issues, but many more are vague in their response 
strategies. A question here is identified by the differences 
in amount of thought about the postmaterialist question, where 
one response list seems to generate more reactions and one to 
generate more thought. Are these people with vague response 
strategies simply going on a 'gut reaction': "I like Europe
so I'll say benefit", "democracy's a good thing so I'll give 
it a high mark" . And this raises the question of what we 
are trying to measure when we measure attitudes, and perhaps 
values. Are we looking for a reaction, or are we looking for 
a more thoughtful considered response?
This difference between rapid and thoughtful response mirrors 
the split between measurement in the psychometric versus the 
survey tradition. In the former, respondents are urged to not 
think but to respond quickly, whereas in the latter 
respondents are often urged to think carefully. A danger in 
the former approach may be that respondents are simply
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reacting to well worn phrases, or vague momentary impulses. 
A danger in the latter is that they are formulating responses 
to issues they have not previously considered and may 
therefore be subject to a host of situational variations. 
Clearly this issue warrants further research.
Across both the behavioural and attitudinal questions 
protocol analysis has provided useful information for 
examining response processes. The use of protocol analysis in 
an experimental design has shown differences in response 
strategies and in this way provided information on a number of 
hypotheses concerning response effects. However, limitations 
of the use of protocol anlysis were also encountered. Chapter 
8 provides further discussion of how this study contributes to 
an evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of protocol 
analysis as a method for investigating response processes.
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CHAPTER 6 - EXPERIMENT 3 PART 1 
CONTEXT EFFECTS AND ATTITUDE QUESTIONS
SUMMARY
This and the following chapter report on an experiment 
examining factors involved in context effects in 
attitude surveys. In this study a standard split 
ballot experiment was used, with two versions of an 
attitude questionnaire, varying the context in which 
target questions appear, presented via computer. 
Instructions on 'how' to think were also varied, and 
latencies collected as a measure of processing speed. 
Thus there were two dependent variables: the responses 
to the questions and the latency of response. This 
chapter describes the results for the response 
variable. The next chapter reports on the results for 
the latency variable.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
The effect of context on attitude questions is a central issue 
for survey methodology. Much work in CASM has focused on 
identifying factors which influence whether or not the context 
produces an effect. These factors have been discussed at 
length in chapter one. The present experiment aims to 
explore some of these factors, taking up some issues which 
have received a good deal of research attention and some 
which, although they have received theoretical attention, have 
had less empirical exploration.
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A number of person factors have been shown to influence 
context effects. In particular the attitude structure, in 
terms of the importance of an issue to the person and whether 
they are conflicted on the issue, has been found to be 
influential (Tourangeau, Rasinski, Bradburn, & D'Andrade 
1989a, 1989b). Although 7attitude strength7 components have 
shown mixed results (Krosnick & Schuman, 1988), Tourangeau et 
al suggest that those who have important but conflicted 
attitudes are more susceptible to response effects.
Although it has been theorised that the amount of knowledge an 
individual has about an issue plays a role in context effects 
(Feldman & Lynch,1988), this factor has received less 
attention within research on context effects. Research from 
other areas might suggest that having more knowledge would 
lead to less effect. For example, greater knowledge has been 
associated with greater resistance to attitude change (Wood, 
1982), and with greater attitude-behaviour consistency 
(Kallgren & Wood, 1986) . But it is not clear whether this 
would also lead to less context effects. It could be argued 
that having alternative inputs available would mean less 
reliance on context information; however, more knowledgeable 
respondents may also be more likely to recognise relations 
between context and target items. The three personal factors 
of attitude importance, conflict, and amount of knowledge will 
be examined in this study.
It has also been assumed that the type of context in terms of 
how related it is to the target issue is also important in
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influencing context effects (Feldman & Lynch 1988). Whilst 
some research has used correlations of context and target as 
evidence of relatedness (Tourangeau et al 1989a, 1989b), this 
issue has not received much empirical attention. Tourangeau 
et al use issues which are all moderately to highly correlated 
with the target issue. While they investigate the question of 
context effect when the issues are highly related, they do not 
address differences in the degree of relation. This issue 
will be addressed in the present study. A further factor 
concerning the type of attitude is the degree of familiarity 
of an issue. Theoretically one would expect more familiar 
issues to be less susceptible to context effects than less 
familiar issues, but again there is limited evidence for this 
in the survey literature. Issue familiarity will also be 
addressed in this study.
One of the more situational factors suggested as influential 
to context effects in a number of ways is the amount of 
cognitive effort devoted to response. Lack of cognitive 
effort is suggested to lead to satisficing strategies 
(Krosnick 1991). It is also associated with the direction of 
the effect. Assimilation is assumed to take less effort than 
contrast effects (Martin, 1986) . Within the survey 
literature, there have not been many studies which address 
this issue (Martin & Harlow, 1992).
Cognitive effort is often linked to the amount of time spent 
thinking about an issue (Krosnick, 1991; Martin & Harlow, 
1992) . More time spent thinking is associated with more
effort and little time spent thinking with less effort. 
Thinking time then is potentially an important factor in 
context effects. Clearly though, the use of a think aloud 
technique would be inappropriate when thinking time is 
central. Although thinking aloud can be assumed not to alter 
thinking substantially, it does tend to increase the amount of 
time taken to respond.
In this study thinking time is manipulated by providing 
instructions on 'how7 to think, in an attempt to influence how 
much people think about an issue, and to determine whether 
thinking effort influences response effects. Thinking time, 
or response latency, will be measured. This provides a check 
on whether the manipulation has worked, but also, as discussed 
in the next chapter, it provides some trace of processing.
6.2. METHOD
6.2.1 Design
The present study was designed to investigate multiple factors 
which may contribute to context effects for attitude 
questions.
Context was manipulated across two questionnaires for twelve 
target issues. Two context items preceded each target item. 
Context items were designed to evoke different aspects of the 
issue which favoured one or other response pole. Half the 
respondents received two items evoking one side of an issue
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and the other half received context evoking the other side. 
The full questionnaires are given in appendix 6.
The amount of time spent thinking about the questions was 
manipulated by instruction to the respondents. Half the 
respondents receiving questionnaire A were instructed to "take 
their time; think carefully' while the other half were 
instructed to 'answer quickly; not spend too much time 
thinking'.
Thus, we have two manipulated independent variables in a 2 X 
2 design: questionnaire context and thinking instruction.
Individual differences on knowledge and attitude factors were 
measured in a post-experimental questionnaire which asked 
respondents three questions about each target issue. These 
were:
1) How much they know about the issue (5 point scale) 
[knowledge].
2) How important the issue is to them (4 point scale) 
[importance].
3) Whether their views on the issue are one-sided or 
conflicted [conflict].
This questionnaire is given in appendix 7.
In addition to the 2 independent variables of context and 
instruction, within subjects the type of target question was 
varied in terms of the degree of assumed prior knowledge about 
or familiarity with the issue. Three knowledge types were
included: Unfamiliar issues, media issues, and familiar
issues. There were 4 target questions for each knowledge 
type.
The type of context was also varied in terms of its degree of 
relation to the target question. It could be either obviously 
or subtly related. 6 target questions had obvious context and 
6 had subtle context (2 obvious and 2 subtle for each 
knowledge type).
Piloting knowledge and context type
The factors of knowledge type and context type were derived 
from a pilot study of 40 students who completed a pen and 
paper questionnaire. Respondents were asked first how much 
they knew about each of the target issues. Knowledge was 
assessed by a five point scale from "nothing at all" to "a 
great deal'.
Second, each context question was paired with the relevant 
target issue and respondents were asked to rate how related 
the two issues were. They responded on a five point scale 
from "not at all related" to "extremely related". This 
questionnaire is given in appendix 8.
Respondents were most knowledgeable about the familiar issues 
and, with one exception, least knowledgeable about the 
unfamiliar issues, with the media issues in between (see table
6.1 below) . The one exception is the rather low score for 
knowledge about "tradeoffs between job creation and damage to
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the countryside' (labelled 'Jobs vs environment' below). It 
was felt however, that it was perhaps poor wording of the 
issue description that lowered the knowledge rating for this, 
rather than the issue per se.
Table 6.1
Mean knowledge of issues in pilot study
ISSUE KNOWLEDGE
TYPE
MEAN SD
Food choices Familiar 4.03 .698
Student housing Familiar 3.80 .823
Course readings Familiar 3.20 .823
London's cleanliness Familiar 3.00 .889
EC benefits Media 2.50 .847
Criminal justice Media 2.45 .904
Pornography Media 1.98 .920
Virtual shopping Unfamiliar 1.93 .917
Jobs vs environment Media 1.75 .899
Inuit whaling Unfamiliar 1.65 .893
Opera funding Unfamiliar 1.55 .904
Genetic engineering Unfamiliar 1.50 .679
With the exception of 'course reading' the respondents rated 
the contexts which were meant to be obvious as more related to 
the target issues than the contexts which were meant to be 
subtle (see table 6.2 below). Because of the high relatedness 
ratings obtained for 'course reading' this set of questions 
was changed to make the context less obvious. Also, one side 
of the context for 'EC benefits' was rated as more related 
than the other; this side was changed to make it less obvious.
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Table 6.2
Mean relatedness of context to target 
(combined into issue area)
TARGET ISSUE CONTEXT
TYPE
MEAN SD
Criminal justice obvious 3 .73 .79
Jobs vs environment obvious 3.58 .715
London's cleanliness obvious 3.46 .619
Course readings subtle 3.62 .824
Genetic engineering obvious 3.12 .745
Inuit whaling obvious 3.01 .760
Student housing obvious 2.97 . 781
EC benefits subtle 2 .42 .646
Food choices subtle 2.19 .945
Virtual shopping subtle 2.81 .755
Pornography subtle 1.98 .768
Opera funding subtle 1.65 .585
Expectations for results
From previous research and theoretical discussions, a number 
of general predictions are possible of where context effects 
are likely to be found in this study.
In terms of the direction of the effect, those who are 
instructed to 7 think carefully7 should show more contrast 
effects, and those who are instructed to 7 think quickly7 
should show more assimilation effects.
For the within subject factors of issue familiarity and 
context type the following pattern of results is expected: 
first, the more familiar the issue the less context effects 
are expected; second, obvious contexts should produce more 
context effects than subtle contexts.
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For the individual factors, those who are both conflicted on 
an issue and who see the issue as important should show more 
context effects. Those with more knowledge of an issue should 
show more context effects for unfamiliar issues.
6.2.2 Procedure
100 students, recruited from around the LSE, responded to the 
questionnaire. Respondents were paid for taking part.
The experimenter gave a brief explanation of the task and then 
respondents were shown into a computer booth. Instructions 
for completing the questionnaire were given on the screen for 
respondents to read at their own pace. They were told that 
their opinions were requested on a number of issues. There 
then followed instructions on "how" to respond which was one 
experimental variable. Half of the respondents received a set 
of instructions which encouraged them to 7 take their time and 
think carefully about the issue before responding7. The other 
half received instructions to 7answer as quickly as possible7. 
The full instructions are given in appendix 9. Instructions 
on how to enter responses were also given.
Two practice questions were then given to familiarise 
respondents with the computer presentation before proceeding 
to the experimental questionnaire. The order of presentation 
of blocks of context plus target questions was randomised to 
minimise extraneous context effects.
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Latency was measured automatically by the computer from the 
time the question was presented on the screen until a response 
was given. Respondents pressed a key for the next question to 
appear on screen. Respondents were not informed that response 
time was being measured.
After completing the computer questionnaire respondents were 
asked to fill in a short pen and paper questionnaire. This 
was the questionnaire dealing with knowledge and attitude 
structure factors. This was obtained from the researcher and 
completed in a room outside the computer booths.
6.3. RESULTS
This section presents the response results, that is the 
answers respondents gave to the questions. The focus is to 
look for differences across questionnaire context, indicating 
an effect of context on response. For each question three 
anovas were carried out.
The first anova looks for effects of the manipulated 
independent variables - questionnaire context and instruction. 
These are, essentially, factors which arise from the survey 
situation rather than factors which arise from the individual. 
The questions here are: Does the context in which the question 
is asked by itself have an effect on response? Do 
instructions on how to respond influence this effect?
- 242
The second anova looks for the effects of self reported 
knowledge on response. Three levels of knowledge (low, 
medium, and high) were derived from a 5-point knowledge scale. 
The question here is: Does the amount of prior knowledge a 
person has about an issue influence the effect of context?
The third anova deals with the "attitude structure" factors -- 
importance and conflict. Importance was divided into 
important and unimportant from a 4-point scale. Conflict is 
whether the person's views are one-sided or conflicted. The 
question here is: Does the structure of the attitude influence 
context effects? For these factors, and for individual 
knowledge, we are not interested in main effects of these 
factors, since that only informs us about how individual 
factors influence positions on an issue. For these factors we 
are interested in interactions with context, as this informs 
us about the nature of context effects.
Separate anovas were conducted to determine the effects for 
each variable separate from others (this also allows more 
comparability with other studies where the various factors may 
not have been measured). However, attempts are made to look 
at whether the results are stable when the other factors are 
included. Because of the large number of anovas conducted, we 
might expect some results to be significant by chance. 
Significant results which are in line with predictions or are 
similar to other results, in the sense of forming a pattern of 
results, can more safely be regarded as non-chance results.
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Those results which are anomolous, and unlike other results 
need to be treated more cautiously.
6.3.1 Manipulation checks
In general those who receive the 'think carefully', or 'slow', 
instruction should take longer to respond than those who 
receive the 'respond quickly', or 'fast', instruction. To 
check that the manipulation of instructions has worked mean 
latency was compared. Latency scores for all questions were 
added together to give a total latency score. This was 
compared across instruction. As expected, the slow 
instruction group took significantly longer to respond than 
the fast instruction group (t=4.33, p.000).
The pilot provides some evidence of the validity of the within 
subjects knowledge types and context type factors. The 
knowledge measure was repeated on the post experimental 
questionnaire and provides additional support for the validity 
of the knowledge type categorisation. Respondents have most 
knowledge about familiar issues, unfamiliar issues are least 
known and media issues come in between. Graphs giving mean 
knowledge, and summarising the importance, conflict and 
extremity of responses to issues are given in appendix 10.
6.3.2. RESULTS: RESPONSE EFFECTS.
First results which show an interaction between questionnaire 
context and thinking instruction will be presented. Second, 
results which show a main effect of questionnaire context will 
be presented, and finally results showing interactions between
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questionnaire context and individual factors will be 
presented. Table 6.3, summarising the results for each 
question by the type of result is given below.
Table 6.3
Type of response effect by question
QUESTION QUESTION TYPE TYPE OF EFFECT
Question
name
knowledge
type
context
type
main
effect
context
context
by
instruct
context by 
knowledge/ 
attitude 
structure
ENVIRONMENT Media obvious X
CRIME Media obvious X
GENE Unfamiliar obvious X X
WHALE Unfamiliar obvious
HOUSE Familiar obvious X
CLEAN Familiar obvious
PORNOGRAPHY Media subtle
EU Media subtle
NEWTECH Unfamiliar subtle X
OPERA Unfamiliar subtle X
TEXT Familiar subtle
FOOD Familiar subtle
Looking first at interactions between questionnaire context 
and thinking instruction, only one question showed a 
significant interaction between these factors. This was the 
question about CRIME, a media issue with an obvious context. 
The question is given below (figure 6.1). The interaction 
between questionnaire context and instruction was significant 
at .042 (F=4.247). This level is reduced somewhat when
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knowledge and attitude structure factors are included (.062 
and .061).
Figure 6.1 
CRIME Question
Question: Stricter punishment is necessary for many
crimes.
( 5 point scale: agree/disagree)
Agree context: "serious crimes"
Disagree context: "trivial crimes"
In general there is slight agreement with this statement. 
The interaction between questionnaire context and instruction 
is that those who receive the slow instructions contrast with 
the context whereas those who receive the fast instruction 
assimilate. For those given the "severe crimes" context, thus 
promoting agreement to "stricter punishment", those who 
receive the slow instructions disagree more than those 
receiving the fast instructions. For the "trivial crimes" 
context, promoting disagreement, those who receive the fast 
instruction disagree slightly more than those receiving the 
slow instruction.
Table 6.4 
Mean Response to CRIME by 
questionnaire context and instruction
Agree Disagree
• Mean SD Mean SD
FAST 3.84 1.14 3.52 1.44
SLOW 3.21 1.38 3.84 1.01
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Figure 6.2
Mean Response to CRIME by
questionnaire context and instruction
Legend
3.9-
3.7-
3.6-
3.5-
3.4-
3.3-
3.2
This is the only context effect for this question. There is 
no main effect of context, nor are there any interactions with 
attitude structure or knowledge factors.
Looking next at main effects of context, three questions show 
some main effects. These are ENVIRONMENT, HOUSE, and GENE. 
All three are issues with an obvious context. Each comes from 
a different knowledge category.
The strongest, and most stable main effect of questionnaire 
context is for ENVIRONMENT, a media issue with obvious 
context.
Figure 6.3 
ENVIRONMENT question
Question: New jobs should be created even if this
sometimes causes damage to the countryside.
( 5 point scale: agree/disagree)
Agree context: 'Job creation'
Disagree context: 'Environment protection'
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The main effect of questionnaire context is significant at 
.007 (F=7.693). This is relatively stable with slightly
reduced significance when knowledge, and importance and 
conflict are added (.01 and .016 respectively).
Table 6.5 
Mean response to ENVIRONMENT by 
questionnaire context
Agree Disagree
Mean 2.28 2.84
S.D. 1.01 1.02
In general there is a tendency to disagree with this 
statement. The main effect of questionnaire context is a 
contrast effect. So those who receive the 'job creation' 
context, which should lead to more agreement, disagree more 
with the 'jobs at the expense of countryside' proposition than 
do those who receive the 'environment protection' context, 
which should lead to more disagreement.
This is the only significant context effect for ENVIRONMENT. 
There is a main effect of conflict, but this simply shows that 
those who are one-sided disagree more with this statement than 
those who are conflicted.
For HOUSE, a familiar issue with obvious context, there is a 
main effect of questionnaire context (F=3.869, sig .052). 
However, this is somewhat unstable acros the different ANOVAs. 
The effect is strengthened when knowledge joins the ANOVA
(.041) and disappears when conflict and importance are 
included (.103).
Figure 6.4 
HOUSE question
Question: Students in higher education are adequately-
housed.
( 5 point scale: agree/disagree)
Agree context: 'homeless in London'
Disagree context: 'mortgage relief'
Table 6.6 
Mean response for HOUSE by 
questionnaire context
Agree Disagree
Mean 2.88 2.39
S.D. 1.15 1.34
Overall there is slight disagreement with this statement. The 
effect of questionnaire context is an assimilation effect. 
Those given the 'house buying' context, prompting 
disagreement, disagree more than those given the 'homeless' 
context, prompting agreement.
This is the only context effect for this question. All the 
effects of knowledge and attitude structure effects are main 
effects.
For GENE, an unfamiliar issue with obvious context, there is 
a slight, but stable, main effect of context. This is 
significant at .071 (F=3.326), a value which remains stable
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across the different analyses. Mean response differs slightly 
across context condition.
Figure 6.5 
GENE question
Question: Genetic engineering research is adequately
controlled.
( 5 point scale: agree/disagree)
Agree context: 'good technology'
Disagree context: 'bad technology'________________________
There is a general tendency to slightly disagree with this 
statement. This slight effect of questionnaire context is a 
contrast effect. Those who receive the 'benefits' context, 
promoting agreement with the adequacy of control of genetic 
research, disagree more than those who receive the 'risks' 
context, which promotes disagreement.
Table 6.7 
Mean response to GENE by 
questionnaire context
Agree Disagree
Mean 2.18 2.56
S.D. 0.99 1.07
However, for this question, questionnaire context also 
interacts with knowledge and attitude structure factors.
The interaction of questionnaire context with knowledge 
(F=7.742, sig .003) is that for those with little or no
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knowledge there is little difference between questionnaire 
context. However, for those with a moderate amount of 
knowledge, there is a contrast effect such that those who 
receive the 'agree' context disagree more than those who 
receive the 'disagree' context. Those with most knowledge 
also follow this pattern, with the 'disagree' context higher 
than the 'agree' context. However, due to the small number of 
those with much knowledge this needs to be interpreted 
cautiously.
Table 6.8 
Mean response to GENE by 
questionnaire context and knowledge
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
High knowledge 2.17 1.47 6 4.50 0.71 2
Mid knowledge 1.68 0.84 22 2.56 1.15 16
Low knowledge 2.71 0.72 21 2.44 0.95 32
The result is similar when those who have much knowledge are 
combined with those who have some knowledge. This simplifies 
the interpretation somewhat. Those with little knowledge show 
little difference between questionnaire context. However, 
those with at least some knowledge show more of a contrast 
effect between questionnaires. Those in the 'disagree' 
context disagree less than those in the 'agree' context.
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Table 6.9 
Mean response to GENE by 
questionnaire context and knowledge 
(knowledge split into two groups)
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Some knowledge 1.79 0.99 28 2.78 1.26 18
Low knowledge 2.71 0.72 21 2.44 0.95 32
Figure 6.6 
Mean response to GENE by 
questionnaire context and knowledge 
(knowledge split into two groups)
m ean response
3.2
Legend
 seme kno*>4*4je
- -  low knowledge
2.4
2.2
disagreeagree
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For the attitude structure factors there are a number of 
significant interactions. Questionnaire context interacts 
with importance ( F=6.3 89, sig .013) and interacts slightly 
with Conflict (F=3.46, sig .066). The thinking instructions 
also interact with with Conflict (F=6.11, sig .015) and with 
Importance (F=4.60, sig .035), though these are of less 
interest in looking at context and response (Tables for these 
are given in appendix 11).
The interaction between importance and questionnaire context 
is such that for those who think the issue is unimportant, 
there is little difference in response between the two 
questionnaires. However, those who think the issue is 
important contrast more; those who receive the "disagree', 
context disagree less than those who receive the "agree" 
context.
Table 6.10 
Mean response to GENE by 
questionnaire context and importance
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Important 1.79 0.92 28 2.56 1.23 25
Unimportant 2.71 0.85 21 2.56 0.92 25
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Figure 6.7
Mean response to GENE by
questionnaire context and importance
m ean response
3.2
Legend
—  Important
—  Unimportant
2.4
2.2
1.2
disagree
The slight questionnaire context by conflict interaction is 
such that the one-sided people differ little between 
questionnaire context. There is a slight tendency for those 
who are conflicted to contrast more; those given the agreement 
context disagree more than those given the disagree context.
Table 6.11 
Mean response to GENE by 
questionnaire context and conflicted
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
one-sided 2.06 1.18 16 2.19 1.28 16
conflicted 2.24 0.90 33 2 .74 0.93 34
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Figure 6.8
Mean response to GENE by-
questionnaire context and conflicted
2 .8 -
2.7-
2.6 -
2.5-
2.4-
2.3-
2.2 -
2.1 -
Other questions which show interactions between questionnaire 
context and either knowledge or attitude structure factors are 
the questions on new technologies, NEWTECH, and the OPERA. 
These two issues are both unfamiliar issues with subtle 
contexts.
For NEWTECH, an unfamiliar issue with subtle context, while 
there is no main effect of context, there are interactions 
between context and knowledge and between context and 
conflict.
Figure 6.9 
NEWTECH question
Question: Moves to introduce new technologies, such as
'virtual shopping', into daily life should be 
resisted.
( 5 point scale: agree/disagree)
Agree context: 'historical viewpoint and isolation'
Disagree context: 'looking forward not back'
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The interaction between knowledge and questionnaire context is 
significant at .026 (F=3.793). This is stronger when the
attitude structure factors added (.014) . For those with little 
knowledge there is little difference across context (i.e. no 
effect of context) . Those with some knowledge tend to 
assimilate to the context and those with high knowledge tend 
to contrast with the context.
Table 6.12 
Mean response to NEWTECH by 
questionnaire context and knowledge
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
High knowledge 2.10 1.60 10 2.91 1.70 11
Mid knowledge 3.33 1.37 18 2.43 0.94 14
Low knowledge 2.29 0.85 21 2.52 1.05 25
Figure 6.10 
Mean response to NEWTECH by 
questionnaire context and knowledge
Legend
 high knowledge
 (nid knowledge
— low knowledge
3.4
3.2
2.6
2.4
2.2
disagreeagree
There is also an interaction between questionnaire context and 
Conflict (F=5.785, sig .018. This is stronger when knowledge 
is added .005) . Those who are one-sided assimilate more to the
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context than those who are conflicted. Thus for the disagree 
context, one-sided people disagree more than those who are 
conflicted. For the agree context, one sided people agree 
more than those who are conflicted. Alternatively, one might 
say that conflicted people contrast more.
Table 6.13 
Mean response to NEWTECH by 
questionnaire context and conflicted
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
one-sided 3.05 1.61 20 2.11 1.28 18
conflicted 2.34 1.01 29 2.84 1.05 32
Figure 6.11 
Mean response to NEWTECH by 
questionnaire context and conflicted
m ean response
3.3
3.2
3.1
2.7
2.6
2.5
2.4
2.3
2.2
For OPERA, also an unfamiliar issue with subtle context, there 
is no main effect of context but there is an interaction 
between questionnaire context and importance.
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Figure 6.12 
OPERA question
Question: The government should provide more support
for the opera.
( 5 point scale: agree/disagree)
Agree context: 'national heritage'
Disagree context:_'elitism'___________________________
Table 6.14 
Mean response to OPERA by 
questionnaire context and importance
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
important 4.00 1.08 13 2.80 1. 79 5
unimportant 2.39 1.02 36 2.93 1.10 45
Figure 6.13 
Mean response to OPERA by 
questionnaire context and importance
mean response
4 6-i
4.2
3.6
3.4
3.2
2.6
2.4
2.2
This interaction effect (F= 6.569, sig .012) is that for those 
given the 'elitist' context, promoting disagreement, there is 
little difference between those who think it unimportant and
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those who think it important. For those given the 'heritage' 
context, promoting agreement there is a large difference 
between those who think it unimportant and those who think it 
important. Those who think it important assimilate to the 
context more while those who think it unimportant do not. 
However, one must be cautious with this interpretation, 
because of the small number of people who think this issue 
important. In fact it is the least important issue as well as 
the one for which people know least. It is possible that 
those who do care about it understand the 'heritage' context 
more readily than those who do not care and are thus more 
influenced by it.
The other questions used here show little or no context 
effects of any type. These include CLEAN, a familiar issue 
with obvious context; TEXT and FOOD, both familiar issues with 
a subtle contexts; WHALE, an unfamiliar issue with obvious 
context; and PORNOGRAPHY and EU, both media issues with subtle 
contexts.
6.3.3 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
The strongest main effect of context is for ENVIRONMENT, a 
media issue with obvious context. HOUSE, a familiar issue 
with obvious context, also has a significant main effect of 
context, though not when attitude structure factors are taken 
into account. For GENE, an unfamiliar issue with obvious
context, the main effect of context tends towards
significance. For ENVIRONMENT and GENE the effects are
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contrast effects. For HOUSE the effect is an assimilation 
effect.
There is only one question for which questionnaire context 
interacts with instruction, this is for CRIME, a media issue 
with obvious context. Those given the fast instruction
assimilate more, those given the slow instruction contrast 
more. Table 6.15 below gives the number of effects broken down 
by knowledge and context type.
There are also a number of context effects which stem from 
interactions with knowledge and attitude structure factors. 
Three of the four unfamiliar questions have this type of
effect: GENE (obvious context), with interactions with
knowledge, conflict, and importance. OPERA and NEWTECH (both 
subtle context), the former with an interaction with
importance, the latter with an interaction with knowledge and 
with conflict.
Table 6.15
Number of context effects by type of effect 
And knowledge + context type
MEDIA
OBVIOUS
MEDIA
SUBTLE
UNFAM
OBVIOUS
UNFAM
SUBTLE
FAM
OBVIOUS
FAM
SUBTLE
TOTAL
QAIRE or 
QAIRE + 
INSTRUCT
2/4 0/4 1/4 0/4 1/4 0/4 4/24
QAIRE + 
ATTITUDE 
or KNOWL
0/6 0/6 3/6 3/6 0/6 0/6 6/36
TOTAL 2/10 0/10 4/10 3/10 1/10 0/10 10/60
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In terms of general response effects due to questionnaire 
factors - there is little difference across knowledge type 
although perhaps the strongest effects are to be found among 
the media issues. Table 6.16 below illustrates this. 
Response effects due to a combination of questionnaire and 
personal factors are more common for the unfamiliar issues.
Table 6.16 
Number Of context effects by 
Type of effect and knowledge type
MEDIA UNFAMILIAR FAMILIAR TOTAL
QAIRE or 
qaire + 
INSTRUCT 2/8 1/8 1/8 4/24
QAIRE + 
ATTITUDE 
OR KNOWL
0/12 6/12 1/12 6/36
TOTAL 2/20 7/20 1/20 10/60
In terms of the type of context it is clear that all the 
response effects due simply to questionnaire & instruction 
factors come from those questions which have an obvious 
context. However, where the effect comes from a combination 
of questionnaire and personal factors the type of context is 
less important. Table 6.17 below illustrates this.
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Table 6.17 
Number of context effects by 
Type of effect and context type
OBVIOUS SUBTLE TOTAL
QAIRE or 
qaire + 
INSTRUCT 4/12 0/12 4/24
QAIRE + 
ATTITUDE 
OR KNOWL
3/18 3/18 6/36
TOTAL 7/30 3/30 10/60
6.4 DISCUSSION
First I will discuss the results in terms of the independent 
variables of context and instruction, and then in terms of 
interactions of context with the individual factors. I then 
want to look at the factors of knowledge type and context type 
to see if these distinctions add anything to the 
interpretation of the context effects.
The first thing to note about these results is the variation 
in context effects over questions. Some questions show 
effects, some do not. Some show main effects, some 
interactions. Some show assimilation effects, some contrast, 
some both. The question is whether we can determine factors 
which are influential in producing these different effects, or 
is it simply a matter of different questions producing 
different effects?
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Only one question showed an effect of thinking instruction. 
This suggests that the manipulation of thinking is likely to 
be only a minor factor in producing context effects. The 
association of contrast with more complex thinking is an 
established idea in the literature (Martin & Harlow, 1992; 
Strack, 1992) . The one question which showed an effect of 
thinking instruction in the present study supports the idea 
that taking more time, or thinking carefully, is more likely 
to produce contrast, whilst assimilation is more associated 
with quick, less thoughtful, response. Although only one 
question showed this relation, this is an important finding; 
it shows, within a survey context, that a simple manipulation 
of thinking can alter response.
In terms of the individual factors -- knowledge, importance, 
and conflict -- there is no overall pattern to the results. 
One question which shows an overall effect can be qualified by 
these factors. This is GENE where the contrast effect is 
stronger for those with more knowledge, for those who think 
the issue important, and for those who are conflicted. Other 
issues show some effect of these factors, but have no overall 
context effect (OPERA, NEWTECH), other questions show context 
effects which are not qualified by these factors (ENVIRONMENT, 
CRIME, HOUSE), although with HOUSE the overall effect is 
eliminated when these factors are included in the ANOVA.
The effects of conflict and importance for GENE are in the 
expected direction. However, the effects for importance and 
conflict are independent effects rather than an interaction
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between the two. Tourangeau et al (1989a, 1989b) found that 
response effects were stronger, though not significantly so, 
for those who were both conflicted and thought the issue 
important; conflict produced some effect on its own, but 
importance did not.
There may be several reasons why no interaction effects 
between the two attitude structure factors and questionnaire 
context appeared in this study. First, perhaps the particular 
issues used do not lend themselves to such effects. Second, 
perhaps the sample size was too small to identify such 
interactions.
Where knowledge interacts with context, for GENE and NEWTECH, 
it is those who have more knowledge who show a larger effect. 
This is somewhat at odds with studies looking at other aspects 
of attitudes, where for example those with more knowledge are 
more resistant to change (Wood, 1982). And, one might expect 
those with more knowledge have access to other information 
which would attenuate the effect of context (Feldman & Lynch, 
1988) . However, the above results are consistent with 
Tourangeau et al's (1989a, 1989b) reasoning behind why those 
who see the issue as important show more effect. They suggest 
that those who see the issue as important have elaborated 
attitude structures which include links to related issues; 
this also implies a greater degree of knowledge about an 
issue. Because they are able to see links between issues, 
they are more likely to be affected by context. That 
knowledge has an effect in this study suggests this is the
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case, at least for some issues, but the fact that importance 
has an independent effect suggests that it should not simply 
be equated with knowledge on an issue.
The more puzzling effects of importance come with OPERA, 
although some cell sizes are too small to place much 
confidence in this result.
Thus, so far, a number of different effects have been seen to 
occur for these questions with no clear reasons why some 
questions show one type of effect whilst others show another 
type. It may well be the case that the nature of individual 
questions is important in determining whether and what type of 
context effects occur. This would be an unfortunate result 
for those trying to design questionnaires, since it would mean 
that individual questions would always need separate 
investigation. However, question and context type have also 
been examined in this study, and it may well be that these 
factors can add to our understanding of context effects.
First, it is important to note in discussing the factors of 
knowledge and context type used in this study that the results 
can only be suggestive rather than conclusive in regards to 
the effect of these factors. Because different questions are 
used to assess these factors, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that particular questions are responsible for 
effects rather than any higher order grouping factor. A 
stronger test of the knowledge factor would be possible by 
using more questions from each category, and a stronger test
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of context type would be possible by comparing the same target 
with different types of context. However, this was beyond the 
scope of the present experiment. Having said this, the 
present results do suggest that these factors may be important 
in the impact of context on response.
All the effects which come from the situational factors, 
questionnaire and instructions, are for questions with 
obvious contexts. This suggests that the relatedness of 
context to target is important in determining context effects. 
It seems for overall context effects, the context needs to be 
conceptually related to the target. This fits well with 
suggestions in the literature that the diagnosticity of 
previous questions is important, that is, the respondent must 
be able to perceive some relation of context and target 
(Feldman & Lynch 19 88). This relationship cannot simply be 
determined by the correlation between context and target 
questions. All 4 issues which show task related context 
effects are among the highest rated 6 issues in terms of 
relatedness of context to target; all had mean ratings near or 
above 'somewhat related'. The correlations between target and 
context are generally no higher for the issues where context 
effects appear than for issues where they do not (see appendix 
12) .
Knowledge type seems less important for overall effects, 
although it might play some role. The strongest overall 
effect comes on a media issue, with the other media issue 
showing an interaction with instruction. The main effect on
- 266 -
the unfamiliar issue is weak and the one main effect found at 
a familiar issue is unstable. Thus whilst the evidence for 
context differences due to situational factors is weak for 
knowledge type, there is some suggestion that media issues may 
be most susceptible to overall context effects, with 
unfamiliar and familiar issues less susceptible.
For familiar issues there may be less effect for an obvious 
context because people have more stable ideas about the issue 
through experience, thus, although they may recognise the 
implications of context for target it is less influential 
because they have more other easily accessible information to 
draw on. That unfamiliar issues are less affected is somewhat 
more difficult. Others have shown context effects for obscure 
or fictitious (and thus presumably unfamiliar) issues (Strack, 
1992; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988). However, these kinds of 
context effects were most likely interpretational; the 
previous context provided a kind of definition of the 
fictitious issue allowing comprehension of the fictitious 
issue in terms of the previous question. In this study the 
context items are unlikely to have aided comprehension, at 
least not in such a straightforward way. Rather, it may be 
that for these unfamiliar issues the context is less 
diagnostic for the target simply because the issue is 
unfamiliar. Whereas for media issues respondents have some 
knowledge about the issue, and also about how that issue 
relates to other issues, for unfamiliar issues they may have 
less of both these types of knowledge, and so be less
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influenced by the context because they cannot so readily 
relate the target issue to the context issue.
In terms of the individual factors, for the media and familiar 
issues most of the effects of knowledge and attitude structure 
factors are main effects. That is, their influence on the 
answer is not dependent on the context. Rather, knowledge and 
attitude structure factors can be seen as related to positions 
on the issue, regardless of context.
For the unfamiliar issues, however, attitude structure and 
knowledge factors are more important. Three of the four 
issues have interactions of context with these factors. But, 
it is also the case that the type of context, obvious or 
subtle, distinguishes less between these interaction effects 
for unfamiliar issues. Both of the unfamiliar issues with a 
subtle context show interactive context effects.
In the case of GENE, where we do get some overall context 
effect, the effect is stronger for those who are more 
knowledgeable, for those who think the issue more important, 
and for those who are conflicted. The above suggestion that 
the context at unfamiliar issues is less diagnostic because of 
a lack of links to other issues would be supported by this. 
Those who are more knowledgeable, or who see the issue as more 
important, are more likely to perceive links to the previous 
context and thus to be influenced by it. A similar situation 
exists for NEWTECH, where those with little knowledge are 
unaffected by context, but those who have more knowledge are
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affected, though in different directions depending on the 
level of knowledge.
But why do we find interaction effects for unfamiliar issues 
and not for media issues? Tourangeau et al's studies (19 89a, 
1989b) showing greater context effects for those who were 
conflicted and saw the issue as important used mainly media 
issues. It is possible that, at least in part, the nature of 
the sample might be responsible for these differences. 
Tourangeau et al used a general population sample; this study 
used a relatively homogenous student sample. The degree of 
exposure to topical media issues might be expected to be more 
uniform in the student sample than in a general population 
sample. This similarity of exposure to issues may serve to 
make the individual's structure of the issue less influential. 
For unfamiliar issues on the other hand, there may be more of 
a variety of exposure to issues, some people may be opera 
buffs for example, or read a lot about genetic engineering, 
whereas others may not. The fact that these issues are not 
such topical media issues means that exposure to them is more 
likely to be driven by personal interest rather than simply 
from reading the newspaper or watching the television news. 
In this way individual structuring of these issues may be more 
influential because the range of exposure is greater.
The implication here also is that for media issues people may, 
generally, have more alternative diagnostic inputs available. 
The subtle context is not very diagnostic; when people have 
alternative, more diagnostic, inputs more readily accessible,
they may be more likely to use these inputs than to use an 
available but weakly diagnostic context (Feldman & Lynch, 
1988). However, for unfamiliar issues, even though the 
context is only mildly diagnostic there may not be 
alternative, more diagnostic information easily accessible, 
and thus, the less diagnostic, but easily available 
information is used, especially among people who are capable 
of recognising its diagnosticity (those with more knowledge).
Apart from what factors influence whether there is an effect 
of context, there is also the question of the direction of the 
effect -- assimilation or contrast. What determines the 
direction of an effect? Most of the effects here are contrast 
effects. However, there are also assimilation effects. And, 
sometimes both occur for the same question depending on the 
interaction of various factors. Context type does not seem to 
discriminate -- there are both assimilation and contrast 
effects for both types of context. Knowledge type may 
discriminate to some extent. For familiar issues only 
assimilation effects occur. For media and unfamiliar issues 
both types of effects occur, though for the effects which are 
solely based on context, only contrast effects are found. The 
direction of the effect is thus difficult to explain by the 
various associated factors, and it may be that it is dependent 
on the particular question.
Tourangeau et al, looking at a number of issues generally 
found assimilation effects. In this study we find more 
contrast effects. One reason why more contrast may occur in
this study is that with more knowledgeable respondents they 
may either be more motivated to respond well, or be more 
capable of linking issues. Contrast is suggested to occur 
when people are aware of the previous context, and are 
motivated to overcome this biasing influence (Martin, 1986). 
Knowledgeable respondents may be more likely to be both 
interested enough to want to provide a good answer, and 
knowledgeable enough to recognise an obvious context (Bickert, 
1993) . Looking at response order effects, Krosnick & Alwin 
(1987) found greater effects for those with lower levels of 
education and suggested this was due to their greater use of 
satisficing strategies to provide easy answers. Our 
respondents are all relatively well educated, and thus may 
satisfice less. Thus, for ENVIRONMENT, they may quickly 
recognise the biasing influence of previous questions, since 
they are so obvious, and adjust for this influence. At GENE, 
those who are more knowledgeable show greater contrast effect; 
likewise at NEWTECH, with a subtle context, it is those who 
are most knowledgeable who contrast whilst those with some 
knowledge assimilate. These results suggest that greater 
knowledge may lead to contrast. With CRIME, however, we have 
both assimilation and contrast effects, although the context 
effect in the fast, 'assimilation7, group is relatively small. 
Perhaps for this particular issue and context it takes more 
time to recognise the biasing nature of the context than it 
does for the ENVIRONMENT issue, hence, the contrast effect 
occurs only for those who are instructed to think carefully. 
Or, perhaps it is easier to 'call up' opposing implications 
for ENVIRONMENT; for ENVIRONMENT, both sides of the issue are,
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to some extent, included in the question, as it mentions both 
"job creation' and 'countryside damage', whereas CRIME does 
not. Certainly knowledge, at some level, seems to be 
implicated in these effects. However, at the familiar issues, 
where one would expect most knowledge, we get an assimilation 
effect, though admittedly an unstable one. Clearly further 
research on these factors would be relevant.
In summary these results have the following implications for 
context effects at attitude questions:
1. Manipulating the amount of thinking at a question can 
influence the direction of context effects in the way 
predicted by an assumption that contrasting takes longer than 
assimilating. However, the effects are likely to be limited. 
Examinations of latencies in the next chapter offer some 
further suggestions about the effects of thinking time on 
context effects. Investigating what kind of questions, and 
perhaps respondents, are most likely to be influenced by 
thinking manipulations would be useful.
2. The individual factors of importance and conflict are 
implicated in some context effects, such that those who see 
the issue as more important show more effects and those who 
are conflicted show more effects. However, the results do not 
support Tourangeau et al's findings of an interaction between 
these two factors. It is not clear whether this is due to 
limitations in the present study or whether the type of
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questions involved is important. Further research
investigating these two factors would be interesting.
3. Individual knowledge is implicated in some context effects. 
Those with more knowledge show more effect. Individual 
knowledge is likely to be important in context effects where 
the variation in knowledge is greater.
4. Knowledge type and context type are likely to be important 
in context effects. As expected, familiar issues show least 
effects. Media issues show effects only in an obvious 
context. Unfamiliar issues show effects which interact with 
the individual factors of knowledge and attitude structure. 
The distinction between issues based on an aggregate knowledge 
level may be important in understanding the nature of context 
effects. This issue, and others raised by this study, are 
discussed further in the concluding chapter.
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CHAPTER 7 - EXPERIMENT 3 -  PART 2 
ATTITUDES AND RESPONSE LATENCY
7.1 INTRODUCTION
As argued in the previous chapter, think aloud does not 
recommend itself as a method for tracing processing when 
thinking time is an important issue. Therefore another method 
to gain information about the cognitive processes underlying 
context effects was sought. Another method commonly used in 
cognitive psychology is the measurement of response latencies. 
This has the advantage of being a non-disruptive measure, 
although it gives less direct information on processing.
Fazio (1990; also Dovidio & Fazio 1992) documents the more 
recent use of latency measures in social psychology. He 
reviews several areas in which latency measures have been used 
to examine construct formation, processing efficiency, and 
associative strength in memory. This latter use of latency 
measures is one which may be most useful for survey 
methodology.
Context effects are linked to the accessibility of 
information, with the context making particular information 
accessible by virtue of its recent use. Other factors, such 
as the chronic accessibility of an attitude or the easy 
accessibility of other information also play a part. But 
again, the key is accessibility. Latency is often used as a
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measure of accessibility. The reasoning being that the more 
accessible a piece of information is the quicker it will be 
reported. Availability is assumed to result in faster 
response time. Thus, factors which increase the availability 
of the response should result in quicker latencies.
Fazio and colleagues (Fazio, Herr, & Olney, 1984; Fazio, 
Powell Sc Herr, 1983; Fazio, Sonbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986; Fazio & Williams, 1986) have done a considerable amount 
of research which uses response latency as a measure of 
attitude accessibility. They show that this measure of 
accessibility relates to attitude-behaviour correspondence. 
Similarly, Basili and Fletcher (1991) use latency measures to 
examine attitudes and non-attitudes. They asked respondents 
two questions about the issue of employment quotas and found 
that those who responded differently on the second question, 
that is changed their opinion, who they term 'movers' , took 
longer than non-movers to respond to the quotas question. 
They suggest this shows that non-movers have more accessible, 
and thus perhaps more crystallised attitudes.
Fazio (1990) also looks at the association between category 
labels and members, using latency as a measure of that 
association, the faster the latency, the stronger the 
association. He suggests that because this measure correlates 
well with a number of other measures of association, latency 
provides a good measure of associative strength in memory. 
Judd, Drake, Downing & Krosnick (1991) provide similar 
evidence using related attitude issues, where they find that
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responses to an issue are quicker when asked after a related 
rather than an unrelated issue. Tourangeau, Rasinski & 
D 'Andrade (1991) also show that response latency may be used 
as a measure of associative strength; they show that when 
targets follow items drawn from related clusters response 
latencies are quicker.
Quicker response time has also been associated with a number 
of attitude factors, some of which have also been related to 
response effects. Important attitudes have been associated 
with quicker response (Bassili, 1993; Krosnick, 1989; Roese & 
Olson, 1994) as have more extreme attitudes (Fazio & Williams, 
1986; Judd & Kulik, 1980). Presumably because attitudes with 
these characteristics are more accessible. In the present 
study one might also expect one-sided attitudes to be related 
to quicker response as opposed to conflicted attitudes. High 
knowledge may also be associated with a quicker response time, 
however this may be influenced by whether this is associated 
with one-sided or conflicted attitudes.
Attitudes which are automatically activated, with quick 
latencies, tend to be those of which one has direct experience 
(Fazio et al 1986) . Thus, one might expect that more familiar 
issues will be associated with quicker response times than 
unfamiliar issues.
A simple association of response time with attitude 
accessibility may not however be warranted in a survey 
setting. As Martin (1986) has pointed out, processing
objectives are also important in determining response. 
Contrast effects are associated with greater cognitive effort 
on the part of the respondent. Greater cognitive effort may 
result in a longer latency. In this case, we might expect 
that contrasting is associated with slower latencies. 
Furthermore, a related previous context may actually result in 
slower latencies if respondents have to decide whether this 
information should be used in forming a judgement.
7.2 RESULTS
Latencies were converted to logs for analysis. Raw latency 
scores tend to be skewed, with a long tail of slower latencies 
(perhaps due for example to respondents being temporarily 
distracted, or searching for the correct key to press). Thus, 
for latency scores the mean tends to be a poor measure of 
central tendency. A logarithmic transformation is commonly 
used to bring the tail closer to the centre of the 
distribution so that the mean is a better measure of central 
tendency (Fazio, 1990).
The results for latency will be presented in terms of the 
question they address. Firstly differences across instruction 
will be compared. Secondly, how latency differs across 
different knowledge and context types will be examined. 
Thirdly, the effect of previous context on latency will be 
examined. Fourthly, individual knowledge and attitude 
structure factors will be examined. Finally, latencies for 
assimilation and contrast will be examined.
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7.2.1 Latency across Instructions.
To give some idea of the real times involved in responding to 
questions, table 7.1 gives the mean raw latency scores for 
each question, across fast and slow instructions. Table 7.2 
gives mean log latency for each question across instruction. 
The results of 2-way Anovas, Questionnaire context by 
instruction, are also given in table 7.2, showing the 
significance of the difference in latencies between fast and 
slow instructions for each question.
Table 7.1
Mean Raw Latency Scores by Instruction
question fast slow min max
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Envi moment 7.69 4.0 11.27 7.1 2.75 36.75
Crime 5.78 3.0 7.61 4.0 2 .31 20.05
Pornography 6.54 3.2 9.42 6.1 2.69 32 .30
EU 7.58 3 .1 10.25 7.2 3.03 44.00
Gene 7.17 3.8 8.62 6.4 2.58 41.85
Whale 12 .48 5.7 14.67 7.1 4.78 35.31
Opera 5.29 1.6 6.92 3.1 1.97 15.82
Newtech 9.22 3.6 10.84 5.9 2.04 33.01
House 6.51 2.8 8.18 5.5 2.69 29 .44
Clean 5.19 1.7 7.14 3.2 2.36 15.00
Food 8.21 2.9 10.28 5.4 3.35 28.73
Text 6.95 3.0 8.29 4.9 3.52 33.89
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Table 7.2
Mean log latency by instruction
Question fast slow sig level
Environment 1.94 (.44) 2.27 (.54) .002
Crime 1.64 (.47) 1.91 (.50) .007
Pornography 1.78 (.42) 2.08 (.56) .003
EC 1.95 (.38) 2.16 (.55) .032
Whale 2.43 (.47) 2.57 (.50) .155
Gene 1.85 (.48) 1.99 (.53) .176
Opera 1.62 (.31) 1.84 (.43) .003
newtech 2.15 (.37) 2.26 (.49) .209
house 1.79 (.40) 1.94 (.53) .104
clean 1.60 (.30) 1.91 (.44) .000
text 1.86 (.39) 2.00 (.45) .107
Food 2.05 (.34) 2.23 (.43) .019
We would expect that those given the instruction to answer 
quickly would have shorter latencies than those given the 
instruction to take their time. And, indeed when we compare 
overall latency this is the result we get (reported in Chapter 
6). For the individual questions all the results are in the 
same direction, the fast instructions produce quicker 
latencies than the slow instructions. However, the extent of 
the difference in the effect of instruction is not uniform 
across the target questions.
7.2.2 Latency and knowledge and context types
To look at how latency varies across knowledge and context 
types a combined latency score was computed. As reading time 
was included in the latency, this had to be deducted for 
direct comparisons to be made, as questions were of different 
length. Reading time was calculated for each question (a set 
amount of time per word) and subtracted from the latency. 
These adjusted means, which allow comparisons between
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questions, are given in appendix 13. Although this measure 
may have some problems (eg. a set amount per word overlooks 
variation in reading time) it also has some benefits over 
other methods. For example, starting latency measures from 
the end of a question (ignoring reading time) neglects any 
thinking done while reading (eg some people may take more time 
than others to think about the meaning of a question while
they are reading) . Latencies were then summed for each
knowledge by context type category and the log taken. Table
7.3 gives mean log latencies by knowledge and context type.
Table 7.3
Mean log latency by knowledge and context types
obvious subtle overall
unfamiliar 1.91 1.66 1.79
media 1.64 1.64 1. 64
familiar 1.56 1.58 1.57
overall 1.70 1.63
A manova was performed with knowledge type and context type as 
within subject factors and instruction as the between subject 
factor. This showed significant main effects for both
knowledge and context types (F=19.55, sig .000 and F=6.59, sig 
.012 respectively) and a significant interaction between them 
(F=6.52, sig .002) .
As can be seen the unfamiliar issues take longest to answer, 
and the familiar issues take least time, with media issues in 
between. This is particularly so in the obvious context;
differences in the subtle context are slight. For media and
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familiar issues the latencies are similar accross obvious and 
subtle contexts but for the unfamiliar issues there is a 
difference between context type with longer latencies for the 
obvious context than for the subtle context.
However, it could simply be that the question showing the 
largest response time (WHALE) is simply a bad question (eg 
difficult to understand) and therefore increases response 
time.
It is interesting to note that the fastest response time 
occurs for an unfamiliar question (OPERA) . This question is 
also seen as the least important issue. So perhaps we have an 
exception to the idea that unfamiliar issues take longer. 
Perhaps if the issue is seen as particularly unimportant, then 
it is deemed not worth thinking about and so people respond 
more quickly. Further work investigating this relationship 
more thoroughly may be profitable.
There is also a slight interaction between knowledge type and 
instruction (F=2.72, p =.068) (see table 7.4 below). This is 
such that the largest difference in instruction comes from the 
media issues, followed by familiar issues, and the smallest 
difference occurs for unfamiliar issues, confirming the 
question by question results of the last section. What these 
results perhaps suggest is that for both familiar and media 
issues one can respond quickly, for unfamiliar issues, 
however, it is difficult for people not to think --to respond 
off the top of their head. Note that the mean for unfamiliar
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issues in the fast instructions is virtually the same as for 
familiar issues in the slow instructions. It may also show, 
somewhat, that for the familiar issues, it is more difficult 
for people to take time. They don't have as much to think 
about since they are more familiar with the issue and perhaps 
have clearer views on it. Thus in the fast condition media 
and familiar issues have more similar latencies, whilst in the 
slow condition media and unfamiliar issues are more similar. 
It seems media issues (often the type of issue questioned in 
surveys) are more variable in the amount of time that can be 
spent thinking about them.
Table 7.4
Mean log latency for knowledge type by instruction
fast slow
familiar 1.44 1.70
media 1.47 1.82
unfamiliar 1.69 1.89
7.2.3 Prior context and latency.
It has been suggested, and in some cases shown, that a 
related prior context makes latency to a subsequent related 
issue quicker (Judd et al, 1991). This question cannot be 
addressed directly in this study because a strong test of this 
would require the use of different contexts for the same
question. To some extent, this issue is addressed above
(Table 7.3) where it is shown that latencies to targets in an
obvious context are slower or no faster than targets in a
subtle context. This question might be addressed further by 
comparing context and target latencies. One might expect that
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target questions following an obvious context will be faster 
than the context latency, since this context may facilitate 
response to the target. However, this supposition needs to 
be treated cautiously, since context may differ from targets 
in other ways which might make them answered more slowly (or 
more quickly) . One obvious problem is that the context at 
unfamiliar target questions may be more familiar than the 
target, and answered more quickly for this reason; the reverse 
may be the case for familiar targets. However, across all 
context questions, there is no reason to assume that the 
context questions differ systematically in any way other than 
that some are obvious and some are subtle, and thus, over all 
questions one might expect that target latencies should be 
faster than context latencies in obvious contexts but not in 
subtle contexts.
To address this question the latency scores for the context 
questions were combined and the mean taken and compared to the 
means for target latency (note that context latencies were 
also adjusted for reading time) . A manova was then performed 
with knowledge type, context type, and context-target as 
within subject factors, and instruction as a between subject 
factor. Over all questions the latency for target questions 
is faster than the latency for context questions (F=5.77, sig 
.018). There is an interaction between context type and 
context-target such that in obvious contexts there is little 
difference between context and target latencies but for subtle 
contexts target latencies are faster overall than context 
latencies (F=19.25, sig .000).
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Table 7.5
Mean log latency for context and target questions by 
obvious /subtle context type
context target
latency latency
obvious context 1.68 1.70
subtle context 1.75 1.63
There is also an interaction with knowledge type such that 
overall for media and unfamiliar issues there is little 
difference between context and target latencies, but for 
familiar issues target latencies are faster than context 
latencies (F=11.41, sig .000). This latter result suggests 
that for familiar issues the targets are more familiar than 
the context and thus the targets are answered more quickly.
Table 7.6
Mean log latencies of context and target 
by knowledge type
context
latency
target
latency
familiar issues 1.77 1.57
media issues 1.64 1.64
unfamiliar issues 1.74 1.79
The idea of target latencies being no different than context 
latencies in an obvious context is contrary to expectations, 
but fits with the earlier finding of overall target latencies 
being slower or no different in obvious contexts. It is 
perhaps not the case that an unrelated context speeds up 
response, but rather that a related context can slow it down.
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People may think about how the previous context relates to the 
present question and take more time over it.
7.2.4 Individual knowledge and latency
In general individual knowledge makes little difference to 
latency. Those who know more about an issue do not respond 
more quickly than those who know little. The exception to 
this is the opera question where those who know more about the 
issue respond more quickly (F=9.75, sig .000).
Table 7.7
Mean log latency for OPERA by knowledge
Mean SD N
High knowledge 1.39 0.39 10
Mid knowledge 1.70 0.31 21
Low knowledge 1.79 0.39 68
There is also an interaction effect for the OPERA question 
between knowledge and context (sig .001). GENE shows a 
similar interaction effect (sig .024). However, small N's in 
both issues for high knowledge mean that this effect is 
suspect. If we combine high and mid knowledge to increase the 
N's, for both issues the interaction disappears.
7.2.5 attitude structure effects.
To look at these factors latency was compared using 4-way 
ANOVAs with questionnaire context, instruction, conflict and 
importance as the factors.
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importance
For ENVIRONMENT there is a main effect of importance (F=8.25, 
sig. .005) and an interaction between questionnaire context 
and importance (F=4.99, sig .028).
The main effect of importance is that those who feel the issue 
is important respond more quickly than those who feel it is 
unimportant.
Table 7.8
Mean log latency for ENVIRONMENT by importance
Mean S.D. N
Important 2.03 0.45 78
Unimportant 2.42 0.62 21
The interaction between questionnaire context and importance 
is that those who feel the issue is important take longest to 
respond in the disagree context while those who think it 
unimportant take longer to respond in the agree context.
Table 7.9 
Mean log latency for ENVIRONMENT 
by questionnaire context and importance
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Important 1.94 0.43 43 2.13 0.46 35
Unimportant 2.54 0.69 7 2.35 0.60 14
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For GENE there is an interaction between questionnaire context 
and importance (F=10.92, sig .001). The interaction between 
questionnaire context and importance is that those who see the 
issue as important respond more quickly in the agree context 
than in the disagree context whereas those who see the issue 
as unimportant differ little across contexts.
Table 7.10 
Mean log latency for GENE 
By questionnaire context and importance
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Important 1.72 0 .41 29 2.14 0.67 25
Unimportant 1.98 0.37 21 1.89 0.45 25
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Conflict
For CRIME there is an interaction between instruction and 
Conflict (F=4.14, sig .045). Those who are one-sided show 
little effect of instruction. However, for those who are 
conflicted we get the expected difference in instruction.
Table 7.11
Mean log latency for CRIME by instruction and conflict
Fast Slow
Mean SD N Mean SD N
One-sided 1.70 0.47 31 1.78 0.46 27
Conflicted 1.54 0.46 19 2.05 0.51 23
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For WHALE there is a main effect of Conflict (F=5.15/ sig 
.026), and a 3-way interaction between questionnaire context, 
importance and Conflict (F=7.26, sig .009). However, for this 
interaction, a number of small N's make the finding suspect.
Table 7.12
Mean log latency for WHALE by conflicted
One-sided Conflicted
Mean 2 .42 2.62
S.D. 0 .44 0.46
N 55 44
The main effect of conflict is that people who are conflicted 
take longer than those who are one-sided.
For GENE there is an interaction between questionnaire context 
and Conflict (F=4.06, sig .047). The interaction between 
questionnaire context and Conflict is that those who are 
conflicted take more time to respond in the disagree context.
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Those who are one-sided take about the same time in each
context.
Table 7.13 
Mean log latency for GENE 
by questionnaire context and conflict
Agree Disagree
Mean SD N Mean SD N
One-sided 1.78 0.39 17 1.82 0 .41 16
Conflicted 1.86 0.43 33 2.11 0.62 34
Figure 7.4 
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For FOOD there is a main effect of Conflict (F=6.42, sig 
.013). There is a significant 3-way interaction between 
questionnaire context, instruction and Conflict (F=6.11, sig 
.015).
The main effect of Conflict is that those who are conflicted 
take longer to respond.
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Table 7.14
Mean log latency for FOOD by conflict
One-sided Conflicted
Mean 2.06 2.24
S.D. 0.34 0.45
N 56 43
The 3-way interaction between context, instruction and 
Conflict is that for one sided people there is little 
difference in the time taken across context although we do get 
the expected difference across instruction. Conflicted people 
take more time to respond in the healthy context when given 
fast instructions and more time to respond in the taste 
context when given slow instructions.
Table 7.15
Mean log latency for FOOD by questionnaire context, 
Instruction and conflict
Healthy Taste
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Fast One-sided 1.95 0.32 15 2.00 0.29 12
Fast Conflicted 2.20 0.20 10 2.08 0.35 12
Slow One-sided 2.14 0.34 15 2.15 0.38 14
Slow Conflicted 2.12 0.39 10 2.57 0.51 11
Summary importance and conflict
There are some, but not a great many, differences in latency 
from the attitude structure factors of importance and 
conflict. Where there are effects they are generally in the 
direction expected. One question, ENVIRONMENT, shows that 
those who see the issue as important respond more quickly.
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For GENE those who see the issue as important respond more 
quickly in one context whereas those who see the issue as 
unimportant differ little across context. One would expect 
important attitudes to be more accessible and thus have a 
faster latency, ENVIRONMENT may show this. Perhaps important 
attitudes are more strongly linked to particular aspects of 
issues, particular contexts, making important attitudes more 
accessible in some contexts than others. GENE suggests this, 
where those with important attitudes differ across contexts 
but those with unimportant attitudes do not.
For conflict, where there is a difference, it is the one-sided 
people who are quicker (WHALE and FOOD). This fits with the 
idea that those who are one-sided have only one aspect of the 
attitude to retrieve and are therefore able to do it more 
quickly. Where there are interactions with the situational 
variables (questionnaire context and instruction) the one­
sided people show less variation in response time, as would be 
expected.
Most of the effects of conflict and importance on latency come 
from media and unfamiliar issues with obvious contexts. So, 
it may be that these factors influence the effect of attitude 
structure factors on speed of response. However, these 
results are also various for the different questions. Some 
show effects of importance, some of conflict, some show main 
effects, some interactions. This suggests that the structure 
of particular attitudes is important. That is, while we may 
suggest that particular types of issues or particular types of
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context are likely to be influential, the particular structure 
of an issue is also likely to influence latency. The 
structure of particular attitudes is important in the speed of 
response (as in shaping the effect of context on response).
Whilst these attitude structure factors show little and varied 
relationships with latency, attitude extremity is more solid 
in its effect on latency.
attitude extremity
To examine whether attitude extremity is associated with 
faster response the response scales given at the target 
questions were collapsed into three categories, from the mid­
point to extreme. To check for interactions with
questionnaire context and instruction 3-way anovas were done 
with questionnaire context, instruction, and extremity as 
factors. For all the questions only one interaction was 
found; therefore, the results presented are from one-way 
anovas with extremity as the factor. A priori comparisons 
were also done to check for a linear relationship. For all 
twelve target questions those responding at the extremes had 
the fastest latencies. Means are given below.
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Table 7.16
Mean log latency by attitude extremity
Extreme Somewhat Mid-point sig level
Environment 1.88 2.13 2.19 .086 *
Crime 1.60 1.84 1.93 .017 *
EC 1.95 2.05 2 .13 .482
Pornography 1.88 1.93 2.13 .609
Gene 1.75 1.83 2.03 .003 *
Whale 2.30 2 .54 2 .72 .004 *
Opera 1.56 1.85 1.73 .010
Newtech 2.11 2 .32 2 .22 .095
House 1.68 1.94 1.97 .029 *
Clean 1.43 1.75 1.94 .000 *
Food 1.91 2.19 2 .27 .001 *
Text 1.88 1.99 2.11 .229
* denotes significant linear relationship
Seven out of the twelve issues show significantly faster 
latencies for extreme attitudes. In addition, seven of the 
twelve issues show a significant linear relationship, so that 
the more extreme the response the faster the latency. This 
fits with results showing that extremity is related to 
response time, suggesting that extreme attitudes are more 
accessible.
7.2.5 Assimilation /Contrast and latency.
The instructions made little difference to response effects. 
Only one question (CRIME) showed an effect of instruction. 
This effect was such that those given the fast instruction 
assimilated whilst those given the slow instruction 
contrasted. This finding is in accord with what one would 
expect given the supposition that contrasting is a more
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effortful process than assimilation. One might expect that 
more effort is associated with slower latency.
To look at this question of whether contrasting takes longer 
more generally, we can look at the latencies of those who 
contrasted with those who assimilated. One simple, if
slightly crude, way of defining assimilation and contrast is 
simply to define those who respond on the positive side of the 
scale in a positive context as assimilating and so on 
(strictly speaking this is the definition of assimilation/ 
contrast within the CASM framework). Whilst this measure is 
certainly not a perfect one it allows us to say something 
about the amount of time associated with assimilation and 
contrast.
To compare latencies for assimilation and contrast the scales 
were split at the midpoint. Those who responded positively in 
the positive context and those who responded negatively in the 
negative context were defined as assimilating and vice versa 
for contrast. 3-way anovas were done with questionnaire 
context, instruction, and assimilation/contrast as independent 
factors. The results are presented in table 7.17 below.
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Table 7.17
Mean log latency for assimilation and contrast
Assimilate Contrast
SigQUESTION Mean N Mean N F
Environment 2.13 22 2.03 46 1.85 .178 *
Crime 1.66 38 1.81 41 1.16 .285
Pornography 1.85 44 1.98 37 1.92 .170 *
EC 1.93 35 2.12 36 2.66 .108
Whale 2.55 43 2 .33 37 5.27 .025
gene 1.91 29 1.72 39 3.40 .070
opera 1.78 33 1.69 33 .62 .435 *
newtech 2.12 37 2 .34 34 5.93 .018
house 1.73 45 2.00 32 5.12 .027
clean 1.73 28 1.60 37 1.55 .218
text 1.90 47 1.93 45 .71 .401
food 2.13 37 2.03 33 .23 .630
♦indicates interaction effect
From this measure we can see that for many questions 
contrasting takes less time than assimilation, however, in 
only one case (WHALE) is this significantly shorter while 
another approaches significance (GENE). For some questions 
contrast takes longer, significantly so in 2 cases (NEWTECH 
and HOUSE).
Two questions have interactions between assimilation / 
contrast and instruction. These are ENVIRONMENT and 
PORNOGRAPHY. For ENVIRONMENT the interaction is such that for 
those given the fast instruction there is little difference in 
latency between assimilation and contrast. For those given 
the slow instruction, assimilation takes longer (F=6.57, sig 
.013).
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Table 7.18
Mean log latency for ENVIRONMENT by instruction 
and assimilation/contrast
Assimilation Contrast
Instruction Mean N Mean N
Fast 1.95 13 1.96 25
Slow 2.40 9 2.11 21
For PORNOGRAPHY assimilation takes longer than contrast with 
the fast instruction, but with a slow instruction contrast 
takes longer (F=3.86/ p=.053).
Table 7.19
Mean log latency for PORNOGRAPHY by instruction 
and assimilation/contrast
Assimilation Contrast
Instruction Mean N Mean N
Fast 1.80 1.72
Slow 1.91 2 .22
For the OPERA question there is an interaction with 
questionnaire context and assimilation/contrast. In the agree 
context contrasting takes longer than assimilation; in the 
disagree context assimilation takes longer (F=7.29, sig.009). 
This may simply reflect that, on this unimportant issue, 
agreeing is quicker.
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Table 7.20
Mean log latency for OPERA by questionnaire context 
and assimilation/contrast
Assimilation Contrast
questionnaire Mean N Mean N
agree 1.64 1.83
disagree 1.88 1.52
For the questions where we actually get contrast effects 
(ENVIRONMENT and GENE ) contrast takes a shorter time, though 
only approaching significance in one case.
7.3 DISCUSSION LATENCY RESULTS
These results provide information about a number of hypotheses 
concerning response time. Firstly, individual attitude 
structure seems to play some part in response time. The most 
consistent relationship is with attitude extremity. As others 
have shown, more extreme attitudes are answered more quickly. 
This relationship cuts across knowledge and context types. 
Importance and conflict have some effect and where they do it 
is in the direction one would expect. That is, those who see 
the issue as important respond more quickly. Also, as might 
be expected, it is those who are one-sided who have faster 
latencies compared with those who are conflicted. Where 
differences appear across context or instruction, it is those 
who are conflicted and those who find the issue important who 
show differences in response time. It is these people who 
would also be expected to show more response effect.
- 298 -
Yet, although most effects are for media or familiar issues 
with obvious contexts, there is little pattern in why- 
particular attitudes or issues show effects of importance and 
conflict on latency. It may be that these differences are due 
to the structure of particular issues.
As in looking at response effects across knowledge and context 
types, the latency results across these factors should be 
treated as suggestive rather than conclusive in that we are 
comparing a limited number of different questions. However, 
they do address some important issues.
It has been suggested that previously accessing a related 
issue shortens response time because the previous context 
makes relevant information more accessible. These results 
suggest that this relation may need to be considered more 
carefully.
Unfamiliar issues with an obvious context took longest to 
respond to and for media and familiar issues targets with an 
obvious context were generally answered no more quickly than 
those with a subtle context. In comparing context and target 
latencies, overall, target issues asked after an obvious 
context were answered no more quickly than the context 
questions, whereas target questions asked after a subtle 
context were responded to quicker than the context questions.
The fact that target latencies in subtle contexts are either 
faster or similar to target latencies in an obvious context,
suggests that an obvious context can induce more thinking 
about an issue, perhaps an attempt to relate accessed 
information to the current question. This seems likely to be 
the case for unfamiliar issues with a more variable situation 
for media issues, but not the case for familiar issues.
Tourangeau et al (1991) looked at the latencies of response to 
the issues of abortion and welfare depending on whether the 
preceding context was either drawn from the same cluster, a 
different cluster, or was an issue related to or unrelated to 
the target issue. They found that when the previous items 
were drawn from the same cluster, latencies were faster. 
However, they also found that, whilst for abortion latencies 
were faster following a related issue, for welfare latencies 
were actually slower in this condition than when the context 
was unrelated. They were uncertain whether this result was 
important since it occurred on only one issue. The present 
findings suggests that this was not a chance finding. 
Tourangeau et al's study offers a stronger comparison of the 
effects of different contexts on an issue in that they 
compared different types of contexts for the same issue, 
however, they looked only at two, similar, issues. The 
present results suggest that, as in Tourangeau et al's 
finding, a related context does not necessarily make response 
to a related issue quicker. Whilst it may make information 
more accessible, what this suggests is that, at least for 
survey questions, accessibility does not necessarily translate 
into quicker latencies.
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One reason for this may be that, as Martin (1986) suggests, 
processing goals may also be important. Where related 
information is accessible, people may need to decide whether 
to use it or not, or perhaps even how to use it, which may 
take longer than when no related context is given.
The more variable nature of thinking on media issues is 
emphasised by the larger difference in latency across 
instructions from this group. It seems that people can think 
more or less about these issues, if asked to, but, they have 
more difficulty slowing down for familiar issues and more 
difficulty speeding up for unfamiliar issues. The exception 
to this latter may be where the issue is seen as particularly 
unimportant (as at OPERA).
The idea that contrasting is a more thoughtful and therefore 
more lengthy process has not received unequivocal support by 
this research. It may simply be that cognitive effort does 
not necessarily translate into longer thinking time. For some 
questions assimilation takes longer and for some contrast 
takes longer. It is difficult to determine whether the 
differences are simply due to individual issues or whether 
they can be linked to other factors. Clearly this issue 
requires further research, however some speculations are 
possible.
It may be that for issues with an obvious context contrasting 
may be faster because the obvious context is more likely to 
make the respondent aware of the priming incident. However,
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this may occur only when the question generally receives a 
high degree of thought. In other words it may take a certain 
amount of time generally for contrast to become the first 
choice response, longer thinking may then be required to 
assimilate. On the other hand when thinking time is generally 
fast, assimilation may be the first choice response, with 
contrast taking longer. Thus, for questions which generally 
take longer to respond to, comparisons between response 
latencies for assimilation and contrast would show that 
contrast is quicker. For questions at which response times 
are generally quick the same comparison would show 
assimilation being quicker.
Looking at the differences found here between assimilation and 
contrast, WHALE and GENE, two questions at which contrast is 
quicker, have the first and third longest latency (see 
appendix 13 for mean adjusted latencies) . ENVIRONMENT, which 
shows contrast as quicker in the slow condition has the fourth 
longest latency overall, and the latency in the slow condition 
is much slower than in the fast condition (mean =1.57 vs 
1.97), in fact, here, it is the third longest latency. 
HOUSE, on the other hand, where we find that contrasting takes 
longer comes nearer to the middle of these questions, ranked 
sixth longest latency. For the other media question with an 
obvious context, CRIME, contrasting takes longer, but not 
significantly so, but there is also an effect of instruction 
on response here such that those given the slow instruction 
contrast. For this issue the overall latency is very fast,
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ranked eighth longest latency (in other words the fourth 
fastest).
Thus it may well be that contrast takes longer than 
assimilation, people need to become aware of the biasing 
nature of that context and decide not to use it in some way. 
However, when a question receives a good deal of thought there 
may be a further acceptance step, that is people may recognise 
the leading nature of the context, but decide that it leads in 
an acceptable direction. Thus the relation of
assimilation/contrast effects to thinking time is not 
straightforward.
7.4 DISCUSSION RESPONSE AND LATENCY EFFECTS
A further comment on response effects due to instructions is 
possible having examined response latencies. Only one 
question, a media issue with obvious context (CRIME), showed 
variation due to instruction differences. It was suggested 
that instruction may not have much of an effect. However, 
looking at the variations in latency across instructions, we 
might expect to find differences due to instruction at media 
issues, but less so at familiar and unfamiliar issues. It 
seems that people may be less able (or perhaps willing) to 
moderate the amount of thinking time they devote to the latter 
issues. In this case instruction would have less effect. For 
media issues, however, differences in instruction were larger. 
It therefore seems that people are more able to moderate the
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amount of time they spend thinking about media issues, and 
thus, instructions might be expected to have more effect here. 
The fact that the one instruction effect that was found was 
for a media issue is in line with this. It is probably also 
the case that there is likely to be variation due to the 
particular issue in question. Thus, further study of the 
effects of instruction on media issues may be fruitful.
A further comment on the direction of the effects found in 
this study is possible. It may be that, in part, where we 
find assimilation effects, people are thinking more quickly 
about the issue (at HOUSE and the fast instruction at CRIME) 
where we get contrast effects (ENVIRONMENT and GENE and the 
slow instruction at CRIME) people are generally taking more 
time thinking about the issue.
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CHAPTER 8 :  D ISC U SSIO N  & CONCLUSIONS
Bradburn in 1992 reviewed the progress in understanding 
context effects in surveys following the application of 
psychological theory, the so called CASM programme. He argues 
that both the theoretical framework and the methods used are 
just a beginning, a move in the direction of explanation. The 
current research can be seen as a contribution to this effort 
of developing explanatory concepts. It has examined a number 
of applications of methods for generating data on survey 
response processes, and it has explore various theoretical 
perspectives concerning the response process.
In this concluding section I will review the key findings and 
draw out the implications of these for survey practice. First 
I will discuss the results of the studies using think aloud 
protocols to examine response processes, secondly I will 
discuss the methods used to elucidate the response process and 
finally I will discuss the study on context effects for 
attitude questions. This is followed by a discussion of 
research at the interface of psychology and survey methodology 
more generally, suggesting areas where further clarification 
and research might be useful, and commenting on the 
implications for survey research.
8.1 DISCUSSING THE RESULTS
8.1.1 Results of protocol analysis and survey response
The application of psychological theory to survey methodology 
attempts to understand the response process. The focus of
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interest is on the cognitive processes involved. The aim is 
to understand how these processes impact upon the reliability 
and validity of survey responses; and to understand where bias 
is likely to occur in survey questioning. In the main, split 
ballot experiments have been used to examine the response 
process. While this approach is valuable for some issues, 
there is a need for a broader methodological base to describe 
and understand response processes. In particular, qualitative 
methods which provide more fine grained detail of thought 
processing could be used.
One way to examine the processes involved in response to a 
question is to use some process tracing technique to provide 
data on these processes. Ericsson and Simon (1984) provide a 
comprehensive review of the use of think-aloud procedures as 
a method for tracing cognitive processing, and develop an 
explanation of when and how to use these verbal report 
techniques. Following this work, the present study used 
verbal report techniques, think-aloud plus immediate 
retrospection, to provide data on processing. A range of 
questions, concerning both behaviours and attitudes were asked 
in an interview. Respondents thought aloud while answering 
each question and provided a retrospective account after they 
had responded to each question.
Two issues were addressed with the protocol data. One is how 
people construct a response to a question and the other is the 
impact of the questionnaire on response. The primary focus
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was on the latter with the former a secondary focus.
Looking at the processes involved in responding to a single 
question can provide indicative evidence of the types of 
biases that are likely to operate. In the present study for 
example, we asked respondents "Last week, how many hours did 
you spend in lectures and classes". To respond to this 
question one might hope that respondents would think back to 
last week and count the number of hours they spent in classes. 
However, examining the protocols we found that most 
respondents use their typical behaviour as an anchor in 
estimating the actual behaviour over the last week. In this 
way estimates of their behaviour last week are likely to be 
biased towards what they think is their typical behaviour. 
One might test this by obtaining objective measures of the 
behaviour, attendance records for example, and compare the 
estimate provided with both actual behaviour last week and an 
average over a period of time. One would expect the estimates 
to be closer to the latter than to the former.
However, whilst the above approach may be revealing about 
processing in general, it does not illuminate how 
questionnaire features impact upon response. For example, if 
we had provided pre-coded categories, rather than an open 
answer format, when asking "Last week, how many hours did you 
spend watching television", would different response 
strategies have been used? Would the particular scale 
provided be influential? To address these types of question
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we need to compare response strategies across questionnaire 
features.
Much of the work in CASM addresses the issue of the impact of 
questionnaire features on response. Many aspects of the 
questionnaire including wording, response scales and the 
context of preceding questions have been shown to influence 
responses to questions (eg. Schuman & Presser, 1981). In this 
study we examined a number of these questionnaire aspects with 
verbal protocols. Three of the questionnaire aspects which we 
manipulated were drawn directly from research using split- 
ballot experiments where response effects had been found and 
hypotheses developed as to the underlying response processes 
involved in producing these effects. The aim here was to 
examine whether evidence for the hypothesised processes could 
be found in the protocols of respondents. In this way the 
results from split ballot surveys can be explored at the level 
of processing. The other three questionnaire aspects which we 
manipulated have received theoretical, and indirect research 
attention, however the questions were not drawn from previous 
CASM research. The aim here was to investigate the response 
processes and suggest likely possibilities for exploration 
with split ballot surveys.
An example of one hypothesis which we examined with verbal 
protocols is that of the 'meaning shift' hypothesis (see 
Chapter 4). Schwarz et al (1988) argue that for a question 
concerning a vague behaviour, the scales provided for response
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are used by respondents to interpret the meaning of a 
behaviour. Schwarz et al (1988) for example asked people "how 
often are you annoyed", with either a high or low frequency 
scale. Respondents given the high frequency scale reported 
more annoyance than those given the low frequency scale. In 
this case high frequency implies trivial instances of 
annoyance and low frequency implies more serious instances of 
annoyance. Gaskell et al (1992) using more substantive topic 
areas found less shift. We used questions from Gaskell et al 
asking " How often are you annoyed with adverts or commercials 
on television" followed by either high or low frequency 
scales, to see if this processing -- using the response scale 
as an indicator of the meaning of the behaviour -- could be 
observed in the protocols. We found no direct evidence that 
people used the scales to infer the meaning of a behaviour, 
however we did find differences in the general strategies used 
to respond. Thus the influence of scales seems largely to 
work outside of conscious awareness. This in itself is an 
important finding. The way these hypotheses had been stated 
in the past one might have expected people to use the scales 
in a conscious way. These results suggests that whilst 
respondents are not consciously aware of the influence of 
response alternatives, the response alternatives do influence 
respondents by affecting the way they think about the 
question. In particular respondents given the low frequency 
scale thought more about annoying adverts, or the meaning of 
annoyance than those given the high frequency scale. The 
strategies revealed by the protocols, offer some suggestions
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as to the production of response effects for these vague 
behavioural questions, and some modification of Schwarz et 
al's original hypothesis- The strategies used suggest that 
some scales are more or less likely to 'fit' with respondents 
prior definitions of ambiguous terms. When the scale does not 
'fit' a more detailed consideration of the behaviour is 
prompted. This may or may not lead to a shift depending upon 
whether people can generate examples which are consistent with 
the extremity implied by the scale. For example, those 
responding to Schwarz et al's question on experience of 
annoyance may find it fairly easy to generate examples of 
annoyance which are relatively extreme, as the low frequency 
scale implies. The term 'annoyed7 is fairly vague and open to 
a range of interpretation. However, with more substantive 
issues, which are in some ways less vague, more constrained by 
experience, it may be more difficult to generate examples 
which are consistent with the extremity implied by the low 
frequency scale. For example, although one can generate 
examples of annoying adverts, these may be considered fairly 
trivial annoyance. It may be fairly difficult to interpret 
these as serious annoyance, thus less shift would be expected, 
and indeed Gaskell et al found less shift for these types of 
behaviours.
By examining the strategies used for response we can better 
understand why response effects occur. In general for the 
various questionnaire aspects manipulated (with one
exception) we found differences in the strategies used for
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response across conditions. Of the hypotheses examined with 
protocols the example given above was the one where the 
strategies most clearly indicated why response effects might 
occur. In the case of other questionnaire aspects manipulated 
in this study the link between strategies and the production 
of a response shift was sometimes less clear, though providing 
useful guidance for further investigation, (for example, in 
the case of the 'comparison shift' hypothesis, see Chapter 4) 
and in one case ( assimilation/contrast effects for life 
satisfaction, see Chapter 5) the protocols did not lead to any 
suggestions as to why response effects might occur. Thus, 
the detail on cognitive processes provided by the verbal 
protocols, can be usefully used for examining the way in which 
questionnaire features may operate, at the level of conscious 
processing, to produce response effects, but there are 
limitations to their use. As well as the limitations on the 
amount and type of information provided, another limitation of 
the use of verbal protocols has to do more generally with the 
use of qualitative data.
A weakness of qualitative research lies in its small sample 
sizes, generalisability is problematic, and when comparing 
across conditions there is a problem in deciding whether a 
difference between conditions is important. We cannot be sure 
that we have captured the full range of response strategies 
(indeed we are very unlikely to have captured all the minor 
strategies) , nor can we be sure that the differences in 
strategies between groups are either important or stable.
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These weaknesses contrast with the strengths of large scale 
surveys providing quantitative data -- generalisability is 
much greater, and comparisons between conditions can be made 
with statistical precision. However, the weakness of this 
data is in the detail it provides. While one has reasonably 
reliable output measures, one has little detail on how these 
output measures are produced. For example, while one may 
reliably produce a meaning shift, and hypothesise that this 
shift is caused by differential interpretation of the question 
as a result of manipulating the response alternatives, one 
cannot provide detail of how this operates. There is, so to 
speak, a danger of putting processes in people's heads.
The fact that at the level of actual responses we found no 
response effects in our small samples is not surprising. Given 
the small shifts identified in split ballots we do not have 
the power to identify these shifts. However, this does not 
mean that the detail provided by verbal reports cannot 
elucidate response effects. The qualitative data can provide 
detail into how observed patterns in survey response, 
quantitative data, might be produced at a cognitive level. In 
this case the pattern is one of a difference across groups
t
depending on features of the questionnaire. How this
difference might be manifest at a cognitive level was 
explored. A move back into the field to explore ideas derived 
from qualitative findings would be useful. It should be 
regarded as an iterative process, results from one type of 
study feeding into the design and interpretation of the other.
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The strength of the approach taken in this study lies in the 
exploitation of different research methods to address aspects 
of the same issue. The issue in this case is the cognitive 
processes involved in response to questions. Clearly the use 
of small samples in the laboratory is unlikely to provide the 
power needed to test for response effects, the appropriate 
place for this is large sample field surveys. The field 
survey allows us to examine the question of whether response 
effects occur due to variations in questionnaire aspects. It 
might also allow the exploration of hypotheses as to the 
nature of the processing that might be involved. However, an 
attempt to understand how the processes operate, at a 
cognitive level, necessitates detailed information at that 
level. The strength of qualitative measures lies in the 
ability to provide a detailed exploration of individual 
processing. Combined with field survey results this detail 
can then be used to understand how response effects, which 
have been shown to occur, could operate at the cognitive 
level.
Implications
The implications of this study for survey researchers cover 
both specific and general issues. For example, in general 
care needs to be taken in interpreting data about usual and 
mundane behaviours. If these are measures of prime interest 
survey researchers should work on developing questions which 
provide better estimates, and drawing on cognitive theory 
would be useful for this purpose. In terms of the specific
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scales of response alternatives provided to assess behavioural 
questions, survey researchers may be advised to choose a scale 
that fits with a 'normal' consensual interpretation of the 
behaviour, especially for questions concerning vague 
behaviours. On the other hand, if they wanted to provoke a 
more considered interpretation of the behaviour, they may be 
advised to use a scale that did not fit. In general, care is 
also needed in the interpretation of attitude measures; it 
seems people do not give much consideration to their response.
Thus protocols, and the psychological theory which underlies 
the interpretation of protocols, can provide some specific 
advice about how to ask questions. Survey researchers could 
usefully use protocols when pre-testing questionnaires, but 
they must be careful in their use, an issue which will be 
addressed in the next section. But the ability to give 
specific advice on how to ask questions is as yet limited. 
Much more understanding is needed of how people answer 
questions and of the influence of questionnaire features on 
responses. Indeed, an important question that -needs
addressing is how we should want people to answer questions.
In terms of further research into CASM, I think some caution 
is needed in the interpretation of split ballot experiments in 
terms of the processes operating to produce response effects. 
In particular care must be taken not to put the independent 
variable into people's head; that is to presume that the 
independent variable actually captures the process in
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question. At the level of the experiment it is the different 
questionnaire forms, the independent variable, which is seen 
as causing the effect. However, at the level of processing, 
it is the differences in thinking which produce the response 
effect. The focus in explaining effects in experimental 
research is the interpretation of the independent variable. 
However, it is all too easy to see the independent variable as 
the direct cause of the effect. The more immediate cause of 
response effects may be the particular strategy used for 
response.
Although there are limitations on their use, I think much more 
use could be made of verbal protocols to examine in detail the 
results found from split ballot experiments, and also to 
generate ideas for testing with split ballot questionnaires. 
In this area where the interest is in understanding the 
processes involved in response, I think both methods are 
crucial to a clearer understanding of response. However, the 
use of verbal protocols rests on the assumption that they are 
valid measures of processing. I want to turn now to address 
this issue.
8.1.2 Review of methods used
As CASM is concerned with the cognitive processes involved in 
responding, the use of process tracing techniques to provide 
data on these processes would be desirable. Within CASM there 
has been some use of verbal reports of cognitive processes, 
however, there is little discussion of the issues involved in
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using them to elucidate processes in survey responding, very 
limited assessment of their validity, and little agreement 
over which method to use. A very few studies have also used 
latency measures within the survey. In the present studies we 
looked at the use of both these methods.
verbal reports of cognitive processes
There is much debate within psychology about the usefulness of 
verbal reports of cognitive processes. In part this stretches 
back to debates surrounding introspection. More recently the 
debate has centred around two thesis offering rival claims 
about the validity of verbal reports. Ericsson and Simon 
(1984) regard verbal reports as valid data on cognitive 
processes when they are given during the task or immediately 
after its completion. In addition the reports should not 
require subjects to focus on particular aspects of their 
thoughts. Given these conditions, Ericsson and Simon regard 
the verbal reports provided as reports of heeded information. 
Information which is not heeded will not be reported, and thus 
— ^the reports provided are limited to reports of more conscious 
thought. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) on the other hand suggest 
that people are unable to give accurate information on their 
thought processes. They regard reports of processing as being 
produced by lay theories of processing rather than as traces 
of the actual processing. The crux of the debate on validity 
rests on the issue of whether the reports are traces of 
processing or whether they are produced by some other process, 
such as people's ex-post theories of processing. A further
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concern in the case of think-aloud protocols is whether 
thinking aloud interferes with ongoing processing, thereby 
changing it.
Assessing the validity of verbal reports is a very complex 
issue (indeed, as is assessing the validity of any 
psychological measure). One common measure of the validity of 
think aloud in the area of problem 'solving is to compare 
verbalising and non-verbalising groups. If the output, the 
problem solving, does not change, it is assumed that thinking 
aloud has not interfered with processing. However, this 
really only addresses the problem of interference, it does not 
address the problem of whether the reports could be produced 
by some other process.
In the present study an assessment was made of the use of 
verbal reports of cognitive processes within the survey. We 
tested four different methods for producing verbal reports, 
all of which were in basic compliance with the principles of 
- - valid reported as specified by Ericsson and Simon- (1984). The' ' 
instructions for verbalisation included two different 
instructions for think aloud only, one combining think-aloud 
and retrospection, and one retrospection only.
No direct comparison was made between verbalising and non­
verbalising groups. This would have been a more powerful test 
of whether the use of think-aloud in the survey interfered 
with processing. However, the necessary comparison would have
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been with people who were being interviewed (rather than for 
example a self-completion questionnaire, since this would have 
confounded the comparison) . The cost of data collection, 
coupled with the low power that would have been achieved from 
any comparison with the small sample sizes in the verbalising 
groups, made this a unrealistic option. A comparison of 
verbalising and non-verbalising groups in a survey would be 
desirable. However, in the case of survey response, as 
opposed to problem solving, some caution is needed in 
comparing output measures. In problem solving, there may be 
certain processes which must occur for the problem to be 
solved. If think aloud interferes, the solution may suffer or 
alternatively be enhanced, thus producing differences in 
output between verbalising and non-verbalising groups. In the 
case of survey response, however, the production of a response 
is more varied. A response may be produced with no thinking 
at all or with a great deal of thinking; there is no 
necessary step to producing a response, because, in a sense, 
any response will do. Unlike problem solving, with survey 
-questions there are no objective criteria for judging the 
veridicality of a response. Thus even if a comparison between 
verbalising and non-verbalising groups produced no difference 
in output, one must be careful in interpreting this as no 
difference in processing. Different ways of thinking, in the 
survey, may produce the same response.
The information examined in this thesis to give pointers to 
the viability of protocol analysis in surveys included
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comparisons of the content of verbalisation, the amount and 
rate of verbalisation, the amount of time taken to produce a 
response, and the structure of the language used.
This comparison of verbal reports was limited by not having a 
non-verbalising group for comparison. However, the assessment 
of the reports does give some indication of the viability of 
these reports for use in the survey.
Our results suggest that respondents find it relatively easy 
to verbalise during a survey: the rate of verbalisation
compared favourably to other think aloud studies and to normal 
verbalisation rates (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). The structure 
of the language was consistent with expectations of language 
structure for the reporting of currently heeded thoughts. In 
terms of the content of the reports, there were few 
differences between the groups. There was some concern with 
the reports provided by the retrospection only group. 
Occasionally, these seemed to be reports of how a person might 
have thought about something rather than how they actually 
did. Thus while there was no indication that verbal reports 
are not valid reports of on-going processing, there was some 
concern with the retrospective only protocols that some 
'slippage' might occur. That is, in the midst of reporting 
what was actually thought, there may be some tendency to 
speculate on what was thought. This type of report is more 
likely to be influenced by theories of thought, as Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977) describe.
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Think aloud plus retrospection seemed to provide the most 
complete reports. In part there may be a slight increase in 
think aloud in this condition, but more importantly, the 
chance to provide a retrospective account after thinking aloud 
allowed respondents to provide further information on very 
quick responses. For example, a respondent answering a 
question about how often they used the library last week very 
quickly responds 'none7. The retrospective report allowed 
them to report that they immediately thought they were away 
last week and so did not use the library.
There was a great deal of variability in the length of the 
protocols provided. Some respondents said a great deal, 
others said very little. This variability seemed to stem from 
three sources. First there is variation in the response task, 
some people are able to give short responses, others, for 
whatever reason, have more to think about. Second, there may 
be some variation across people in the ability or motivation 
to produce verbal reports. Some people find it somewhat 
easier^ to think aloud than others, and others are more or less 
motivated to do so. Finally, there is variation in the 
motivation to respond to the questionnaire. All of these may 
interact. Some people approach the questions with interest 
and genuinely want to provide good answers; others just want 
to answer the questions and get away; some find it boring; 
others are more anxious about being questioned. These 
variations in the motivation to respond have been found to 
exist in the survey interview (Krosnick, 1991) . Thinking
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aloud may reflect these positions, but it does not seem, from 
our study, that it systematically alters them. Thinking aloud 
and retrospection may be subject to similar influences that 
exist in the survey interview.
The second study, where we used protocol analysis to examine 
differences in response strategies across questionnaire 
features, provides some additional information on the use of 
think aloud. In this study we found differences in response 
strategies, but no awareness on the part of the individual as 
to the questionnaire feature that produced these strategies. 
That is, as Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argue, people may be 
unaware of the influences which determine their response; in 
the case of experiments this is the independent variable. 
However, as Ericsson and Simon argue, they can report what 
they are thinking, even if they cannot report why they are 
thinking it.
Nevertheless, some care is needed in the collection and 
interpretation of verbal reports of cognitive processes during 
survey response. First, Ericsson and Simon (1984) suggest 
that heeded thoughts will be reported. But, this is probably 
over optimistic. It is likely that not all heeded thoughts 
will be reported. This is for a number of reasons. People 
may experience lapses of attention between the thought and its 
reporting. If many thoughts are occurring at any one time, 
some of these may not be reported; they may be too quick to 
bring to attention and label. Also it is likely that some
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private information will be censored. Some people may censor 
more information than others because they are more anxious in 
reporting. Think aloud is unlikely to be a useful technique 
for gaining information on sensitive topics.
Secondly, even though most of the thoughts reported may be of 
what is or was being thought, some subjects may slip into more 
hypothetical reporting. That is, reporting what they think 
they must have thought. This seems to be especially likely in 
retrospective reports, in particular in circumstances when 
retrospection does not follow think aloud.
Finally, because of the large variability in reports, think- 
aloud in the survey seems less useful when one is interested 
in particular pieces of information. This may be the case 
with the type of information Bishop (1989) is looking for in 
his use of verbal protocols.
I think that the protocols are best treated as a whole. 
Individual pieces of information are much more subject to 
random fluctuations in the ability, or desire to report, and 
are more variable across a sample not simply because they are 
or are not thought about, but because they may be thought 
about or reported at different levels. Looking at the 
protocol as a whole, and examining general patterns of 
thought, one is less at the mercy of these variations in 
reportability.
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Thus, verbal reports are probably a reasonably reliable source 
of data about cognitive processing during the survey 
interview, though further testing would be desirable. Care is 
still needed in their use and their use is somewhat limited.
latency measures in surveys
In the final study on context effects for attitude questions, 
we looked at the use of latencies as information on cognitive 
processes. The use of latencies within a survey context seems 
problematic. In their use within cognitive psychology, and 
mostly as used by Fazio et al (1986; Fazio, 1990) , the 
response situation is very circumscribed. A very simple 
stimulus is presented, and the response called for is very 
general. However, in the survey situation, the task is more 
complex and diverse. For example, Bassili & Fletcher's (1991) 
use of latencies to examine the strength of attitudes asked, 
within an interview situation, the question #Do you think 
that large companies should have quotas to ensure a fixed 
percentage of women are hired, or should women get no special 
treatment?' •*, Based on • their responses to this question 
respondents were then asked either if they would support it 
.'even if this meant not hiring the best person for the job' or 
'even if it meant that women remained economically unequal'. 
People who shifted their response, or were inconsistent, 
between the two questions had slower latencies than those who 
did not change. They interpret. this as indicating that those 
who shifted had- less crystallised attitudes. But there is 
more to this question than simply deciding where one stands.
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There are also possibly pressures to respond consistently or 
to exhibit inconsistency. Perhaps those who did not shift 
have a strong motivation to appear consistent whereas those 
who do shift gave more thought to this issue. Those who did 
not shift may not have crystallised attitudes but simply have 
a response set. Those who do shift may give more 
consideration to the issue because they have a more elaborate 
attitude structure. The latencies cannot discriminate between 
these explanations, thus using latencies as a simple measure 
of attitude strength is problematic.
In this thesis we examined response latency. The analysis of 
latencies in the present study was somewhat restricted by the 
design; some interesting questions could only be addressed 
weakly, or indirectly. However, many of the findings indicate 
a need for caution in the interpretation of latencies in the 
survey. For example, a simple manipulation of instruction on 
whether to take one's time in response or to think carefully 
produced the intended result (for this study) of shorter or 
— - longer latencies respectively. However, looked at another way 
this suggests that latencies measures may be very susceptible 
to influences other than a simple association between items in 
memory, for example, influences such as respondent motivation. 
Similarly, an obvious context (prior questions) in some cases 
produced longer latencies than a subtle context. This would 
be contrary to an accessibility account. Here, there may be 
effort on the part of the respondent to relate the previous 
context to the present question, and possibly to decide
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whether or not to use the previous information. In the case 
of survey response, the response is likely to be multi-
determined, including retrieval of elements from memory, 
motivation to think, and decisions of whether to use retrieved 
information. Both the results of our study, and an
understanding of the nature of the task suggest the use of
latency measures in surveys requires great care both in design 
and interpretation because there is much scope for erroneous 
interpretation.
8.1.3 Context effects
One major concern for survey researchers is the prevalence and 
strength of context effects in the 7 field'. There are
differing views on this issue. Some suggest context effects 
are common (eg Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988) others suggest 
they are not pervasive, but equally not rare (eg Schuman & 
Presser 1981). Studies which suggest context effects are 
common tend to be those which manipulate context in 
theoretically driven ways. They use largely topical media
issues with a context designed to increase the accessibility
of one or other aspect of the target issue. Studies which 
find context effects less common, such as Schuman and 
Presser's study, re-examined different versions of a 
questionnaire where a large number of questions just happened 
to be asked in different contexts. Here, the variation in 
context is not theoretically driven but simply a by-product of
the design of the questionnaires. The problem here is there
is little indication of what it is about the different
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contexts that leads or does not lead to effects.
One factor which should, theoretically, influence the 
likelihood of the occurance of context effects is the 
relatedness of the context to the target. In terms of the 
episodic relation of context to target there have been a 
number of studies which examine the effect of scattering 
context items, or of 'buffering', separating context and 
target by a block of unrelated issues. One would expect a 
reduction in context effects when the context and target is 
separate. Mostly, though not invariably, this is what has 
been found (Bishop, 1987; Tourangeau et al 1989a; 1989b).
However, as well as the episodic relation one would also 
expect that the conceptual relation between target and context 
would affect the likelihood of context effects. One would 
expect that a strongly related context would produce more 
effect than a context which is only weakly related. This 
supposition has not, however, been adequately tested. 
Tourangeau et al (1989b) used the correlations between items 
as a measure of relatedness and suggested that those items 
which were more correlated led to greater context effect. 
However, correlation between items may not be an adequate 
measure of relatedness.
In addition research on attitudes would suggest that familiar 
issues, issues of which people have direct experience, would 
be less susceptible to context effects than issues which
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people have less experience of.
These concerns are about what types of context and targets are 
most likely to produce effects. These are important issues 
which have not received much attention in the CASM research 
programme. Some research within CASM has looked at what type 
of people are likely to be most effected by context, hence the 
focus on individual positions on an attitude. The issue of 
who is most likely to be affected by context effects is also 
an important one. However, this question is somewhat removed 
from normal survey practice. Survey researchers are largely 
interested in main effects of context, since many other 
measures, such as interest, and knowledge would not be 
collected in a survey context.
In the present study context effects due to priming were 
examined. This study explored the issue of the extent of 
context effects by drawing questions from different levels of 
knowledge or experience of an issue and by examining different 
levels of relatedness between target and context. This allows 
us to look at context effects over a range of target and 
context types, rather than focusing on question and context 
combinations where context effects have often been produced. 
However, rather than a haphazard association between context 
and target (as in Schuman & Presser's 1981 review), we devised 
questions and context to differ in theoretically important 
ways. Thus we can explore the issue of the prevalence of 
context effects.
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We also looked at other factors which may be important to 
understanding how context operates to influence response. 
Although theoretically important to context effects, the 
amount of time spent responding has not been examined. We 
manipulated thinking time to examine its interaction with 
context. The influence on context effects of individual 
variation in knowledge, and attitude structure factors was 
also examined.
Unlike many studies within the CASM framework, we found few 
overall, or main effects of context in this study. This is 
somewhat problematic, since because of the large number of 
tests conducted some of the results we found may be due to 
chance. However, there is some theoretical rationale for 
where we did and did not find context effects (though this 
latter is also problematic) . Most of the effects we found 
were for obvious contexts (for example, asking about trivial 
or serious crimes prior to a question concerning sentencing 
for crime), though not all obvious contexts produced effects. 
We also found less effects for familiar issues (for example, 
student housing) . This is, generally, as expected. The few 
interactions we found with thinking time, individual knowledge 
and attitude structure factors were in the expected directions 
(Martin, 1986; Tourangeau et al, 1989a, 1989b. See chapters 
1 and 6).
Implications
Survey researchers may take some heart from this study. It
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suggests that context effects, especially as a main effect are 
rather more elusive than some CASM research may suggest 
(although because interactions with personal positions and 
thinking time factors have been less examined, there may be 
more interaction effects). It appears that the context must 
be fairly obviously related to the target question for it to 
have a effect. So, by and large, one may be able to judge 
when context is likely to have an effect by judging the 
relatedness of the context to the target. Although, the 
results concerning issue familiarity were not so clear cut, it 
may be that media issues are likely to generate stronger 
context effects than familiar or unfamiliar issues, the latter 
are perhaps more likely to interact with personal positions.
Further research exploring context effects might examine the 
issues of thinking time and the effects of individual 
knowledge and attitude structure. On the basis of this 
research, a fruitful area to research the effects of thinking 
time is likely to be with media issues in an obvious context. 
For knowledge and attitude structure factors, a concentration 
on less familiar issues is advised.
In terms of the relatedness of context to target, the split in 
relatedness used here suggests that subtle contexts are 
unlikely to produce response effects except, perhaps, in 
interaction with knowledge and attitude structure for 
unfamiliar issues. Further exploration of this split for less 
familiar issues may be useful. However, this was a first
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attempt to define relatedness. Rather than looking at a 
simple split between obvious and subtle, an attempt might also 
be made to assess different aspects of relatedness. As the 
relatedness of context and target is likely to be a key factor 
in context effects, much more work is needed to develop the 
concept of relatedness and to define what it means. These 
results suggest that simply looking at correlations between 
target and context is not a sufficient definition of 
relatedness.
8.2 DISCUSSING THE SURVEY METHOD
The above results contribute further explanation to a number 
of aspects of the response process. But they, along with the 
discussion of survey methods in chapter one, also suggest a 
number of areas where further exploration may be beneficial to 
the study of response processes. I would like in this section 
to broaden the discussion, looking at some of the issues 
surrounding survey response and looking at where survey 
measurement stands as a method.
8.2.1 True response versus constructed response
As discussed in chapter one, the previous view of the 
foundation of survey response generally regarded questioning 
as a means of getting out a fact or attitude or some other 
element that was ' in the head'. Response effects were 
regarded as technical problems. The input of psychological 
theory has questioned this assumption, showing instead how 
response can be constructed at the time of questioning and
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may not be drawing out any stable elements. Many factors can 
contribute to this constructive process.
In this study the main focus has been on features of the 
questionnaire. The think aloud protocols clearly show how 
processing is affected by changes in the questionnaire, by 
altering what is thought about, and show how responding 
involves the construction of a response. The latency study 
shows how different contexts can effect response and 
implicates the time taken to think, personal and social 
factors, in this process. Thus, as in most other CASM 
research, these results show that responses may be either 
retrieved or constructed, and that factors within the 
questionnaire, as well as other types of factors, contribute 
to this construction.
Several other factors, which may be important in responding 
have not been studied here. Perhaps most important is the 
more overarching situational features of the survey. The 
conversational context of the interview for example, and 
respondents general representations of what is expected of 
them in this situation. The think aloud protocols allude to 
the importance of this in the general nature of the way in 
which respondents approach questions, that is in a rather 
conversational manner, but do not address how this might 
affect response.
I believe that progress in understanding the nature of 
responding may be aided by developing the conceptions of the
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nature of the elements involved in the constructive process. 
These include conceptions of the relation of context to 
thinking, the social nature of issues, and ways of thinking 
about objects, but also issues of respondent motivation and 
effort as well as individual, and group, differences need to 
be further addressed. I will now look at these issues.
8.2.2 context
Schuman (1992) broadens the notion of context, which is often 
treated as the effect of previous questions on later ones, to 
include not only the influence of one question on another, but 
also includes the interviewer, the interview setting and even 
the historical setting. He suggests that for context effects 
we are likely to find different types of effects with 
different theoretical explanations. 'Context7 may be a term 
covering several theoretically unrelated ideas. He suggests 
the importance of bringing different types of context together 
to examine how they interact in influencing response. There 
is, I think, the need to address what context is, both in the 
way Schuman does by looking at different kinds and levels of 
context, but also by examining more carefully the way that 
context relates to thought.
At a more general theoretical level, rather than viewing 
context as a factor, out there, which impinges on the 
cognitive system, context can be regarded as part of a 
relationship. Shannon (1990) suggests that context is neither 
external nor internal but the interface between thought and 
the world. This is similar to Mead's (1934) conception of the
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relational nature of mind. A similar notion is apparent in 
Palmerino et al's (1984) conception of the attitude as a 
relation between person and object. A dynamical systems 
approach (Ostrom, Skowronski, & Nowak, 1994) considers the 
cognitive system within a temporal dimension; at any moment 
the contents of thought depend on what they were the previous 
moment. With each new experience, consciousness is not simply 
erased and replaced, but rather flows on from what it 
previously was. Thus, whatever was there previously forms a 
part of what is there now. In these types of view context is 
seen as much more integral to thought. In terms of survey 
responses a serious question in this view is not only why 
context does effect response but also why it does not.
Concentration on context in terms of a response effect can 
lead to the view that sometimes people are affected by context 
and sometimes not. But, context effects should be seen as 
more general than merely response effects. Krosnick (1992) 
reports on a study investigating false consensus effects 
(thinking others share the same view as oneself) due to 
question order. In this study there was no overall effect of 
order on the marginal distributions. However, differences 
were found when the respondents' reported importance of 
attitudes was taken into account. He suggests that simply 
looking at the marginal distributions is not sufficient for 
determining whether variations in the questionnaire have 
affected response.
Similar results were found in the present study. In the study
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on context effects, we found a number of different types of 
effects. Some of these would not show up as general response 
effects, because overall the distribution of responses was not 
altered by the context alone. In a number of cases it was 
having particular positions on an issue or differing amounts 
of knowledge, or thinking about it more or less which led to 
effects. However, since these effects were in different 
directions for different factors, they would not appear as 
general response effects. But they are a response effect. 
Thus, context may have more effect that previously suggested.
Often it is only when an overall effect is found that any 
attempt is made to relate this effect to other factors -- what 
caused this overall effect. Thus the focus on the effects of 
various questionnaire factors on the overall response 
distributions may have obscured a more pervasive nature of 
context. The idea that context, which here I am considering 
as any aspect of the questionnaire, is influential in the way 
people think about issues is also apparent in the think aloud 
protocols. For all but one issue we find differences in 
response strategies at questions. Two of these have actually 
been shown to lead to response effects, the other three have 
not been tested in this way, though, if the responses from our 
small sample transferred to large samples, two of these 
effects would be unlikely to manifest response effects. Yet, 
whether they lead to effects in the response distribution is 
in some ways a moot point, the fact is they have influenced 
the way people think. This is strong evidence for the 
interactive nature of thought. It is not a passive process
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that draws on static elements and stable processes to respond. 
Rather thought is dynamically engaged with the environment; 
the situation influences not only what is thought about 
(content) but how one goes about thinking (process). One has 
to question why, if context affects thinking, it does not 
affect response. One has to explain not only the instances 
where context does result in a response effect, but also the 
instances when it does not.
8.2.3 what factors to examine
The social nature of issues
Much of the focus in explaining context effects has been on 
the accessibility of information. To have an effect context 
is presumed to need to be both accessible and applicable. 
This study shows a variety of ways in which accessible context 
(defined more widely than simply previous questions to include 
factors such as response scales) may affect both thought and 
response. Feldman and Lynch's (1988) notion of diagnosticity 
is comparable to applicability. They suggest that along with 
information being accessible the diagnosticity is also 
important but so too is the availability of alternative 
inputs. But this begs the question what makes information 
applicable or diagnostic?
Feldman (1992) recognises the importance of the questions of 
why and when information is diagnostic. He suggests that to 
answer this question we will need to explore knowledge 
structures and their degree of flexibility. I agree with 
this, but I think the concern should not simply be for
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individual knowledge structures. In the latency study we 
found a variety of context effects, some overall effects and 
some interacting with other factors. It seems that the 
particular issue and the particular context are important in 
producing effects. To explain these effects we need to draw 
on a knowledge of the structure and content of the particular 
issues investigated. In this study we looked at how the 
effects varied due to different levels of familiarity and we 
looked at how related the context was to the target. Both of 
these factors seem important in explaining context effects. 
I would argue that these factors represent not an individual 
structuring of the issue, but rather are tapping the social 
nature of issues. The use of issue relatedness and
familiarity in this study are only two ways of addressing the 
structure and content of issues, and whilst the results 
suggest they are important, more detail is needed to examine 
other aspects of content and structure. Tourangeau et al 
(1991) address this issue by looking at the structure of 
attitudes towards welfare and abortion. They show that these 
issues involve not only a pro-con dimension, but also involve 
different clusters of beliefs, which do not map directly onto 
a pro-con dimension. They show that reaction times are 
quicker to a target when the context is drawn from the same 
cluster. This structure, again, should not be seen as any one 
individual's knowledge structure, but is rather an aggregate 
level structure, which I would argue reflects the social 
structuring of these issues.
To understand why one context affects responses to an issue
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whilst another does not we need to understand the structure 
and content of issues. Whilst this may seem to suggest that 
for each issue we have to think anew about context effects, I 
do not think this is entirely the case. In this study for 
example, the degree of familiarity of an issue was suggested 
as important to context effects. One way of addressing the 
problem is to look for these types of dimensions on which 
issues can vary, familiarity is likely to be one of them. 
Perhaps the importance of an issue or the degree of conflict 
or consensus that exists about it within a society may also be 
important factors. Research by Boninger, Krosnick and Berent 
(1995) suggests that the importance of attitudes to an 
individual results in part from the individual's social 
identifications.
In one sense examining the structure and content of issues is 
addressing one of the criticisms often levelled at an 
information processing approach which is that the 
'information' is rarely defined (Graumann, 1988). What is 
this information that is processed? Massaro and Cohen (1993) 
reviewing information processing theory, attempt some 
definition of information. They draw a distinction between 
information and data; the former being knowledge within the 
individual and the latter being in the environment. This 
distinction, however, divorces the individual from the 
environment, in the same way as does a view of context as an 
external, rather than a relational factor. Defining 
information in terms of its social structure and content 
recognises the individual as part of that structure. Seeing
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the individual more firmly as part of this structure, allows 
one to more clearly define the information which they are 
dealing with at particular questions.
This position also addresses a criticism levelled at social 
cognition, namely how is it 'social'. Schneider (1991) 
suggests one way of doing this is to look at how social 
variables affect cognitive processes. One way of doing this 
in the survey is to look at how the conversational situation 
influences response, and thought; research on the effects of 
conversational norms has begun to address this issue. Another 
way is to acknowledge that knowledge structures are, at least 
in part, cultural productions. Examining how these knowledge 
structures influence response is to examine the dynamics of 
these systems. Thus, what one is aiming for in describing the 
social structure and content of issues, is to, at least in 
part, define the social and the historical context (Schuman 
1992) in which the interview takes place.
Different types of context
But, it is also important to develop a conception of different 
types of context effect. A number of researchers deal with 
types of context, with context defined as preceding questions 
(Schuman & Presser, 1981; Smith, 1992). What these 
conceptions essentially are trying to capture is the fact that 
there are different ways of thinking about an object. For 
example, one might compare it to other, similar objects along 
the same dimension; this is the specific-specific relation 
identified by Schuman and Presser (1981) , and is very much
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related to research in social judgement, where the normally- 
found contrast effects are explained as due to the extremity 
of the anchor provided by the context. Other types of context 
may include the specific-general relationship, considering the 
same object in different ways (for example affective or 
cognitive aspects), or considering an object in terms of 
related issues (as in the priming paradigm).
The importance of combining both an understanding of the 
social structure of an issue with an understanding of the type 
of context may be best illustrated by an example of a well 
studied context effect for abortion (Schuman & Presser 1981). 
Support for abortion in the case where the woman does not want 
any more children (birth control) is less when this question 
is asked after a question which asks about support for 
abortion in the case of birth defect. Often this effect is 
classified as of the specific-general kind. That is, the 
question dealing with abortion as birth control is seen as a 
general question. I think this is an incorrect interpretation 
of this question, rather, I think it represents another reason 
for abortion and thus these questions are better seen as 
ratings along the same dimension (specific-specific). The 
finding of contrast is consistent with other findings which 
use this type of structure. Birth defects may be seen as an 
extreme anchor, which perhaps makes the following reason seem 
rather trivial by comparison. However, other extreme anchors 
were used prior to the 'birth control' question which failed 
to find such large effects, if they found effects at all 
(Schuman, 1992). These included 'pregnancy due to rape',
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'poverty of mother', and 'threat to life of mother'. Looking 
at the structure of the abortion issue which Tourangeau et al 
(1991) identified, it can be seen that these 'reasons' may be 
drawing on different belief clusters, with the birth defect 
reason as part of a topical cluster which emphasises the 
child's welfare in abortion, and the other reasons likely to 
fall under a women's rights focus. Thus in this particular 
case the birth defect reason may not only be an extreme 
anchor, but may involve a categorical difference in the 
anchors, which emphasise different aspects of the abortion 
argument. Using both an understanding of the type of effect 
and of the social structuring of the issue, seems to aid in 
the interpretation of context effects.
Thinking effort and processing goals
Martin and Harlow (1992) suggest that simple accessibility of 
information does not capture the complexity of response. 
Rather the amount of cognitive effort devoted to response is 
also important, as are the processing goals.
But the amount of cognitive effort, again, may vary due to the 
social structure of issues. Issues may be more or less easy 
to devote effort to. As shown in this study, media issues 
were more likely to differ in terms of the time taken across 
different instructions. It was suggested that for these 
issues, as opposed to unfamiliar and, to a lesser extent, 
familiar issues, respondents find it easier to moderate the 
amount of thinking they devote to the issue. Similarly people 
may want to devote more or less attention to some issues.
3f0
The idea that processing goals may influence the way in which 
people think about issues is also important, and needs to be 
examined more fully. Processing goals may derive not simply 
from a particular question, but may derive from respondents 
general approach to, or representation of what an interview is 
all about. People seem for example, to treat it more as a 
conversation than an examination. We do not expect, nor 
usually get, four page structured replies to a question such 
as 'do you think Britain has benefited from being a member of 
the EC?7. Yet we might expect this in an examination 
situation. Similarly, the goals in an interviewing situation 
may include such things as stating ones views, regardless of 
whether they are an accurate answer to the question, or trying 
to answer as one thinks one should answer. Both of these 
goals seem to underlie some of the responses given in the 
think aloud study. Understanding the nature of the 
interactive situation seems to be an important part of 
understanding how the respondents goals may operate in 
producing responses, in that it may define more clearly what 
these goals are. An attempt to integrate the more 
sociological approaches to the survey (Briggs 1986; Suchman & 
Jordan, 1992), which look more at the conversational situation 
might be appropriate here, however, there would be a need to 
show how the conversational goals impacted upon thought and 
response. As Schuman (1992) suggests, showing how different 
factors (questionnaire, interview setting etc) interact is an 
important aim for understanding survey response.
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Individual and group differences
However, it is also important not to neglect individual 
differences. Although the social structure and content may 
define issues at one level, within this structure individuals 
also have their own positions on these issues, as they have 
their particular place in a social structure. The importance 
of individual differences in explaining context effects has 
been demonstrated in this and other studies.
Examining how issues vary across different groups is equally 
important. Our homogenous sample allowed the definition of 
some issues as familiar (eg student housing) that would almost 
certainly not be familiar to a general population sample; some 
of our unfamiliar issues may be more familiar to different 
groups.
8.2.4 The use of surveys
This study, and more generally the research area on which it 
is based, raises serious questions about the use of surveys 
as a research method. If responses are often constructed, if 
there is no 'true' response, is the survey a useful 
measurement instrument?
One suggestion would be to discard measures in traditional 
survey terms and use more open ended, qualitative, measures 
which allow respondents more room to qualify and explain their 
views. There are several problems with this approach though. 
As well as losing the value of large scale surveys, it is a 
mistake to see more qualitative methods as necessarily less
3*2
problematic. Even qualitative interviews exist in, and 
create, context, and thus, the issue of the effects of context 
on thinking and response still exist.
For those who want to measure attitudes and behaviour, some 
form of survey still seems an attractive method. One way to 
view the research in CASM is to see it as an attempt to 
understand effects in order to eliminate them, and for survey 
researchers this may be the desired goal. But, whilst this 
research may lead to "better" questions, it also suggests that 
in some cases there is no "best" question. This is especially 
so in the case of attitude measurement, where any expression 
of attitude may simply be a temporary construction based on 
accessible information.
One suggestion, in terms of the context of attitude questions, 
is to examine how the context in surveys varies from contexts 
encountered in everyday life. Schuman (1992) suggests that 
the contextual forces in surveys are likely to be the same as 
those occurring elsewhere in life. Feldman (1992) , on the 
other hand, suggests that in surveys, questions may bring 
normally automatic behaviour under conscious control. The 
concept of "self-generated validity" (Feldman & Lynch 1988) 
claims that the questioning may influence the construction of 
beliefs, a construction which might not otherwise have taken 
place. This construction may then influence subsequent 
behaviour.
Thus, there are mixed views as to how much the survey context
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varies from everyday experience. But certainly one could 
suggest, in terms of the particular contexts used, that 
introducing a context which is unusual, is likely to produce 
ways of thinking about an issue which would not normally 
occur, and thus, do not represent a more probable attitude. 
If this context was not encountered again (and was not 
recalled by the respondent) , that particular attitude may 
never be produced again. This suggests that a knowledge of 
the types of contexts in which particular issues arise in 
everyday life may be important for survey measurement. This 
again, suggests the need to understand more fully the social 
nature of the issues one is measuring.
The question of whether it is better for respondents to give 
a thoughtful, considered, response, or to give a gut reaction 
response, may rest on a similar comparison to everyday life. 
Do people normally consider issues or not? Are some issues 
more likely to be given consideration than others? The fact 
that respondents have not considered an issue before being 
asked about it in a survey does not necessarily mean that the 
response they give is meaningless. It depends on whether the 
survey context leads to consideration in a way which would not 
normally be encountered in everyday life. The fact that 
respondents treat a survey in a conversational way, suggests 
this may not be very different from other types of activities 
which respondents engage in.
But, looking at how context varies in everyday life will not 
eliminate context effects in attitude measurement, in everyday
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life, as in the survey, issues may appear in different 
contexts. If the different contexts have different
implications, they may induce different attitudes. If we 
measure such an attitude in only one context in a survey, we 
are only getting a partial picture of that attitude. Thus, it 
may be a better strategy for survey researchers to use 
contextual variation as a means for understanding attitudes, 
rather than to fight against context. As well as trying to 
control response effects, these effects can also be seen as 
valuable data. Billiet, Waterplas and Loosweldt (1992), 
looking at attitudes to cohabitation and marriage, show how 
experimental variation of the context within a survey can 
provide a deeper understanding of the attitudes being 
measured.
As Bodenhausen (1992) notes, questionnaire effects are 
important not just to survey researchers but also as a source 
of information about the processes involved in responding. 
That is they are not just methodological problems, but a 
source of data about thought processes. The widespread effect 
of context in a variety of areas of psychological research, 
and the growing interest in the interactional nature of 
thought, makes them a very important data source.
Jobe, Tourangeau, and Smith (1993) discuss the contributions 
of survey research to the understanding of memory. They point 
out that although some of the controls present in laboratory 
research are lost, researching memory through the survey may 
be more ecologically valid, allowing the exploration of a
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greater range of events and longer time scales. Reveiwing 
research within the CASM framework they suggest that survey 
research can make a substantial contribution to the 
understanding of memory.
Rather than diminish the value of surveys, at least in one 
way, response effects actually open up exciting possibilities 
for new ways to use surveys, especially for social scientists. 
By examining survey response we can examine how the cognitive 
system interacts with the world, at least in one situation. 
The study of context effects in other areas has looked at such 
a relationship. The interesting aspect of the survey is that 
it questions people about themselves, their behaviour, 
beliefs, attitudes, and offers a move away from some of the 
more artificial tasks often studied.
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APPENDIX 1
VERBAL REPORT INSTRUCTIONS - EXPERIMENT 1
THINK ALOUD INSTRUCTION A 
(EXPERIMENTS 1 & 2)
In this interview I am interested in what you think about when 
you answer some questions that I am going to ask you. In 
order to do this I am going to ask you to THINK ALOUD as you 
answer the question.
What I mean by think aloud is that I want you to tell me 
EVERYTHING you are thinking from the time you first hear the 
question until you give an answer.
I would like you to talk aloud CONSTANTLY from the time I ask 
the question until you have given your answer to the question.
I don't want you to try to plan out what you say or try to 
explain to me what you are saying. Just act as if you are 
alone in the room speaking to yourself.
It is most important that you keep talking. If you are silent 
for any long period of time I will ask you to talk.
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THINK ALOUD INSTRUCTION B
In this interview I am interested in what you think about when 
you answer some questions that I am going to ask you. In 
order to do this I am going to ask you to THINK ALOUD as you 
answer the question.
As soon as I ask the question, please start thinking aloud. 
The best way to do this is to be as spontaneous as possible.
Tell me everything you are thinking as you are thinking it, 
even details or sidetracks that seem insignificant or 
embarrassing. If you think aloud spontaneously, you will soon 
forget that you are speaking at all.
There is no need to explain to me why you are thinking what 
you are. You don't have to interpret or justify your approach 
to a question. Just tell me what you are thinking at the 
moment.
If you are silent for more than a few seconds, I will remind 
you by saying: Please tell me what you are thinking.
3$  7
THINK ALOUD PLUS IMMEDIATE RETROSPECTION - INSTRUCTION C - 
(EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2)
The think aloud part of this instruction is exactly the same 
as think aloud instruction A, given above. The following 
retrospective instructions are also given:
After you have answered the question I then want to see how 
much you can remember about what you were thinking from the 
time I asked you the question until you gave the answer. I am 
interested in what you actually can REMEMBER rather than what 
you think you must have thought.
If possible I would like you to tell about your memories in 
the sequence in which they occurred while you were answering 
the question. Please tell me if you are uncertain about any 
of your memories.
I don't want you to work on answering the question again, just 
report all that you can remember thinking about when answering 
the question.
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RETROSPECTION ONLY - INSTRUCTION D -EXPERIMENT 1
In this interview I am interested in what think about when you 
answer some questions that I am going to ask you. In order to 
do this I am going to ask you, after each question, to report 
all that you can remember thinking about while answering the 
question.
I want you to try to remember as much as you can about what 
you were thinking from the time I asked you the question until 
you gave the answer. I am interested in what you actually can 
REMEMBER rather than what you think you must have thought.
If possible I would like you to tell about your memories in 
the sequence in which they occurred while you were answering 
the question. Please tell me if you are uncertain about any 
of your memories.
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APPENDIX 2 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE - EXPERIMENT 1 
First I would like to ask you a few questions about your use 
of the library.
Ql. How many hours a week do you usually spend in the 
library, that is the BLPES?
Q2. How many hours did you actually spend in the library 
last week?
Q3. Would you say that you use the library more than you
did last term, less than last term, or about the same?
Q4. In the four weeks ending Sunday (DATE) did you do any of 
these things: Yes No
Use the libertas service 
Use the card catalogue 
Use the microfiche 
Ask library staff for help in locating a reference
Ask others for help in locating a reference
Do anything else to locate a reference 
Q5. How often are you annoyed with the services provided by 
the library?
PROMPT AS NECESSARY - WOULD YOU SAY YOU WERE ANNOYED:
every day
at least once a week 
less than once a week 
or never.
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Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about your views on
some of the issues facing Britain.
Q6. On the whole, to what extent would you say you are 
satisfied with the way democracy works in Britain? 
Please use the scale on this card to decide on your reply.
'10' means you are completely satisfied and '1' that you 
are completely dissatisfied. (SHOW CARD) 
completely completely
dissatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 satisfied
Q7. Taking everything into consideration, would you say
that Britain has on balance benefited or not from being 
a member of the European community?
Q8. If you were to be told tomorrow that the European
Community had been scrapped, would you be very sorry 
about it, indifferent, or relieved?
Q9. There is a lot of talk these days about what the goals 
of this country should be for the next 10 or 15 years.
On this card are listed some of the goals that different 
people say should be given top priority. Would you 
please say which one of them you yourself consider most 
important in the long run. (SHOW CARD)
1. Maintaining law and order in the nation
2. Giving the people more say in important government 
decisions.
3. Fighting rising prices.
4. Protecting freedom of speech.
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APPENDIX 3
MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS PER QUESTION - EXPERIMENT 1 
THINK ALOUD
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
GROUP 1 48.8 35 .2 23 38.9 60 .9 77 .7 85 36.7 111 .2
GROUP 2 24 .6 16 .9 17.3 32 .1 66 65 41.1 46.1 101.1
GROUP 3 44 .5 22 .3 41.2 31.9 97.4 136.4 106.6 22 .8 172 .7
GROUP 4 9 15.6 11.2 25 .8 58 .6 24 .1 45.8 12.7 10.2
RETROSPECTION
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
GROUP 3 55 .3 52 .7 42 .5 39 .3 83 .1 96.5 93 .7 48.6 136.4
GROUP 4 51.4 48.7 35 .4 110 .5 90.1 121.0 81.7 53 .5 81.7
MEAN NUMBER 
THINK ALOUD
.OF CODES PER QUESTION -EXPERIMENT 1
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
GROUP 1 5.2 5.1 2.6 2.8 6.4 6.8 5.4 3.9 11.1
GROUP 2 2.9 2.3 2.2 2.1 6.9 4.9 4 4 8.7
GROUP 3 5.1 3 3.4 2.7 5.8 8.9 7.7 2.5 14 .4
GROUP 4 1.7 2.2 1.4 1.3 3.7 2.8 4.1 1.9 1.4
RETROSPECTION
Qi Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9
GROUP 3 4 .1 3.7 3.2 2.8 4.4 7 6 3.4 8.8
GROUP 4 4.7 4.6 3.4 7.5 5.3 7.6 5.9 3.3 5.2
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APPENDIX 4
CODING FRAMES - EXPERIMENT 1
QUESTION 1: USUAL LIBRARY
USE
1. Activities
In library- 
general
2. Amount of use
Hours (response) 
number of visits 
Calculations of amount
3. Personal
4. About the question
Repeat/rephrase question 
difficulties
time frame consideration
5. Other
6. Process description
QUESTION 3 -- COMPARE USE
1. Activities
In library 
general
2. Amount of use
3. Personal
4. About the question
Repeat/rephrase question 
difficulties
time frame consideration
5. Comments on library
6. Other
7. Process description
8. Response
QUESTION 2 -- USE LAST WEEK
1. Activities
In library 
general
2. Amount of use
Hours (response) 
number of visits 
Calculations of amount
3. About the question
Repeat/rephrase question 
difficulties
t i m e  f r a m e  
consideration/
definition of week
5. Other
6. Process description
QUESTION 4 
USED
FACILITIES
1. Activities / Reason for 
use
2. Amount of use
3. Personal
4. About the question
Repeat/rephrase question 
difficulties / easy
time frame consideration
5. Other
6. Process description
7. Responses
393
QUESTION 5: ANNOYED WITH
LIBRARY
1. Aspects / services
2. Defining annoyed
3. Comments on library
4. Personal
5. About the question 
Repeat/rephrase question
difficulties / easy
time frame consideration
6. Other
7. Process descriptions
8. Response / Frequency 
QUESTION 6:
SATISFACTION WITH DEMOCRACY
1. Aspects of democracy
2. Definitions
3. Comparisons
4. Evaluations
5. Dealing with the scale
6. Personal
7. About the question 
Repeat/rephrase question
difficulties
8. Other
9. Process Descriptions
10. Responses
QUESTION 7 -- EC BENEFITS
1. B e l i e f s / a s p e c t s  
considered
2. Considers past or
future benefits
3. evaluations
4. personal
5. About the question 
Repeat/rephrase question 
difficulties
6. Other
7. Process Descriptions
8. Response
QUESTION 8 -- EC SCRAPPED
1 . B e l i e f s / a s p e c t s  
considered
2. what comes after 
scrapping
3. evaluations
4. personal
5. About the question 
Repeat/rephrase question 
difficulties
6. Other
7. Process Descriptions
8. Response
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QUESTION 9 -- GOALS
1. Beliefs/aspects of 
options
general beliefs 
about priorties
2. evaluations of options
3. Reads / labels options
4. personal
5. About the question 
Repeat/rephrase question 
difficulties
6. Other
7. Process Descriptions
8. Response / responding
3^5
APPENDIX 5
QUESTIONNAIRES - EXPERIMENT 2
QUESTIONNAIRE A
1. How many cups or mugs of coffee or tea do you usually 
drink in a day? (SHOW CARD 1A)
16 or more cups/mugs a day ...........  1
10-15 cups/mugs a day ................ 2
4-9 cups/mugs a day .................. 3
2-3 cups/mugs a day .................. 4
1 cup/mug a day ..................... 5
Never drink tea or coffee ...........  6
2. Taking your answer from this scale, compared to other 
people, how often would you say that you have coffee or 
tea to drink? (SHOW CARD 2)
Much more than most .... 1 A bit less than most
A bit more than most. ... 2 Much less than most
About average ..... , , , 3
Last week, how many hours did you spend watching
television? RECORD NUMBER OF HOURS
How often do you feel annoyed by an advert or commercial
on television? (SHOW CARD 4AB1)
HIGH FREQUENCY LOW FREQUENCY
Every day .....  1 Once a month or more often.. 1
Most days .....  2 Once every few months...... 2
Once a week .... 3 Once every six months...... 3
Once a month ... 4 Once a year................. 4
Less often ....  5 Less often ................. 5
Never .........  6 Never ..................... 6
For the next question we simply need to collect some 
information about you. For this question, and only this 
question, you do not need to think aloud.
5. Are you .... (READ OUT)..
Married ..................................  1
In a permanent or long term relationship .. 2 
Or are you single (not in a relationship)? .3
6. Taking things altogether, how would you describe your 
marriage / relationship / dating life. Would you say 
that you very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy with
your marriage / relationship / dating life?
very h a p p y...  1
fairly happy ....  2
not too happy .... 3
7. Taken altogether, how would you say things are these 
days? Would you say that you are very happy, fairly 
happy, or not too happy?
very h a p p y ......  1
fairly happy ....  2
not too happy .... 3
3 $ 6"
Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about your views on
some political issues.
8. If you were to be told tomorrow that the European 
community had been scrapped would you be very sorry about 
it indifferent or relieved?
very s o r r y   1
indifferent .... 2 
relieved ......  3
9. Taking everything into consideration, would you say that 
Britain has on balance benefited or not from being a 
member of the European Community?
Benefit ......  1
Not benefit .... 2
10. Are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy 
works in your country?
very satisfied ......  1
fairly satisfied .....  2
not very satisfied .... 3
not at all satisfied .. 4
11. There is a lot of talk these days about what a country's 
goals should be for the next 10 or 15 years. On this 
card are listed some of the goals that different people 
say should be given top priority.
Would you please say which one you yourself consider 
most important for your country in the long run. (SHOW 
CARD).
And what would be your second choice.
First Second
Maintaining order in the nation ........  1 1
Giving the people more say in important
government decisions   2 2
Fighting rising prices   3 3
Protecting freedom of speech ...........  4 4
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QUESTIONNAIRE B.
1. How many cups or mugs of coffee or tea do you usually
drink in a day? (SHOW CARD)
4 or more cups/mugs a day ...........  1
3 cups/mugs a day ................... 2
2 cups/mugs a day ................... 3
1 cup/mug a day........................  4
Less than 1 cup/mug a day ............ 5
Never drink tea or coffee ............ 6
2. Taking your answer from this scale, compared to other 
people, how often would you say that you have coffee or 
tea to drink? (SHOW CARD)
Much more than most .... 1 A bit less than most ... 4
A bit more than most ... 2 Much less than most .... 5
About average .......  3
3. Last week, how many hours did you spend in lectures and
classes? RECORD HOURS
4. How often do you feel annoyed by an advert or commercial
on television? (SHOW CARD)
HIGH FREQUENCY LOW FREQUENCY
Every day ..... 1 Once a month or more often .... . . 1
Most days ..... 2 Once every few months ...... .... 2
Once a week .... 3 Once every six months ...... .... 3
Once a month ... 4 Once a year ................... . . 4
Less often 5 Less often....  5
Never 6 Never ........  6
For the next question we simply need to collect some 
information about you. For this question, and only this 
question, you do not need to think aloud.
5. Are you .... (READ OUT)..
Married .....................................  1
In a permanent or long term relationship ...... 2
Or are you single (not in a relationship)? .... 3
I would now like to ask you to report on two aspects of your 
life, which may be relevant to people's overall well being:
a) marital / relationship / dating satisfaction
b) satisfaction with life as a whole.
6. Taking things altogether, how would you describe your 
marriage / relationship / dating life. Would you say 
that you are very happy, fairly happy, or not too happy 
with your marriage / relationship / dating life?
very happy ......  1
fairly happy ....  2
not too happy .... 3
7. Taken altogether, how would you say things are these 
days? Would you say that you are very happy, fairly 
happy, or not too happy? very h a p p y ......  1
fairly happy ....  2
not too happy .... 3
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Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about your views on
some political issues.
8. Taking everything into consideration, would you say that 
Britain has on balance benefited or not from being a
member of the European Community?
benefit............. 1
not benefit......... 2
9. If you were to be told tomorrow that the European 
community had been scrapped would you be very sorry about 
it indifferent or relieved?
very sorry ..... 1
indifferent .... 2
relieved.........3
10. On the whole, to what extent would you say you are 
satisfied with the way democracy works in your country? 
Please use the scale on this card to indicate your 
reply. 10 means you are completely satisfied and 1 means 
you are completely disatisfied. (SHOW CARD) 
completely completely
dissatisfied satisfied
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
11. There is a lot of talk these days about what a country's 
goals should be for the next 10 or 15 years. On this 
card are listed some of the goals that different people 
say should be given top priority.
Would you please say which one you yourself consider 
most important for your country in the long run. (SHOW
CARD)
And what would be your second choice.
First Second
maintaining a high level of economic growth .. 1 1
making sure that this country has strong
defense forces ............................  2 2
seeing that people have more say about how
things are done at their jobs and in their
communities   3 3
trying to make our cities and countryside more
beautiful .................................  4 4
3 m
APPENDIX 6
QUESTIONNAIRES -- EXPERIMENT 3
CONTEXT 1
Environmental issues should be given a higher priority by 
government.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 . 5
Motorway and road building poses a great threat to the
countryside.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
New jobs should be created even if this sometimes causes 
damage to the countryside.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
There should be more financial support given to victims and 
families of victims of drink drivers.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
More rape cases should be tried by women judges.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Stricter punishment is necessary for many crimes.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Should the law allow television to show interviews with people 
who support terrorism in the UK?
SHOULD allow interviews 1
SHOULD NOT allow interviews 2
Political parties should be required to disclose their source 
of income.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Pornographic magazines and films should be freely available to 
adults.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
A simpler library system ahd greater borrowing facilities 
would help me in my studies.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
The administration at this university is often slow to get 
things done.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
- 4&0
Do you think Britain has benefited or not from being a member 
of the EC?
Not Benefited Benefited
at all a lot
1 2 3 4 5
Research into the development of biological weapons should be 
banned.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
How likely do you think it is that there will be a serious 
nuclear accident in the next 10 years?
Very Unlikely Very Likely
1 2 3 4 5
Genetic engineering research is adequately controlled. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Do you believe it's right for western cultures to impose their 
values onto other non-western cultures?
Right in Never
all cases right
1 2 3 4 5
The west should do more to help african countries where many 
of the problems stem from past western imperialism.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
The Inuit people of Greenland should be compelled to follow 
international bans on whaling, rather than be allowed to 
develop their own rules on whaling.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Do you agree or disagree with the sale of British antiquities 
abroad?
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Do you think laws protecting listed buildings should be 
strengthened?
Should be strengthened 1
Should NOT be strengthened 2
The government should provide more support for the opera. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
The lack of a vision of the future means that most 
politicians offer only short term policies.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
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Many of the problems of modern life stem from people trying
too hard to live in the past.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Moves to introduce new technologies, such as 'virtual
shopping', into daily life should be resisted.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
The government should do more to house those homeless in 
London.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
London's local councils should take more responsibility in 
housing the homeless.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Students in higher education are adequately housed.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
It is right to forbid people living in London from cutting 
down trees on their property.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
One of the most attractive features of London is its many 
parks and green squares.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
How clean a city do you think London is?
Very Clean Very Dirty
1 2 3 4 5
There should be a standard computer operating system so that 
computing is made easier for everyone.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Supermarkets save time and other resources because you can get 
most things that you want in one place.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
University courses should be based on a single textbook rather 
than lots of different readings.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Politicians should take decisions for the long term benefit of 
people, even it this sometimes means short term suffering. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
- 4&2
Teachers should encourage children to discipline themselves 
rather than delivering punishment as this is more likely to 
lead to long term self-control.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
On the whole, do you mainly try to eat food which is healthy
or food which tastes good?
Mainly Healthy Mainly Tastes good
1 2 3 4 5
CONTEXT 2
Unemployment should be given a higher priority by government. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Government should finance more projects to create new jobs. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
New jobs should be created even if this sometimes causes 
damage to the countryside.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Extra support should be given to families whose children are 
convicted of shoplifting.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
More judges from ethnic minorities should be appointed to try 
criminal cases.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Stricter punishment is necessary for many crimes.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Do you support or oppose the idea of a law against sex 
discrimination in employment, pay and so on?
Strongly oppose Strongly support
1 2 3 4 5
Political parties should favour female candidates in order to 
balance the representation of women in parliament.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Pornographic films and magazines should be freely available to 
adults.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
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The governments of Britain and Ireland should work together 
more to find a solution to problems in Northern Ireland. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
West Indian immigrants have contributed a lot to British 
culture.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Do you think Britain has benefited or not from being a member 
of the EC?
Not Benefited Benefited
at all a lot
1 2 3 4 5
Enough money is being provided for cancer research.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
How likely do you think it is that a vaccine will be developed 
for AIDS in the next 10 years?
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Genetic engineering research is adequately controlled. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
International law - under the UN - should be strengthened. 
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Sadaam Hussein should be brought to justice under 
international law.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
The Inuit people of Greenland should be compelled to follow 
international bans on whaling, rather than be allowed to 
develop their own rules about whaling.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Should the monarchy in Britain be abolished or retained? 
abolished 1
retained 2
Should the house of lords be abolished or retained? 
abolished 1
retained 2
The government should provide more support for the opera.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
-  4£4
1 2 3 4 5
The lack of an understanding of history means that most 
politicians repeat past mistakes.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Many of the problems of modern life stem from the isolation of 
individuals from the community.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Moves to introduce new technologies, such as 'virtual
shopping', into daily life should be resisted.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
The government should lower interest rates further to ease 
pressure on those paying high mortgages.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Young people should be given tax relief to assist them in 
buying their own homes.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Students in higher education are adequately housed.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Road pricing schemes should be introduced to reduce traffic 
congestion in London.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
More pedestrian zones should be created in London to reduce
the risk of accidents to pedestrians.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
How clean a city do you think London is?
Very Clean Very Dirty
1 2 3 4 5
Religious education in schools should cover all the major
religions equally.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
Do you agree or disagree with the saying ' travel broadens the 
mind'?
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
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University courses should be based on a single textbook rather 
than lots of different readings.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
The government should take care of pension provision so that 
people can get on with living rather than worry about 
tomorrow.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
It's unfair that wages should rise simply with age because 
this discriminates against young people who need money to 
enjoy themselves when they are young.
Strongly Disagree Strongly Agree
1 2 3 4 5
On the whole do you mainly try to eat food which is healthy or 
food which tastes good?
Mainly Healthy Mainly Tastes good
1 2 3 4 5
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APPENDIX 7
POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE MEASURING KNOWLEDGE, 
IMPORTANCE AND CONFLICT.
For this questionnaire the following three questions followed 
a description of each issue:
How much do you know about this issue?
1 2 3 4 5
almost a something a lot a great
nothing little deal
For you personally how important is this issue?
1 2 3 4
very important not very not at all
important important important
Would you say that your views are mostly on one side or the 
other on this issue or would you say that your views are 
mixed?
mostly on one side 1 
mixed 2
The 12 issues which preceded these three questions were:
1. Control of genetic engineering research.
2. The advantages and disadvantages of set texts for 
university courses.
3. Government policy on the availability of pornographic 
material.
4. The benefits to Britain from being a member of the EC.
5. Government support for the opera.
6. Tradeoffs between job creation and damage to the
countryside.
7. How clean London is.
8. Whaling by the Inuit people of Greenland.
9. Your own choice to eat food because it is healthy or
because it tastes good.
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10. Housing for students In higher education.
11. Criminal justice policy
12. The introduction of new technologies, such as 'virtual
shopping' into daily life.
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APPENDIX 8
PILOT QUESTIONNAIRE -- EXPERIMENT 3
HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW ABOUT THESE ISSUES 
(Please circle the appropriate response)
Trade offs between job creation and damage to the countryside.
1 2 3 4 5
almost a something a lot a great
nothing little deal
NOTE: the same scale was presented after each issue
discription
Control of genetic engineering research.
How clean London is.
The availability of pornographic material.
Britain's benefits from being a member of the EC.
Government support for the opera.
Provision of readings for your courses 
Whaling by the Inuit people of Greenland
Your choice to eat food because it is healthy or because it 
tastes good.
Housing for students in higher education 
Punishment for crimes
The introduction of new technologies, such as 'virtual 
shopping', into daily life.
HOW RELATED ARE THESE ISSUES
a. The risk of serious nuclear accidents.
b. Control of genetic engineering research.
THESE ISSUES ARE:
1 2 3 4 5
not at all a bit somewhat related very-
related related related related
NOTE: the same scale was presented after each issue pair
a. Creation of pedestrian zones in London.
b. How clean a city London is.
a. Justice under inter-national law.
b. The control of whaling by the Inuit people of Greenland
either by international whaling bans or by the Inuits 
themselves.
a. Reducing unemployment.
b. The trade off between job creation and damage to the
countryside.
a. Disclosure of sources of income by political parties.
b. The availability of pornographic material.
a. The effect of the government's interest rate policy on 
mortgage payers.
b. Housing for students in higher education.
a. The exchange of ideas at university due to the mix of 
nationalities.
b. Britain's benefits from being a member of the EC.
a. Laws protecting listed buildings.
b. Government support for the opera.
a. Government finance for job creation projects.
b. The trade off between job creation and damage to the
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countryside.
a. Lecturers encouraging students to be independent.
b. Provision of course reading.
a. Politicians repeating past mistakes because of a lack of 
understanding of history.
b. The introduction of new technologies, such as 'virtual 
shopping', into daily life.
a. Support for victims and families of victims of drink 
drivers.
b. Punishment for crimes.
a. The law banning television interviews with people who 
support acts of terrorism in the UK.
b. The availability of pornographic material.
a. The priority given to environmental issues by
government.
b. The trade off between job creation and damage to the 
countryside.
a. The strength of international law -- under the UN.
b. The control of whaling by the Inuit people of Greenland
either by international whaling bans or by the Inuits 
themselves.
a. The development of a vaccine for AIDS.
b. Control of genetic engineering research.
a. Parks and green squares in London.
b. How clean a city London is.
a. The efficiency of the administration at this university.
b. Britain's benefits from being a member of the EC.
a. The isolation of individuals from the community as a 
source of the problems of modern life.
b. The introduction of new technologies, such as 'virtual 
shopping', into daily life.
a. Provision of pensions by the government.
b. Choosing to eat food because it is healthy or because it 
tastes good.
a. Trial of rape cases by women judges.
b. Punishment for crimes.
a. The responsibility of London's local councils in 
housing the homeless.
b. Housing for students in higher education.
a. The abolition or retention of the house of lords.
b. Government support for the opera.
a. Selection of female candidates by political parties in
order to balance the representation of women in 
parliament.
b. The availability of pornographic material.
a. Road pricing schemes to reduce traffic congestion in 
London.
b. How clean a city London is.
a. Wage rises due to age as discriminating against young 
people.
b. Choosing to eat food because it is healthy or because it 
tastes good.
a. Help from the west for those african countries where 
many problems stem from past western imperialism.
b. The control of whaling by the Inuit people of Greenland
either by international whaling bans or by the Inuits 
themselves.
a. Politicians offering short term policies.
b. The introduction of new technologies, such as 'virtual 
shopping', into daily life.
a. The effects of the library system on your studies.
b. Britain's benefits from being a member of the EC.
a. Trial of criminal cases by judges from ethnic 
minorities.
b. Punishment for crimes.
a. The threat to the countryside from motorway and road 
building.
b. The trade off between job creation and damage to the 
countryside.
a. Financial support for cancer research.
b. Control of genetic engineering research.
a. The law in Britain against sex discrimination in 
employment, pay and so on.
b. The availability of pornographic material.
a. Your freedom to express your own views in essays and 
coursework.
b. Provision of course reading.
a. The right of western cultures to impose their values 
onto other non-western cultures.
b. The control of whaling by the Inuit people of Greenland
either by international whaling bans or by the Inuits 
themselves.
a. Discipline of children by encouraging self discipline or 
by delivering punishment.
b. Choosing to eat food because it is healthy or because it 
tastes good.
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a. The sale of British antiquities abroad.
b. Government support for the opera.
a. The problems of modern life as a result of people trying
too hard to live in the past.
b. The introduction of new technologies, such as 'virtual
shopping', into daily life.
a. Tax relief to assist young people in buying their own
homes.
b. Housing for students in higher education.
a. Knowledge of a foreign language as helpful in your
studies.
b. Britain's benefits from being a member of the EC.
a. Scheduling of classes and lectures.
b. Provision of course reading.
a. Support for families whose children are convicted of 
shoplifting.
b. Punishment for crimes.
a. Control of research into the development of biological 
weapons.
b. Control of genetic engineering research.
a. Government responsibility for housing those homeless in 
London.
b. Housing for students in higher education.
a. The abolition or retention of the monarchy in Britain.
b. Government support for the opera.
a. The right of people living in London to cut down trees
on their property.
b. How clean a city London is.
4 vj.4
a. Politicians making decisions for the long term benefit
of people, even if this sometimes means short term 
suffering.
b. Choosing to eat food because it is healthy or because it 
tastes good.
a. The cost of items of stationery from the university 
shop.
b. Provision of course reading.
APPENDIX 9
INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF QUESTIONNAIRE
We are interested in your opinions on a number of different 
issues. There are no right or wrong answers to these 
questions. We are interested in your opinions.
FAST INSTRUCTION
There are quite a few questions to get through, so although 
there is no set time limit, we do ask you to answer each 
question as quickly as possible. Don't spend time thinking 
about each issue.
SLOW INSTRUCTION
There are not too many questions and there is no time limit 
for answering the questions. We ask you to take your time in 
answering. Think carefully about each issue before you 
respond.
Press any key to continue
Each question will be presented in a box in the top half of 
the screen. Answer categories, or scales, for responding 
will be presented in a box in the bottom half of the screen.
Select your response from the scale presented by pressing the 
number key corresponding to your response. This will then be 
shown in a box within the answer box. You will then be asked 
to press a key to go on to the next question.
Two practice questions will be given first.
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APPENDIX 10
BREAKDOWN OF TARGET QUESTIONS BY IMPORTANCE. CONFLICT 
INDIVIDUAL KNOWLEDGE, AND EXTREMITY OF RESPONSE
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APPENDIX 11
Interactions of instruction with conflict and 
importance for GENE
Table 6.14 
Mean response to GENE by 
instruction and conflicted
Fast Slow
Mean SD N Mean SD N
one-sided 2.47 1.28 17 1.73 1.03 15
conflicted 2.48 0.97 33 2.50 0.93 33
Instructions interact with Conflict (F=6.11, sig .015)
Table 6.15 
Mean response to GENE by 
instruction and importance
Fast Slow
Mean SD N Mean SD N
important 2.13 1.23 24 2.17 1.07 29
unimportant 2.81 0.80 26 2.40 0.94 20
Instructions interact with Importance (F=4.60, sig .035).
4$9
APPENDIX 12
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN RESPONSES TO CONTEXT AND TARGET QUESTIONS 
-- EXPERIMENT 3
Questionnare Questionnaire
VARIABLE Context 1 Context 2
CLEAN
context
context
quesl
ques2
- .057
- .016
(p=.69) 
(p=.91)
.09
.33
(p=.54) 
(p=.018)
CRIME
context
context
quesl
ques2
.010
.043
(P=.95) 
(P=.77)
- .378
- .207
(P=.007) 
(P= .149)
EC
context
context
quesl
ques2
.013
.254
(P=.928) 
(P=.076)
.289
.153
(P=.042) 
(P=.294)
ENVIRONMENT 
context quesl 
context ques2
- .237
- .009
(P=.100) 
(P=.952)
.272
.348
(P=.059) 
(P=.014)
FOOD
context
context
quesl
ques2
- .055 
.195
(P=.708) 
(P=.174)
.292
.085
(P=.040) 
(P=.558)
GENE
context
context
quesl
ques2
.007 
- . 019
(P=.963) 
(P=.897)
- .028 
- .159
(P=.851) 
(P=.276)
HOUSE
context
context
quesl
ques2
- .281 
- .289
(P=.050) 
(P=.044)
- .312
- .059
(P=.031) 
(P.687)
OPERA
context
context
quesl
ques2
- .040
- .139
(P=.784) 
(P=.334)
- .049
- .036
(P=.738) 
(P=.810)
PORNOGRAPHY 
context quesl 
context ques2
- . 191
- .158
(P=.184) 
(P=.273)
- .088 
- .051
(P=.543) 
(P=.725)
TEXT
context
context
quesl
ques2
.327 
- .021
(P=.020) 
(P=.885)
- .057
- .155
(P=.693) 
(P=.282)
NEWTECH
context
context
quesl
ques2
.256
.116
(P=.073) 
(P=.424)
.063
.323
(P=.665) 
(P=.023)
WHALE
context
context
quesl
ques2
- .296
- .077
(P=.037) 
(P=.594)
- .040 
.440
(P=.784) 
(P=.001)
4&0
APPENDIX 13
MEAN ADJUSTED LATENCIES
FAST SLOW OVERALL
OPERA 1.28 1.56 1.42
CLEAN 1.26 1.66 1.46
TEXT 1.37 1.57 1.47
CRIME 1.3 8 1.71 1.55
PORNOGRAPHY 1.45 1.82 1.64
EC 1.52 1.78 1.65
HOUSE 1.58 1.75 1.67
FOOD 1.57 1.83 1.70
ENVIRONMENT 1.51 1.97 1.74
GENE 1.68 1.84 1.76
NEWTECH 1.81 2.00 1.91
WHALE 1.97 2.13 2.05
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